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Abstract 
Although most macroeconomists agree that the control of inflation may involve 
losses of output, there is no consensus about why. 
New Classical economists, focusing on the issue of credibility, have identified in- 
centive problems as important obstacles to price stability. On the contrary, many 
new Keynesians regard credibility problems as secondary. They focus on the microe- 
conomic details of wage and price adjustments as potential sources of disinflationary 
costs. 
Yet, if the costs and the benefits of anti-inflationary policy are strictly related to 
the market structure of the economy, so will be the incentives tempting the monetary 
authority to inflate. Indeed, what we show in this thesis is that the microeconomic 
aspects of wage and price setting not only affect the costs (benefits) of credible dis- 
inflationary (inflationary) policy, but that they need to be considered to determine 
whether those disinflationary (inflationary) policies can be perceived as credible or 
not. 
Despite the relevance of this problem, the economic analysis of microfoundations 
has received little attention at the time of designing efficient resolutions for the cred- 
ibility problem of monetary policy. This idea has been illustrated in different ways. 
First, Rogoff's idea of delegation does not seem very attractive, if the wage setting 
process appears to be dominated by insider workers. Moreover, we have underlined 
the difficulties that a country like Spain, with a highly distorted labour market, may 
face in fighting inflation. 
Second, interesting patterns of inflation and output behaviour may be generated 
by the interaction of both credibility problems and staggered wage setting. 
Finally, although the difficulties of implementing anti-inflationary policies are em- 
phasised in all our examples, they are particularly severe when near-rational behaviour 
or, alternatively, costs of changing prices are taken into account. 
I Introduction 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
"One need not read far in the economic literature to learn that inflation 
is ultimately a monetary phenomenon. That is, it is not easy to conceive 
of the conditions under which inflation could continue at a high level or 
could accelerate for sustained periods unless that money supply also grew 
or accelerated. The most vigorous statement of this position comes from 
monetarist economists. Some have seemed to believe that the solution to 
the problem of inflation is rather simple - instruct the monetary authority 
to control the money supply. From that point of view, monetary author- 
ities appear to be perverse or ignorant - else why haven't they done the 
right thing already? A more sophisticated approach recognises that the 
reasons for the behaviour of the monetary authority are not so obvious. " 
(Wooley (1985). ) 
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Today most macroeconomists agree that the control of inflation can be costly in 
terms of output. Still, there is no consensus about why. 
New classical economists argue that credibility problems are central to this com- 
plication, and they have identified incentive problems as important obstacles to price 
stability. If the public does not believe policy announcements for price stability, anti- 
inflationary policy will lead the economy into recession. In this fashion complicated 
formulae for central bank constitutions have been proposed in order to create the 
optimal incentives for the central banker not to inflate. 
On the contrary, many new Keynesians regard credibility problems as less impor- 
tant. They have recognised the microeconomic details of wage and price adjustments 
as potential sources of disinflationary costs. If, for example, nominal rigidities were 
important, the persistence of high (or low) inflation might be seen as a consequence 
of the partial adjustment of underlying wages and prices to new information about 
the state of the economy. In the same way, the short-run costs (benefits) of disin- 
flationary (inflationary) policy would depend upon the frictions and distortions that 
characterised the structure of the labour and goods markets. 
Yet, if the costs and the benefits of anti-inflationary policy are strictly related to 
the market structure of the economy, so will be the incentives tempting the monetary 
2 
authority to inflate. Therefore, credibility problems and wage - and price - setting 
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microfoundations cannot be easily separated when explaining the costs of disinfla- 
tionary policy. 
As an example, the departure from full rational behaviour or, alternatively, costs of 
changing prices have been held responsible for macroeconomic fluctuations in Akerlof 
and Yellen (1985). This paper is, no doubt, one of the most salient expositions 
of the new Keynesian tradition: changes in business activity can be generated by 
anticipated money supply changes, provided that some agents are willing to engage 
in near-rational behaviour. Credibility issues are not considered because the authors 
want to show that, even with perfect credibility, disinflationary policies might be 
costly. What we study in this thesis is how the microfoundations of near-rational 
behaviour affect the credibility problem of a monetary authority trying to control 
inflation. Rather than assuming perfect credibility, we show that the microeconomic 
details of wage and price setting have an extraordinary impact on the credibility 
problem suffered by the monetary authority. 
Although this analysis is worth doing regardless of whether the economy is sub- 
3 
jected to adverse shocks, it acquires special significance in the presence of supply-side 
disturbances. For example, Taylor (1980) demonstrates that, under staggered wage 
contracts, one-time shocks to the economy are capable of generating the 
type of un- 
employment persistence that has been observed during postwar 
business cycles in the 
United States. Moreover, the unemployment persistence of most European countries 
1 INTRODUCTION 
could have been partly generated by one-time shocks, if the wage setting process 
was dominated by insiders, as in Blanchard and Summers (1988). In the presence 
of adverse supply shocks, the costs of anti-inflationary policies will depend upon the 
structure of the labour market. Yet, for the same reasons, such a market structure 
will determine whether the benefits of a one-time monetary surprise are more or less 
persistent. 
Disregarding this problem and following the regulations governing the Maastricht 
Treaty, most European countries have revised their central banks constitutions in 
recent years or are in the course of doing so. For countries trying to build a reputation 
for fighting inflation, central banks have been guided towards the main objective of 
price stability. This has been so even for countries like Spain, which suffers from a 
highly distorted labour market structure. 
Those who emphasise the preferences of the policy-maker and the role of tough 
policies, as an infallible method of signalling toughness and raising credibility, do not 
seem to consider the market structure of the economy, although such a structure is 
at the core of the output costs caused by a disinflation. 
The role of external circumstances was clearly illustrated with the breakdown of 
the European Monetary System (EMS), on August Ist, 1993. With unemployment 
4 
persistence, avoiding realignments to signal the toughness of governments proved too 
1 INTRODUCTION 
costly. Policy-makers could not ignore pressures to restore high employment and the 
financial markets correctly anticipated the devaluation of the Spanish peseta, the 
Sterling pound and the Italian lira. Alternatively, France had to apply large interest 
differentials in order to control devaluation expectations. What this implies is that 
the credibility problem reflects not only the policy-maker's intention but also the state 
of the economy. 
Furthermore, as suggested by Ball (1995), building a reputation for fighting infla- 
tion will be very costly with unemployment persistence, if the public is not certain 
about the type of the policy-maker, i. e., if there is a credibility problem. Accommoda- 
tive monetary policy may put the reputation of the central bank at risk, if the public 
identifies the accommodation of the shock with a relaxation of monetary policy. 
This thesis represents an attempt to combine two elements: credibility problems 
and market structure of the economy. Chapter 2 describes the difficulties found on the 
way to European Monetary union (EMU). It also introduces the literature on the time 
consistency problem of monetary policy and the institutional arrangements which will 
characterise the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Chapter 3 considers 
5 
two important issues for European Monetary Integration: the asymmetry of policy 
making in Europe and the persistence of unemployment in European 
labour markets. 
The Spanish experience and the difficulties of the Spanish authorities for controlling 
inflation, without further pressures on unemployment, receive special attention in 
I INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents different patterns of inflation and output behaviour 
generated by the interaction of both credibility problems and staggered wage setting. 
Finally, the severe difficulties of implementing anti-inflationary policy are emphasised 
in Chapter 6, where near-rational behaviour or, alternatively, costs of changing prices 
have been taken into account. Chapter 7 concludes. 
6 
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2 The European Central Bank and the debate on delegation 
Chapter 2 
The European Central Bank and 
the debate on delegation 
2.1 Introduction 
The economic analysis of monetary policy has been dramatically reorientated after 
the rise of the time consistency literature. The main principle suggests that if, for 
example, the monetary authority is known to be concerned over output and employ- 
ment, it will have difficulties convincing the public of its well-meaning behaviour for 
controlling inflation. 
Although there is no academic consensus about how to tackle this problem, cen- 
7 
tral bank independence has emerged as a tool that might reduce this complication. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years we have witnessed an extensive number of reforms in central bank 
legislation. Since the end of the 1980's, not only the European countries immersed 
in the regulations governing the Maastricht Treaty, but also the countries outside 
the European integration process, such as New Zealand, Chile or Argentina, have 
revised their central bank constitutions, granting them more authority and guiding 
them towards the main objective of price stability. 
These proceedings, based upon the exemplary inflation record of the Bundesbank 
and upon the theoretical analysis of Rogoff (1985a), have stimulated a vigorous con- 
troversy. The reason is that, in theory, the central banker's anti-inflationary bias, 
which controls expected inflation, tends to increase the variance of output and em- 
ployment in the presence of supply-side shocks. 
In this chapter we describe in some detail two particular aspects of this dispute. 
Section 2.2 presents the proposed stages and the difficulties found along the way 
to European Monetary Union (EMU) . 
Section 2.3 outlines the institutional arrange- 
ments, which will characterise the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and 
the controversy on whether these proceedings are the right mechanism to overcome 
the so-called time consistency problem of optimal monetary policy. Section 2.4 con- 
8 
cludes. 
2.2 EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 
2.2 European Monetary Integration 
2.2.1 The blueprint 
The European Community (EC) has been aiming to achieve an economic and mone- 
tary union since 1969. ' In the years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957), 
the main achievements of the EC were the completion of the customs union and the 
establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Treaty, however, had 
no provisions for monetary arrangements, mainly because the currencies of the six 
initial member states were part of the international monetary system of fixed ex- 
change rates negotiated at Bretton Woods. Moreover, the stabilisation of exchange 
rates in the early 1960's did not imply the sacrifice of domestic targets; inflation and 
unemployment were low enough so that fiscal and monetary policies were conducted 
smoothly, and the still rudimentary capital markets gave the monetary authorities 
some scope to correct domestic disequilibria. 
In 1969, acknowledging that closer coordination of economic and monetary policies 
was necessary, the Heads of State or Government of the six initial member states - 
The European Council - expressed their wish to see the Community develop into an 
economic and monetary union through the implementation of a phased plan. A group 
of experts chaired by Pierre Werner, then Prime Minister of Luxembourg, prepared 
9 
lFor a description of European monetary integration, see Gros and Thygesen (1992). 
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the so-called Werner Plan, which was endorsed in 1971. An agreement on narrowing 
margins of fluctuation of the Community currencies, termed the snake, was reached. 
Furthermore, the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was established as 
the intended forerunner of a Community system of central banks. At that time, the 
process of monetary integration was questioned because countries could not agree on 
policies in response to the main shocks of the period: the oil crisis and the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods monetary system. 
A major initiative to relaunch monetary integration was not established until 
1979, when the European Monetary System (EMS), a system of stable but adjustable 
exchange rates, was set up. In its origin, the EMS, a political rather than economic 
initiative, was believed to be as unstable as the snake. However, after a turbulent 
start, realignments became less frequent and inflation differentials returned to the 
range known during the 1960's. 
The perceived success of the EMS, during the first ten years of its existence, 
contributed to further progress in European integration. ' As a result, the Single 
European Act, the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome, was signed in 1986. It 
reaffirmed old objectives and established additional ones, such as the achievement of 
the single market, the strengthening of economic and social cohesion, and the gradual 
2 See, for example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) for an analysis of the effective disciplinary device 
of the EMS. 
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realization of EMU. The concrete stages leading towards EMU were finally endorsed 
in the so-called Delors Committee Report, which was presented in April 1989. 
The Report proposed three stages: 
Stage One involved the completion of the single market, closer co-ordination and 
harmonisation of economic and monetary policy, and the negotiation and rati- 
fication of the Treaty amendments needed to establish EMU. 
Stage Two included the implementation of the new Treaty and was conceived as a 
transition period for the new institutional arrangement. It involves the strength- 
ening of co-ordination procedures based on multilateral surveillance, so that 
member states enter into reciprocal commitments needed to ensure financial 
stability, credibility, and final success of EMU. Furthermore, the European Sys- 
tern of Central Banks (ESCB) has now been established. 
Stage Three will consist of the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates and the transfer 
of powers for administering economic and monetary union. 
In December 1989, EC Governments convened an Inter Governmental Conference 
to prepare the changes in the Treaty of Rome required for the creation of a Central 
Bank. This Conference concluded a blueprint revision of the Treaty of Rome by 
December 1991, The Maastricht Treaty. Although the new Treaty was signed by all 
2.2 EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 12 
Community members' Heads of State or Governments at that time, it needed to be 
ratified within individual countries. According to the Treaty, countries willing to join 
the single currency area - in Stage Three - should achieve the following controversial 
set of convergence criteria: 3 
(i) A consumer price inflation rate no more than 1.5 percentage points above the 
average for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates, 
(H) average nominal long-term interest rates no more than 2 percentage points above 
those for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates, 
(iii) non-realignment of national currencies within narrow bands in the EMS, for at 
least two years before the irrevocable locking of exchange rates, and 
(iv) a sustainable government financial position, defined as a general government 
deficit to GDP ratio of less than 3 per cent, and a gross debt to GDP ratio 
of less than 60 per cent. Although these are the numbers that dominate the 
public discussion, the Treaty contains important qualifications for the budgetary 
discipline of the Member States. With respect to the issue of debt the final 
decision will take into account the following criteria: 
(a) first, whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross 
domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless either the ratio has 
3See, for example, Hughes Hallet and McAdam (1996) for an analysis of the consequences and 
importance of attempting to impose those criteria. 
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declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes 
close to the reference value, or, alternatively, unless the excess over the 
reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains 
close to the reference value; 
(b) second, whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product 
exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. 
At Maastricht, it was also agreed that, at the end of 1996, the European Council 
would have to vote, by qualified majority, on whether a majority of member 
countries satisfies the convergence criteria above, basing their decisions on a re- 
port to be given by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers. The Council 
would then decide the suitability for progressing to stage three of EMU. On the 
other hand, if the Council found it inappropriate to move forward, Stage Three 
would start on January Ist, 1999. In fact, the Madrid meeting of the Euro- 
pean Council reaffirmed, in December 1995, the commitment of the European 
Union's leaders to Monetary Union by January Ist, 1999. ' Those countries that 
had not satisfied the criteria would enjoy a special status, Members States with 
a derogation, and their situation would be periodically reviewed. 
4 See Gros (1996) for an extensive report on the most recent developments in the way towards 
EMU. 
2.2 EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 
2.2.2 In reality 
14 
In a number of European countries, under the auspices of the EMS, monetary policy 
was entirely directed at stabilising exchange rates. This strategy, named competitive 
disinflation by Fitoussi et a]. (1993), seemed infallible: in a fixed exchange rate regime, 
a country with higher inflation than its trading partners loses competitiveness; as a 
result, aggregate demand falls and unemployment goes up. Subsequently, with high 
unemployment and lower competitiveness, inflation decreases over time. Finally, in 
the long-run, improved competitiveness leads to lower unemployment. The strategy 
is virtuous: it not only delivers low inflation and a strong currency, but also full 
employM'ent and renewed competitiveness. 
The breakdown of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Mon- 
etary System at the beginning of September 1992 demonstrated how difficult it is to 
carry through the project of EMU. Following the exceptional circumstances which 
started with German re-unification, the virtuous approach proved too costly. The 
need for high German interest rates to contain domestic inflation involved a massive 
real shock to the system and unemployment rates returned to levels unknown since 
the 1930's. 
At that time, a Deutschmark (DM) real appreciation was advocated by Begg et 
al. (1990): 
5 
5 The Bundesbank had long believed that both the lira and the sterling were overvalued. See 
Marsh (1992). 
2.2 EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 
"The real DM must initially appreciate but then decline to a level lower 
than its initial position, real interest rates in Germany must exceed those 
elsewhere ... The question is whether other EMS countries should match 
the initial DM appreciation ... we believe the answer is no ... The impact 
of these changes is large immediate ... but the position will then unwind 
over a decade or more ... The case for an immediate DM realignment is 
overwhelming. " 
15 
The same authors also argued that, even in the absence of German re-unification, the 
opening of Eastern Europe economies would have led to a DM realignment against its 
EMS partners. Quite simply, the reason was that the former West Germany would 
have attracted a disproportionate share of demand from the East. ' Indeed, unsustain- 
able high interest rates forced Britain and Italy to leave the ERM. Furthermore, the 
Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo had to be devaluated; Denmark, France 
and Ireland saw their currencies seriously threatened; Finland, Norway and Sweden 
had to remove their unilateral pegs to the ERM. 
6The greatest evidence of the professional consensus on the fragility of the system is probably 
supplied by Portes (1993). 
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Table 2.1: Convergence Criteria - European Community. 
Inflation Interest rates Govt. net borrowing (*) Public Debt (*) 
Objectives 3.0 10.4 3.0 60.0 
EC 15 3.0 8.1 3.1ý 71-3ý 
Belgium 1.6 7.9 3-5T 130-0ý 
Denmark 2.2 8.6 0.5ý 70-5ý 
Germany 2.2 7.1 2.4ý 59-3ý 
Greece 9.9 18.4 7-3ý 113-1ý 
Spain 4.7 11.5 3-6ý 65.4ý 
France 1.7 7.8 2.9ý 54.2t 
Ireland 2.6 8.5 1-3ý 76-9ý 
Italy 4.7 12.3 5.2ý 122-3ý 
Luxembourg 2.1 6.2 - 0.7ý 6-8T 
Holland 2.2 7.2 2.7ý 77-8ý 
Portugal 4.2 11.7 4.7ý 70-9ý 
United Kingdom 3.3 8.4 3.7ý 53.2ý 
Austria 2.5 7.3 5-0ý 71.5T 
Sweden 2.6 10.7 4.5ý 79-8ý 
Finland 1.3 9.4 1.5ý 64.5ý 
Source: Banco Central Hispano, November 24th, 1995 
Inflation: Private consumption deflator. 
Govt. net borrowing: In % of GDP. 
(*) Forecast 1997, T Trend upwards, ý Trend downwards. 
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After a year of turmoil in the EMS, the currency crisis was brought to an end 
only when the EMS was radically reformed and loosened its rules. On August Ist, 
1993, the currencies that remained in the system were allowed to fluctuate by ± 15% 
from their central parities, in contrast with the previous limit of ± 2.25%. For many 
months the breadth of the fluctuation bands brought relative tranquility to the EMS. 
But the spectre of a new crisis was raised when, in an apparent consequence of the 
2.2 EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 
17 
Mexican crisis, the peseta and the escudo suffered from a devaluation on March 7th, 
1995. 
Since then, after a period of introspection, Europe's federal illusions have followed 
a different path. Politicians seem to talk about widening the Community, rather than 
deepening it. In fact, Austria, Finland and Sweden, countries which have negotiated 
their integration into the EMU recently, present a relative advantage with respect 
to other countries of the EC. The securing of a majority of countries (nine out of 
fifteen), which satisfied the convergence criteria described above, might be facilitated 
by the incorporation of these three countries. Such an event would necessarily mean 
a second speed for those countries less favourably placed. 
Although it is unclear what is going to happen on January 1st, 19997) most Euro- 
pean countries, when making decisions on monetary and fiscal policy, give top priority 
to their qualification for EMU. From an economic perspective, such a qualification, 
as described in the convergence criteria above, will be based mainly on nominal prin- 
ciples. The achievement of low inflation, low long-term interest rates, and the pursuit 
of sound fiscal policy are now at the top of the political agenda, despite high levels of 
European unemployment. This reflects the discomfort of an alleged credibility prob- 
lem, suffered by most European countries and which might complicate the German 
7While the attainment of the convergence criteria remains to be seen, so does the political will- 
ingness to move towards Stage Three of EMU. 
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decision on surrendering the very reliable Deutschmark. 
If the opening of Stage Three of EMU effectively implies the transfer of monetary 
policy to a supra-national institution, it is easy to envisage the German concern over 
the delegation of monetary policy to an institution other than the Bundesbank. Yet, 
which are the features making the Bundesbank the most envied European central 
bank? Why should central banks across Europe and, in particular, the ESCB try to 
duplicate the institutional design of their German counterpart? We turn to this issue 
in the next section. 
2.3 The ESCB 
2.3.1 The ESCB's solution to the time consistency problem 
Kydland and Prescott's (1977) seminal work, showing that optimal macroeconomic 
policies could be dynamically inconsistent, has resulted in the reorientation of mone- 
tary policy analysis. Incentive problems have been recognised as important obstacles 
to price stability; efforts intending to depoliticise monetary authorities have been 
seriously undertaken. 
The basic premise is that monetary policy-making can be viewed as an agency 
problem between society and the monetary authority. The public 
interest is to achieve 
2.3 THE ESCB 19 
low inflation and to stabilise output and employment around certain socially desired 
levels. It is then assumed that, because of special characteristics of the labour mar- 
ket, the monetary authority has the incentive to affect the real economic activity in 
the short-run. Hence, controlling inflation is not a credible policy, if the government 
is known to care about oUtpUt. 8 But rational expectations affect price dynamics, 
because prices cannot fully and instantaneously react to current information. Gov- 
ernments who wish only to stop inflation cannot easily persuade the public of this 
fact, and therefore induce severe protracted recessions when they try it. 
The possibility that the government might establish a reputation for fighting 
against inflation in an infinitely repeated game has been explored, by Barro and Gor- 
don (1983). The central feature of the model is the punishment strategy implemented 
by the private sector once the government has deviated from the socially optimal equi- 
librium. However, this strategy is arbitrary and there will be multiple Nash equilibria 
depending on the form in which this punishment is actually implemented. 
Backus and Driffill (1985) examine a case for uncertainty, where the public does 
not know which type of government behaviour it faces, i. e., whether or not the gov- 
ernment is committed to pursuing a zero inflation policy. In this case, applying the 
concept of sequentially rational equilibria, given a sufficiently long time horizon and a 
81ncentives to inflate may arise from revenue motives, financial stability considerations or directly 
from the nature of monetary institutions. 
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non-zero initial reputation for fighting against inflation, there might be an equilibrium 
with zero inflation. 
Although both of these concepts of reputation have been criticised9, they capture 
interesting elements of what reputation means in practice. Barro and Gordon (1983) 
capture the idea that a central bank, whose preferences are well-known, can improve 
social welfare, in an infinitely repeated game, by acting in its long-term interest. 
Backus and Driffill. (1985), however, assume that the central bank's preferences are 
unknown and show how proper behaviour can engender a favourable reputation. This 
last work is particularly relevant to European countries and to the composition of the 
ESCB, for it incorporates the prior belief notion representing the central bank's initial 
reputation. 
Although there is no single panacea for price instability, central bank independence 
has emerged as a factor which itself improves monetary behaviour. An institution 
which is fundamentally free from political constraints would not make opportunistic 
use of monetary policy, and it would enjoy the credibility that the policy-maker lacks. 
In this sense, stylised institutional design tending to grant partial independence to a 
conservatme central banker, who places a higher weight on inflation than the policy- 
maker, has been suggested by Rogoff (1985a). This paper (mainly written when 
9Punishing strategies are an equilibrium only when all members of the public choose to follow 
them. These strategies, therefore, require some degree of coordination among the members of the 
public. Conceiving of a mechanism that would bring people together is, 
however, difficult. 
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its author was working for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve of the 
USA) explains the value of delegating policy to an agency, known to be more anti- 
inflationary than the government itself, as a credible method of reducing expected 
inflation. 'o 
Rogoff, however, is careful to qualify the point in several important respects. He 
observes, for example, that unqualified delegation is inferior to first-best policies aimed 
at eliminating the distortions tempting monetary policy makers to inflate; and that it 
is also inferior to second-best policies consisting of appropriate innovation- contingent 
feedback rules. " Indeed, Rogoff notes that the anti-inflationary bias, which checks 
expected inflation, has a tendency to raise the variance of output and employment in 
the face of supply shocks, such as a rise in the price of imported oil. Choosing the 
ideal central banker, therefore, involves balancing gains on the anti-inflationary front 
against losses of flexibility in handling such supply-side shocks. 
When supply-side shocks are considered, however, given that the policy-maker 
would like to retain the flexibility to employ monetary instruments to stabilise em- 
ployment and output, a dominating institution would be such that the policy-maker 
retai ns the option to override the central bank's decision. In this way a non-linear 
policy rule could be implemented so that for large shocks to output, the central 
1OSee Cukierman (1992) for an extensive study on the value of delegation. 
"There are no standard reasons to explain why such state contingent rules cannot be enforced, 
but it is generally agreed that the difficulty to observe the realization of shocks, and the problems 
of specifying a complete range of rules to follow under all contingencies, make such rules infeasible. 
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bank would accommodate the policy demands. This conclusion has been reached by 
Lohmann (1992), who discusses the idea of qualified delegation, where the authori- 
ties can (at a cost) override the central bank. This is the case with the Netherlands 
Bank. As described in The Economist (1990), the Bank conducts its own monetary 
policy in normal circumstances. But, if the Dutch Government exercises its overriding 
power and the Bank objects, the Bank's case as well as the Government's need to be 
published. The prospect of a parliamentary motion of no confidence, that will force 
either the Government or the Central Bank's Governor to resign, has prevented this 
happening. 
More flexible institutional arrangement than the simpler unqualified delegation to 
an anti-inflationary central bank has been also proposed by Flood and Isard (1989). 
These authors analyse the implementation of simple rules with escape-clauses where 
supply shocks turn out to be large. However, in all of these cases, a trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility still remains. If the central bank cannot optimally offset ad- 
verse supply shocks, delegation to a conservative central banker can only be proposed 
as a third-best policy. 
more promising way of creating the optimal incentives for the central 
banker, 
by choosing a central banker with perverse preferences, has 
been suggested in Persson 
and Tabellini (1990). In particular, the ideal output - alternatively, employment - 
targeting regime, which eliminated the output distortions tempting the monetary 
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authority to inflate, would solve the credibility problem of the optimal monetary 
policy. 
The role of private information in monetary policy games was first studied in 
Canzoneri (1985). Without private information, resolutions of the credibility prob- 
lem would be too easy to come by. In the absence of central bank private information, 
the public can always tell when the monetary institution has been honest or what 
the policy-maker's true preferences are, so that these monetary games cannot be re- 
garded as a serious universal problem. Besides, these models do not help to explain 
the episodic periods of credibility breakdowns and bouts of inflation that are actually 
observed. As pointed out in Canzoneri (1985), the credibility problem of the mone- 
tary institution is a real problem only in the presence of private information. If the 
central banker's adherence to the ideal policy rule cannot be verified directly, efficient 
resolutions of the credibility problem will be much more difficult to find. 
Fratianni and Huang (1995), based on a synthesis of Canzoneri (1985) and Ro- 
goff (1985a), demonstrate that reputation alone cannot solve the time inconsistency 
problem of monetary policy. Most importantly, they show that, in an environment of 
private information, reputation can substitute for conservativeness. This result has 
special significance. Central banks with a good reputation, such as the Bundesbank, 
can afford to be less conservative than central banks with a worse reputation There- 
fore, the central bank gains from extra flexibility in output stabilisation. A similar 
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argument can be found in Lockwood et a]. (1995). Based upon reputational building 
factors a la Barro and Gordon (1983), they consider delegation to a central bank that 
is both more far-sighted and more conservative than the government. Even with- 
out asymmetric information, extending Rogoff's model to take account of reputation 
could improve social welfare if the central bank has incentives for building a repu- 
tation against inflation. Although the central bank cannot achieve the government's 
precommitment rule, it still pays the government to free ride on the central bank's 
superior ability to maintain a reputation. Once again, society gains from extra flexi- 
bility in output stabilisation, as delegation to far-sighted central banks is a substitute 
for Rogoff's delegation to a conservative central banker. 
Agenda theory and contractual design have been used by Persson and Tabellini (1993), 
Fratianni et aL (1993) and Walsh (1995) to obtain a solution to this problem that elim- 
inates the inflationary bias of discretionary policy, while still ensuring that inflation 
responds optimally to aggregate supply shocks. In standard monetary policy games, 
where the inflationary bias is constant across states of nature, an incentive contract 
that internalises the cost of higher expected inflation - thus, raising the marginal cost 
of inflation - could deliver the optimal state-contingent policy. 
Although the feasibil- 
ity of implementing any incentive contract is discussed in 
depth - the most obvious 
problem being that they are not renegotiation proof -, these authors 
have suggested 
the following: (a) making the central bank's budget or the income of the central 
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bank Governor contingent on the state of the economy, and (b) a dismissal threat, if 
inflation exceeds a critical value. This is the case of the New Zealand Reserve Bank 
Act of 1989, which includes publicly announced conditions under which the central 
banker may be fired. But, as pointed out in Lockwood et a]. (1995), governments do 
not hire central bank Governors on performance contracts of the type required by the 
theory. In fact, performance contracts, such as New Zealand's, bear little resemblance 
to those suggested in the literature. 12 
An additional difficulty arises in models where the optimal incentive contract is 
state-contingent. For instance, in models with output persistence, the incentive con- 
tract approach clearly shifts the problem for designing central bank rules that capture 
a complete range of states of nature to writing an incentive contract with, for example, 
an equally large number of incomes for the central bank Governor. Since there is no 
reason why the latter should be easier to establish, Herrenclorf (1995) has suggested 
a combined solution of delegation to a conservative central bank with a feasible, opti- 
mal designed contract as a powerful mechanism to overcome the credibility problem 
in these cases. 
Finally, the most recent proposal to pick up the ideal central banker's preferences 
can be found in Svensson (1995). An inflation target conservative central bank, with 
an inflation target equal to the difference between the socially desired inflation rate 
12See Fischer (1995) for a description of the New Zealand's experience. 
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and the inflationary bias, dominates the Rogoff's weight conservative central banker 
and delivers the precommitment outcome, in a model without output /employment 
persistence. However, in the presence of persistence, a combination of an optimal 
state contingent inflation target and a weight conservative central bank is required 
to achieve the second-best solution. In a parallel study, the need to combine inflation 
target regimes or inflation contracts with the appointment of a Rogoff-type conser- 
vative central bank has been also advocated by Muscatelli (1996). In the presence 
of uncertainty about the central bank's preferences, a combination of both inflation 
contracts (alternatively, inflation targets) and a weight conservative central banker, 
though inferior to second-best policies, will be desirable. 
Solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy becomes, somehow, 
more controversial if, as in Herrendorf and Lockwood (1996), we allow for private 
information on the side of wage setters. If the delegation decision of the government 
cannot be made st at e- contingent on the private information of wage setters, a com- 
bination of an appropriate choice of either employment /output targets or a linear 
inflation contract and a weight conservative central banker is optimal. Although the 
government can no longer achieve the optimal precommitment rule, supplementing 
weight conservatism with alternative ways of choosing optimal preferences dominates 
Rogoff's suggestion of appointing only a weight conservative central banker. 
In summary, private information and output persistence should be viewed as tech- 
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nological constraints at the time of designing efficient resolutions of the credibilitý, I 
problem. It is most likely that the delivery of optimal monetary policy, which controls 
expected inflation but allows for optimal output stabilisation, is not uniquely deter- 
mined. It also appears to combine several of the alternative delegation instruments 
suggested in the literature. The resolution of the credibility problem is, therefore, a 
matter that deserves further attention. 
In particular, the empirical work on central bank independence should be carefully 
revised. There is a consensus in the empirical literature on central bank independence, 
that Rogoff's caveat on delegation does not hold. " In other words, while central bank 
independence reduces the level and the variability of inflation, it does not have any 
impact on real economic performance. This observation suggests that the inflation 
benefits of central bank independence are likely to outweight the output and employ- 
ment, losses. But independence is not the same as conservativeness. The literature 
referred to above suggests that reputation for fighting inflation, such as the Bundes- 
bank's, is a substitute for conservativeness. Furthermore, linear inflation contracts or, 
alternatively, inflation/ output targets can complement the central bank's weight con- 
servativeness, so as to allow for more output stabilisation. Hence, if distinguishable 
delegation instruments deliver different outcomes, it is imperative that the empirical 
literature also discriminates among them. 
13See, for example, Alesina and Summers (1993) and Cukierman (1994). 
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Moreover, goods and labour market structure across countries 'should be incor- 
porated into the empirical work, in order to account for the dangers of delegation. 
Waller (1992) analyses how the heterogeneity of market structure affects the equilib- 
rium inflation rates and the choice of a conservative central banker a la Rogoff. In 
our opinion, the latter problem has received very little attention . 
14 Besides, with het- 
erogeneity of market structure across Europe, countries will disagree on the optimal 
trade-off between output stability and inflation stability. Despite their importance, 
these matters were widely disregarded at the time of designing the institutional ar- 
rangements for the ESCB. The ESCB's statutory provisions are the issue to which 
we turn in the next section. 
2.3.2 The ESCB's statutes 
A single currency implies a single monetary policy. In this sense, the creation of a 
monetary institution, to which countries delegate monetary policy, constitutes one of 
the most polemical tasks in the process of European integration. 
The monetary authority conceived for the EMU is the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). The ESCB is composed of a European Central Bank (ECB) and of 
national central banks, and the governing bodies are the Governing Council and the 
"In the following chapters, we consider some of the special characteristics of market structure, so 
as to analyse their implications for the credibility problem. 
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Executive Board. The Executive Board, which includes the Governor of the ESCB 
and comprises six members, is appointed by the European Council. The Governors 
of the national central banks, chosen within individual countries, and the Executive 
Board constitute the Governing Council. 
If it is true that, Citizens need to be protected from their own Governments as 
much as from muggers and invading armies (The Economist, February 10th, 1990. ), 
the legal structure of the ESCB may be of great importance. In his Re-flections 
on the proposed statutes of the European Central Bank, Alberto Giovannini (1993) 
has compared the proposed European System with those currently in the USA and 
Germany. From a literal interpretation of the statutes, he concludes: 
"Given the limited political importance of the European parliament, and 
given its inability of affecting any of the regulations concerning the Eu- 
ropean System of Central Banks (ESCB), it appears that the ESCB for- 
mally enjoys more independence than the other two institutions. This 
impression is confirmed by the sheer number of articles that appear to 
be expressly devoted to guard it from political pressures emanating from 
national governments or any other entities. " (Giovannini, (1993), p. 11. ) 
Political independence implies that members of central bank Boards must be free 
from Government pressure when choosing monetary policy, i. e., the central banker 
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must be goal independent. Political independence is, therefore, intended to avoid the 
governmental decision in setting certain targets for the central banker, who is then 
penalized for non-attainment of these. To some extent, this concerns the procedures 
for appointing and dismissing Board members. The proposed statute of the ESCB 
designates an eight year term for the Governor and the other members of the Executive 
Board - the same as the Bundesbank. Governors of national central banks will be 
elected for a minimum term of five years, depending on national regulations. Such a 
long-term of office will help to impede sudden dismissals of the officials and, as the 
price stability objective is explicitly mentioned in the statutes, the ESCB is likely to 
enjoy a high degree of independence. 
Economic independence refers to the ability of the ESCB to use optimal monetary 
instruments to achieve its monetary policy objectives. Instrument independence in- 
cludes restrictions on financial government spending and on government's interference 
with daily policy-making. This reflects a general tendency to separate monetary and 
fiscal authorities. 
One of the main weaknesses of the ESCB has been stressed by Goodfriend (1983), 
who has expressed concern over the excessive decentralisation in the Governing Coun- 
cil, the policy-making body of the ECB. Following the spirit of the Early 
Open Market 
Committee of the Federal Reserve, the highly decentralised Governing Council seems 
to be lacking in a preeminent personality able to provide coherent and decisive pol- 
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icy. This could affect the ECB's ability to deliver stable prices. National central 
bank Governors - regional representatives of national interest - could easily outvote 
the six Executive Board members, and national political pressures might produce a 
majority in favour of inflationary monetary policy. The incentives to pursue loose 
monetary policy might be reinforced by the potential revenue from seignorage and 
the well-known expansionary effects of monetary policy coordination. 15 
Finally, the fundamental disadvantage of independence, the costs in terms of ac- 
countability, needs to be resolved. The statutes of the ESCB specify the need for an 
annual report which subjects the central bank's activities to the scrutiny of European 
Parliament. 
The planned structure of the ESCB doubtless owes more to the perceived lessons 
of historical experience than to the published papers of academics. As for where the 
proposed European statutes stand on the issue of rules versus discretion, 
"it is widely believed that in this, as in many other aspects,... the [revised] 
Treaty of Rome [has] copied the Bundesbank Act. Rather than imposing 
on the bank a fixed rule, these statutes assign it an objective 
(albeit 
vaguely worded): safeguarding the currency and price stability. 
They 
then give it substantial independence in pursuing that single objective, 
15See Rogoff (1985b). 
2.3 THE ESCB 32 
and subordinate all other activities to it" (Giovannini, (1993), p. 11. ) 
Given that a central bank may be given a substantial degree of independence, 
the issue of how the delegated power should best be exercised is obviously of great 
importance. The provisions guaranteeing independence are certainly designed to 
allow a conservative central banker to operate efficiently. But, in Giovannini's view, 
in some respects the statutes of the ESCB outperform Rogoff: 
"By making the Central Bank independent, limiting its objective to price 
stability, and, more importantly, cutting linkages between monetary policy 
and the financing of budget deficits and, at the same time, providing 
procedures to stem the build up of large government debts, the revision 
of the Treaty of Rome could ... eliminate the incentives that monetary 
authorities have to systematically affect real economic activity beyond its 
natural rate" (Giovannini, (1992) p. 15). 
In Giovannini's eyes, therefore, the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty may well have 
removed the inflationary bias from time consistent monetary policy, so the second-best 
outcome discussed above might be achieved. If this is true, however, then there is no 
need for any conservative bias. Monetary policy should be able to respond fully to 
temporary shocks without triggering expectations of persistent inflation. 
But the Treaty also legislates for the objectives of policy and gives primacy to 
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price stability; indeed, the ordering of objectives appears to be lexicographic - other 
objectives can only be pursued once price stability has been achieved. No trade-off is 
permitted. Such a stern anti-inflationary bias is, as indicated, actually unnecessary, 
if the Treaty has really solved the incentive problem; and even if it has not, the bias 
seems excessive in the light of Rogoff's analysis. 
2.4 Conclusions 
After years of evident enthusiasm, the journey towards greater European monetary 
integration appears to have reached an impasse. Since the beginning of the 1990's 
the sensational increase in unemployment rates across European countries has divided 
the economic profession and the political class. 
The supporters of the Maastricht orthodoxy have insisted that price stability and 
sound fiscal policy should be followed. These recomendations have been bitterly 
criticized by those economists Nvho perceive the formidable European unemployment 
rates as frightening losses of human lives. For governments trying to build a reputation 
for fighting inflation, the sacrifice in terms of employment losses is believed to be worth 
paying in the long-run. 
But countries across Europe may have to bear different losses when implementing 
anti-inflationary policies. The reason is that the heterogeneity of market structure 
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across Europe seems to lead to different optimal feedback rules. Therefore, convincing 
the public about the government's well-meaning behaviour will prove very costly for 
countries like Spain, with a highly distorted market structure. According to the 
literature referred to above, further complications seem to arise also with imperfect 
information, as solutions to the time inconsistency problem imply a combination of 
parameters rather than a more simplistic notion of delegation. Finally, the delegation 
of monetary policy to a too conservative supra-national central bank has been subject 
of speculation. In this scenario, the debate over how the ESCB's delegated power 
should best be exercised has been heated, and the dispute continues. 
3 Hysteresis: The consequences of persistent unemployment 
Chapter 3 
Hysteresli. s* * The consequences of 
0 
persistent unemployment 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers two important issues for European ý, Nlonetary Integration, 
which must be taken into account when one considers the merits of delegation. The 
first of these is the asymmetry of policy-making in Europe, and the second is the 
persistence of unemployment in European labour markets. 
3.5 
The asymmetry arises from the fact that monetary policy decisions in the EMS are 
effectively delegated to a national central bank, the Bundesbank, even though it has 
no constitutional obligations to concern itself with European matters. This exposes 
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the system to particular strains in the face of shocks not common to all members of 
the EMS, as shown in Section 3.2 of this chapter. 
The serial correlation or persistence of unemployment has been described, for ex- 
ample, by Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994). Section 3.3.1 presents a diagramatic 
interpretation of how the persistence of unemployment will affect the sort of mone- 
tary policy which is appropriate in the face of supply-side shocks. The rest of the 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.3.2 describes the basic model; Section 3.3.3 
shows that, as the benefits of accommodating supply-side shocks rise sharply with 
the high degree of hysteresis that characterises the European labour markets, rigidly 
anti-inflationary policy seems inappropriate; and Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2 Asymmetry of decision making in Europe 
The case for delegating monetary policy is normally discussed in the context of a single 
country, where policy discretion passes from central government to an independent 
national agency. But in the context of the European debate, delegation has involved 
transferring policy discretion across national frontiers, since belonging to the ERM 
with narrow bands means de facto accepting monetary policy decisions made 
by the 
Bundesbank in pursuit of its own national objectives. 
In this context, a key assumption of the Rogoff model - that there will be no 
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adverse effects from shocks to aggregate demand - fails to apply to countries other 
than Germany. With asymmetry of decision-making, the core or centre country sets 
European monetary policy to stabilise its own economy, without regard to conditions 
in the periphery. But in the face of idiosyncratic supply shocks, this may involve 
impostng demand shocks on periphery countries. This can be illustrated graphically 
as follows. 
In Figure 3.1, S= S* represents the Short-Run Aggregate Supply in both the 
centre country (denoted by asterisk) and the periphery. (Note that we plot inflation 
7T) 7T* on the vertical axis and output, measured as the percentage deviation from 
equilibrium, on the horizontal axis. ) Let there be an idiosyncratic adverse shook in 
the centre country, which shifts its supply curve S* up to S, *,. If the centre country 
acts so as to completely stabilise its price level, then output there must contract from 
E to A. But reducing demand in the centre country so that it becomes in line with 
supply requires that the relative price of its products should be higher than in the 
periphery. Assuming a fixed exchange rate and stable prices in the centre country, 
the only way to achieve this is for monetary policy to be tightened sufficiently so as 
to force prices down in the periphery. As shown in the figure, this can be achieved by 
a leftward shift in Aggregate Demand from D to D', leading to equilibria of A in the 
centre country and B in the periphery, so the anti-inflationary policy of the centre 
3.2 ASYMMETRY OF DECISION MAKING IN EUROPE 
country imposes a recession on the periphery. ' 
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Figure 3.1 may be something of a caricature, but it captures some features of 
the situation in Europe since 1990 - when Germany suffered a negative productivity 
shock on unification. 
Inflation 
supply 
Output: 
Figure 3.1: How a supply shock in the Core becomes a demand shock in the Periphery. 
The restrictive monetary policy emanating from Germany has led to such contrac- 
'See Appendix A-1 for further details on the algebra of this result. 
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tion elsewhere that the tight currency links have had to be temporarily suspended 
- as countries have realigned, floated or settled for very wide bands. By responding 
in this way, Germany's partners have essentially revoted the delegation of monetary 
policy to the Bundesbank. 
It might, of course, be argued that all this is soon to be suPerseded. Under the 
Maastricht treaty there will be no asymmetry - as the European Central Bank does 
not, in principle, represent any one country. But, is it really plausible that German 
monetary leadership in Europe will disappear in the near future? Surely Germany will 
only go along with the Maastricht provisions if they allow her to continue pursuing the 
objectives of German monetary policy (as would be the case in a two speed Europe, 
where the DM bloc moved promptly to achieve monetary union). 
The problems that asymmetric supply shocks pose for the Maastricht arrange- 
ments have also been answered in a number of papers. It is widely understood that, 
in the case where disturbances are distributed asymmetrically across the countries, 
there will be a need for an asymmetric policy. Mundell (1961), the precursor of the 
optimal currency areas theory, considered this problem and noted that an optimal 
currency area is one in which differential demand shocks vis -a- vis other currency 
blocks are relatively frequent, but within which they are infrequent. The need to 
accommodate the German re-unification shock has provided new arguments for and 
against the suitability of EMU. But, if the fall of the wall can be considered as a once 
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in a lifetime shock, it becomes necessary to discuss more carefully the direction from 
which new idiosyncratic shocks are likely to come. 
Bayourni and Eichengreen (1992a) provide empirical analysis that reveals a sharp 
difference between the countries at the centre of the EC, - the core: Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, - and the periphery Greece, Ireland , Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. 
A core of EC members experience smaller, highly correlated aggregate supply 
disturbances than the members of the EC periphery. There is also some evidence that 
demand disturbances are more highly correlated across the core. In order to weight the 
magnitude of the difference between the EC members, these authors use the United 
States (US) monetary union as a standard of comparison. Shocks to the US show 
considerably more coherence than shocks to the analogous European regions. The 
same can be said about the size and speed of adjustment to shocks. Furthermore, in a 
subsequent study, Bayourni and Eichengreen (1992b) follow the same methodology in 
order to discuss the case for EMU participation of EFTA countries. They find that, 
although Austria, Switzerland and Sweden belong with the EC core, the same does 
not apply to Finland, Iceland and Norway, countries which remain in the periphery. 
Hence, the PolicY imPlication is that EC countries may find it difficult or, at least, 
costly to operate in a monetary union. 
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The theory of optimum currency areas has also established that, -if labour and 
capital can move freely among the regions of the union, adjustment to some kind 
of economic shocks can be less harmful. The work by De Grauwe and Vanhaver- 
beke (1991) in this area is illuminating. The difference in the intensity of interre- 
gional mobility of labour between the South and the North of Europe is surprising. 
Although regional differences in per capita income tend to be higher in the South 
than in the North, Northern Europe exhibits a relatively larger regional mobility of 
labour than does Southern Europe. Between countries of the EC, labour seems to be 
relatively immobile. 
Another way of maintaining a monetary union without real imbalances is fiscal 
federalism, i. e., a redistribution through an insurance scheme from favoured shocked 
to adversely shocked regions. Here the original analysis of Sachs and Sala -i- Mar- 
tin (1992) is quite relevant. Once again, the US fiscal system appears to play an 
important role on the stabilisation process of the union by offsetting about a third of 
a decline in regional personal incomes relative to the national average. 
2 In a parallel 
way, the existing European tax system on regional income suggests that a one 
dollar 
shock to regional GDP would reduce tax payments to the EC Government by half 
a cent. Hence, Europe should seriously consider the need for improving the actual 
insurance scheme. 
'Gros (1996) mentions further research by Goodhart and Smith (1993) and Pisani-Ferry, 
Italianer 
and Lescure (1993), which results in lower but still significant estimates. 
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In summary, as noted by Alesina and Grilli (1992), 
"in a situation where the EEC is not completely unified economically and 
politically, different countries may have substantially different preferences 
over the conduct of monetary policy. For example, ... countries at the 
periphery of Europe, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal may have to 
pay the highest costs of giving up their monetary independence" (Alesina 
and Grilli, p-69. ) 
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Furthermore, as Vittorio Grilli emphasised in his presentation in the Royal Eco- 
nomic Society meeting at York, April 1993, the problems for periphery countries will 
be exacerbated if the moves to EMU are sequential because in this case, the first 
movers will have the advantage of setting the rules of the game in their own interest. 
3.3 Output persistence and delegation 
3.3.1 A diagrammatic interpretation 
In this section of the paper we first use aggregate supply and demand analysis to illus- 
trate how optimal policy must strike a compromise between a short anti-inflationary 
bias (which helps to stabilise prices) and a flexible approach to price changes (as 
needed to stabilise output given supply shocks); then discuss how employment per- 
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sistence (due to an asymmetry in market power between insiders and outsiders) can 
dramatically increase the consequences of policy inflexibility. (For simplicity we only 
consider the special case of hysteresis here, but the algebraic analysis that follows 
deals with varying degrees of persistence. ) 
The top panel of Figure 3.2 contains two Aggregate Supply schedules (showing 
the marginal cost of producing output at a given money wage but with different levels 
of productivity) and a reaction function ABF, defined by the tangency of the social 
indifference curves to successive supply schedules. (While output y is measured in 
levels, prices are measured in logs, so pt - pt-1 measures the rate of inflation, and the 
indifference curves show the tradeoff between inflation and - losses of - output). In 
the lower panel, where n denotes the level of employment and w -p the log of the real 
wage, one finds the labour market, with the demand for labour DL and the supply 
(in the absence of productivity shocks) SL defining market equilibrium at f2.3 
Following Rogoff, however, we assume that some factor such as income taxation or 
unemployment insurance distorts the labor-leisure decision and causes the market de- 
termined level of employment to lie below the socially optimal level, (Rogoff (1985a), 
p. 1173). The undistorted labour supply is shown as §L in the figure, and it intersects 
DL at A, which defines ii, the socially optimal level. Output levels marked 9 and ý 
3Given declining marginal productivity of labour, y=f (n) is not a linear function of n; so strictly 
y and n are not commensurate. Locally, near Tz, however, they are, with dy ýz-, f'(i! )dn. 
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likewise denote market and social equilibria. Because the government is known to 
care about the shortfall of y below ý, this imparts an inflationary bias to demand 
management; point B in the upper panel shows specifically how the government is 
tempted to raise prices in order to stimulate output. With rational expectations, 
however, money wages will incorporate this inflation forecast at the market equilib- 
rium, shown at B in the lower panel. The extent of this inflation bias clearly depends 
on the slope of the reaction function AB: if the government was believed to be more 
concerned about inflation (flatter AB), expected inflation would fall. The idea of 
delegation to an agency with preferences known to be more conservative than the 
government seems to be endorsed. 
Consider now the impact of an adverse productivity shock which reduces the de- 
mand for labour schedule DL to D'L and shifts the aggregate supply curve upwards 
from AS to AS'. Given that money wages cannot immediately adjust to current infla- 
tion and supply-side shocks, the short-run equilibrium depends upon the government's 
reaction function. Assuming that the government observes the supply shock and is 
free to adjust the aggregate demand so as to do the best it can in the circumstances 
(and that its reaction function remains unchanged), the short-run equilibrium occurs 
at F, which corresponds to a lower level of employment and output and higher 
level 
of prices, i. e., there is stagflation. Note that the unanticipated increase 
in the price 
level ensures a decrease in the real wage, so the impact of the negative pro uct vity 
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shock on employment is partly cushioned; and that (for simplicity) we have assumed 
no change in ý, the target level of output, in response to the fall in productivity. 
If policy were delegated to an ultra- conservative monetary authority responsible 
for price stability (characterised by a horizontal reaction function), the fall of output 
and employment would be more pronounced than shown so far. Preventing any 
increase in prices, by applying a contractionary monetary policy, would eliminate 
the short-run shock absorber of the economy, and with real wages kept constant, 
employment and output would be at point C. It is, of course, because of the need 
for some flexibility to respond to supply shocks, that Rogoff (1985a) concludes that 
the weight the central banker puts on inflation should not be infinitely greater thqn- 
society's weighting. 
In Rogoff's analysis, however, the end of the supply shock would enable a prompt 
return to the initial equilibrium at 9. Following the traditional approach, he assumes 
that the wage is unilaterally fixed by the workers, in advance of the realization of the 
shocks affecting labour demand and supply. But this will not be true if there is per- 
sistence as, for example, in the paper of Alogoskoufis, Lockwood and Philippopoulos 
(1992), hereafter ALp. 4 Following Blanchard and Summers (1986,1988) and Lind- 
beck and Snower (1986), ALP assume that nominal wages are set by insZders, who 
aim to achieve an employment target which is a weighted average of 
the labour force 
4 See also Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994). 
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and those actually in employment when the contract is drawn up, with weights of 
I-A and A respectively, 1>A>0: 
4C where A measures' the extent to which the unemployed are disenfran- 
chised from the labour market. If A equals one only the employed insiders 
matter for wage setting. If A equals zero, both the employed and the 
unemployed get the same weight", (ALP (1992), p. 1375). ' 
As a result, in their model unemployment evolves according to the equation: 
ut = Aut-, - c(7rt -, xe), 
where -Trt denotes actual inflation, 7r' denotes expected inflation and 7r' = Et-1 (7rt) 
the expected value conditional on information at t-I. So, 
"... in the extreme case when A=1, the unemployment rate stays at its 
new level until it is displaced by a new shock. In other words, it displays 
hysteresis ", (ALP (1992), footnote 12). 
Consider in particular the case of hysteresis, when only the employed insiders mat- 
ter for wage setting; in that case employment would remain at whatever equilibrium 
5Alternatively, Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988) suggest that the persistence of European unem- 
ployment can be attributed to a sluggish labour demand. 
This might well be a natural consequence 
of the high costs of employment adjustment in Europe. 
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was reached initially, even after the shock disappears. Insiders can keep their jobs 
while raising real wages (to levels shown as F and C' in the lower panel). What 
this suggests is that employment persistence could substantially increase the cost of 
policy inflexibility, thus implying that less conservatism is desirable. On the other 
hand, when employment persists, a small increase in current inflation not only reduces 
today's employment gap, but it also has future benefits in terms of lower unemploy- 
ment. Indeed, Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) show how the inflationary bias 
associated with discretionary monetary policy increases when unemployment per- 
sists. ' Therefore, to control the larger inflationary bias of the dynamic model, a more 
conservative central banker is proposed. What is, therefore, the optimal degree of 
conservativeness for the central banker? In the following two sections we consider 
these issues algebraically. 
3.3.2 A formal model without persistence 
Before studying the dynamic case, consider the following one period model. 7 Assume 
that the social loss function is the expected value of a misery index, defined as the 
sum of the squared deviations of the inflation rate 7r and the level of output y from 
'See also Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) for a study on precommitment monetary equilibria 
in the presence of unemployment persistence. 
7 Here time subscripts have been suppressed for notational convenience. 
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their target values (zero and kq, respectively), so 'that: 
7r2 + (kq - Y)21 
where 9 is the expected market clearing equilibrium and k>1. 
The presence of nominal contracts set at the start of the period leads to an aggre- 
gate supply curve that ascribes deviations in output from 9 to errors in forecasting 
inflation and to supply-side shocks, that is: 
y-y a(7-7r e) + ul (3.2) 
where 7r' denotes expected inflation, a represents the degree of nominal inertia in the 
economy, and u is a supply side shock following a normal distribution with zero mean 
and variance a,,, 2 and zero serial correlation. 
3.3.2.1 Commitment to the optimal feedback rule 
On the assumption that the government can respond to realizations of the supply 
shock u, and that iT', representing wage setting, is determined before u is known, 
then, were the government able to precommit, it could implement the optimal state- 
contingent rule for the inflation rate. The precommitment solution - second-best - is 
such that the government internalises the effects that its decision rule has on people's 
3.3 OUTPUT PERSISTENCE AND DELEGATION 50 
expectations, i. e., it minimises the social loss function (3.1) subject to (3.2) and to 
the rational expectations condition: 
E7r = 7r'. (3.3) 
Substituting (3.2) and (3.3) into (3-1), the first order condition (hereafter FOC) with 
respect to 7r implies 
E) [(k - I)Y - a-F + aE7r - u]. (3.4) 
Taking expectations on (3.4) gives 
7r e: 0. (3-5) 
Combining (3.5) and (3.4) provides us with the optimal feedback rule 
,F=- 
au 
2' 
(3.6) 
1+a 
so that output is given by 
u (3.7) 
+ Ce2 
The average inflation rate will equal the socially desired inflation rate, while average 
output equals the natural rate. The optimal stabilisation policy provides optimal 
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variability of output relative to inflation. Inflation decreases with the supply shock 
in order to soften the supply shock's effect on output. 
3.3-2.2 Discretion 
In the absence of precommitment the government no longer internalises the effect of 
its decisions on inflation expectations, i. e., it minimises M, given u and 7r'. This 
implies: 
a[(k - I)y + Ce7e - U] (3.8) 
1+a, 
and so, on substituting from (3.2) above, 
, 7r = ce[kq - y], 
(3-9) 
see Blanchard and Fischer (1989), p-609. 
The average inflation rate is, therefore, positive, given by: 
E-F = a(k - I)y- 
(3-10) 
Average output is still equal to the natural rate, 
+ 
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The discretionary equilibrium delivers optimal stabilisation at the cost of an inflation 
bias: a(k - I)q. 
3.3.2.3 Delegation 
The potential gains from delegating power to a conservative central banker, third-best 
solution, can be seen by changing the reaction function in (3.9) above to that of the 
central bank, namely: 
7r = -yce(kg - y)) (3.12) 
where -y, the reaction coefficient, is strictly less than one. ' The expected level of 
inflation is thus reduced to -ya(k - 1)g, which is the principal reason for appointing 
a conservative head to the central bank. To see how delegation affects stabilisation, 
however, note that from (3.2) and (3.12), given 7e = -ya(k - 1)q, we find that devia- 
8jt should be noticed that the reaction function in (3.12) arises after minimising a social loss 
function of the form: 
II ---: Ab7r 
2+ (1 
- Ab) 
(kg 
_ y)23 (3-13) 
where the parameter Ab, I ý> Ab > 0, which measures the central bank's degree of aversion to 
inflation, is strictly greater than 1/2. Were the model written in this way, -y would equal: 
Ab 
Ab 
(3.14) 
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tions of output from 9 depend on the supply-side shock, divided by I+ 7a2, i. e., 
u 
53 
(3.15) 
Clearly, lowering -y increases the sensitivity of the economy to these shocks, which 
is why Rogoff warns against setting 7=0. Ideally the central banker would have 
a reaction coefficient -y* which minimises E(M). Note that, after substitution, the 
social loss function can be rewritten as: 
2 
All +a 2 ýy 2) (k - 1)y -u 
11+ 
7Ce2 
So the expected loss function is: 
E(M) (I +a 
272) (k - 1) 
292+ au 
22 
(3.17) 
1 
(1 + -Yce TI 
Setting the derivative of this loss function with respect to -ý equal to zero gives 
the necessary condition for the optimal feedback coefficient 7*, namely: 
K 
(I a2 IT, *)3 
7 * 
1 _ 7 * 
(3.18) 
where K=a,, 
2/J27 
usingJ2 _ (k - 
1)292 to denote the squared distortion in output. 
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Figure 3.3: Determining the optimal value of -y with and without persistence. 
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The determination of -y* - the Rogoff's result - is illustrated in Figure 3.3 where 
the LHS of (3.18) is plotted as the curve KL, a decreasing function of -ý; and the 
RHS is shown by the increasing function labelled OR. Clearly any increase in OrU2 
will increase K and shift KL upwards, leaving OR unchanged, implying that a more 
flexible rule is desirable. 
3.3.3 Optimal delegation with output persistence 
Consider now a multi-period extension, shown formally in the Appendix A. 2. In the 
model without persistence, the delegation problem consists of choosing an optimal 
fI eedback rule, fully characterised by 7*. In the dynamic case, however, the delegation 
problem acquires different significance: the interest rate at which the government 
and the central bank discount the future, 0 and Ob respectively, constitutes an issue 
of major importance. The reason for this is straightforward: in the equilibrium, a 
small increase in current inflation not only increases today's output but also future 
levels since output benefits persist. In our model we allow the government to choose 
Ob- Specifically, we seek to identify that feedback rule with which the government 
would like to endow the central bank, in circumstances where Ob is extremely large. 
In other words, the government chooses to appoint a myopic central bank. 
This surprising choice is merited by the analysis in Lockwood and Philippopou- 
los (1994), which contains essential background to our analysis. Let us devote some 
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56 
Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) obtain the discretionary and reputational 
equilibria for a monetary policy game with employment persistence. In particular, 
employment persistence arises from a monopolistic trade union with an employment 
target, lut, that is a weighted average of those insiders, who have been recently 
employed, lt-1, and the total labour force, n: 9 
Pt = alt-, + (1 - a)n. 
Hence, the payoff to the union depends negatively on the deviations of actual em- 
ployment from the target (lut - lt): 
00 1E 
6t-1 (jut _ 
lt)2 
2 
t=l 
where 0<J<1 is the social discount factor. 
A social loss function that depends upon the deviations of actual employment 
(1t) 
and inflation levels (pt - pt-1) from target numbers 
(n and 0, respectively) is also 
9Note that, in this case, there would be temporary rather than permanent employment 
persistence. 
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proposed: 
)2 +- X) (pt 
- pt 
Z dt-1 
t=l 
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where 0<J<I captures, again, the society's intertemporal preferences, and 
A>1 is the relative weight that society places on the employment target, It. 
The model is completed with a labour demand equation, 
It =0 (pt - wt), 
that determines the level of employment at time t (1t) as a function of the real 
wage (wt - pt). 
Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) solve for the discretionary and reputational 
equilibria of the model, and explore how the equilibria inflatiop rate are changed 
by the employment dynamics. We focus on the discretionary solution. First, the 
incorporation of lagged employment into the union's target converts the game from 
a repeated game into a dynamic game. As a consequence, the authors focus, as 
normally in these complex environments, on equilibria in Markov strategies. 'O Second, 
multiplicity of equilibria arise, as may happen in infinite horizon games, based on 
Markov perfect equilibria. In presence of employment persistence, Lockwood and 
1OIn Chapter 5 we explain in detail what the general properties of Markov perfect equilibria are, 
and how to tackle them. 
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Philippopoulos (1994) show that two equilibria arise, if and only if: 
(1 + A) 2v/-, \-> da2 
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As long as this existence condition is satisfied, there will exist a well-behaved, low 
inflation equilibrium, characterised by the following inflationary bias, 
7rt 
where 
and 
26a2 I 
Q= (I _ A)2(l + 
j2C, 4) -2(l _ A2)jCe2. 
A less intuitive, high inflation equilibrium, 7rt+, also arise. In that case, the inflation- 
ary bias will be given by: 
a(n - lt-1), 
(I - A) - (I A)6a' - 
7rt +A+ I-L+ a(n - 1-A 
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where 
(1 +A) J Ce 2 
2JCe2 
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Although the authors provide some'intuition for the high inflation equilibrium, the 
comparative statics properties possessed by the low inflation equilibrium are far more 
consistent with economic intuition. Therefore, we focus on the latter. 
In the presence of unemployment (n > It-, ), the inflation bias associated with the 
discretionary equilibrium will be above the socially desired level (7rt- > 0). Further- 
more, combining the existence condition and the solution for 7rt- guarantees that p- 
is decreasing in 6a', so that the inflation bias is decreasing in the insider power (a) 
and the discount factor (J). The higher the persistence of the employment gap (the 
higher a) or the more the bank cares about the future (the higher 6), the greater the 
incentive to lower the current employment gap, and so the greater the incentive to 
inflate now. Hence, in terms of our model, if the inflationary bias decreases with the 
discount rate 0, it seems reasonable to wish to appoint a central banker with a large 
Ob- Yet, we still need to find out how the optimal central bank's reaction function 
should look like. 
As shown in the Appendix A. 2, optimal delegation to a myopic central bank will 
still be characterised by -y**, as given in Equation (3-12). We shall, therefore, need a 
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pair of parameters (-y** i 
Ob) to describe the central bankers behaviour and preferences. 
With output persistence, the aggregate supply equation can be rewritten as: 
p(yt_l + ce(7 y -Y e) + (3.19) 
where 1>pý: 0 and yt-1 denotes lagged output. We find that, as the failure to 
stabilise output now has much more lasting consequences, the optimal value of -y 
increases with p. Specifically, on the assumption that yt-1 = 9, the formal analysis in 
the Appendix A. 2 gives the simple result that the optimality condition for delegation 
(3.18) should be modified to read: 
K' 
(i a27 
where 
pY** 
- 
1_/y**' 
1+0 au 2 
1+0-p2 J2 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
0 is the social rate of time preference, and p is the measure of persistence. Notice that, 
if there is no discounting so K' = a,,, 
2/[(1 
_ p2)62]1 the optimal value of -Y* is found by 
simply replacing the one period variance or,, 
2 appearing in (3.18) by the asymptotic 
variance: a,, 
2 /(1 
-P 
2) 
- As can be seen from Figure 3.3, -y** > -y*, as persistence 
in 
output reinforces the need for policy to accommodate productivity shocks 
by price 
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adjustment. (The only exception to this is when 0 -ý oo and K' -+ K, so that 
7 ** = 7* , as the 
future consequences of current policy are completely discounted. ) 
Figure 3.4 illustrates this point for different levels of a,, 2. On the horizontal axis 
is measured the optimal reaction coefficient -y**, ranging from zero to one; and on the 
vertical axis is p2, the squared of the degree of persistence, I>p>0 (the assumed 
rate of discount is 5%, the parameter oz equals one - for simplicity - and the condition 
used to calculate -y** is Equation (A. 29) in the Appendix A. 2, where et-1 = 0, i. e., it 
is the value of -y** which minimises unconditional expected losses). 
The schedules AA, BB, CC show how -y** increases with p for u,,, 
2= 62 /4,07U 2= 
P/2 and au2= 
62 
, respectively. The rightward shift from AA to CC along the 
horizontal axis (where p= 0) illustrates Rogoff's point - that raising au' (relative to 
P) reduces the conservative bias in the ideal feedback rule. The rightward bending ?D 
of these curves is the point we emphasise in this paper - that output persistence can 
greatly reduce the attractions of inflexible delegation of monetary policy. 
Lockwood et a]. (1994) build on an earlier version of this paper to extend the 
analysis of delegating monetary policy in an insiders- outsiders model in a number 
of interesting directions. In particular, they consider the so-called 
full delegation 
problem, a more general case than the one shown above as they also 
look for the 
central bank's optimal discount rate. 
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Figure 3.4: How the optimal reaction coefficient varies with p2 and 072 U 
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Fortunately for our purpose, they find that, if the government appoints a central 
bank characterised by (-y** 7 
Ob*) 
7 it will always choose a central bank who is myopic, 
(Ob* = oo), and who is more inflationary averse than the government (-ý** < 1). The 
intuition for this is clear: a myopic central bank, that discounts the future completely, 
does not consider the future benefits of lower unemployment and has less incentives 
to use monetary policy in an opportunistic way. Furthermore, they also find that the 
coefficient -y**, which characterises the central bank's reaction function, is increasing 
in p, the degree of persistence. All this would seem to ratify our result. 
According to the same authors, however, the myopic central bank's temptation 
to expropriate holders of nominal government debt (Lockwood et al. (1994), p. 7. ) 
might be a good reason not to wish to appoint a myopic central bank. " Hence, they 
also consider the case for partial delegation where Ob is fixed exogenously, and the 
government chooses only -y**. In this case, if the central bank is much more far-sighted 
than the government - as is likely to be the case -, there exists a plausible range of 
parameters (0, Ob and p) such that the government might choose not to delegate, if the 
need for stabilisation is sufficiently strong. For other ranges of parameters, however, 
partial delegation to a non-myopic central bank sharply decreases welfare losses. In 
that case, in order to reduce the inflationary bias, a more conservative central bank 
is proposed, when p increases. The effects are perverse: it decreases inflation, when 
"But this will be superseded under the Maastricht Treaty. 
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rises, at the cost of less stabilisation. 
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When output persists, Rogoff's idea of delegation does not seem very attractive. 
On one hand, the idea of choosing a myopic central bank is very puzzling. On the 
other, partial delegation to a non-myopic central bank might involve less stabilisa- 
tion policy as output persistence rises. This last result is particularly inefficient: 
were the government able to precommit, the optimal policy would involve increasing 
stabilisation in p. 12 
Clearly, allowing for output persistence exposes the traditional approach to del- 
egation to its major criticism: the policy analysis based only on ad hoc incentive 
structures. As Walsh (1995) has pointed out, 
"it is never clear to what extent the economic outcomes and policy trade- 
offs that arise are inherent in the policy problem or simply arise from 
the suboptimality of the targeting rules chosen for analysis. For example, 
by deriving the optimal contract, I show that the trade-off between infla- 
tionary bias and suboptimal stabilisation in Rogoff (1985a).... and others 
arises because these authors place arbitrary restrictions on the targeting 
rules they consider. This trade-off disappears under the optimal contract; 
full credibility and flexibility are simultaneously achieved" 
(Walsh (1995), 
p. 153. ) 
12 See Appendix A. 3 for a derivation of the precommitment equilibrium. 
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Indeed, Lockwood (1996) shows that, when output persists7 the precommitment 
solution can be delivered by a central banker whose payment is inversely related to 
observed inflation. Following Walsh (1995), he proposes that the government may 
offer the central bank an employment contract that gives shape to the incentives 
the central bank faces. In a more recent study, Herrendorf (1995) has suggested 
a combination of both a weight conservative central bank and a feasible optimal 
incentive contract, as a potential solution for economies where the incentive to create 
surprise inflation fluctuates significantly. " In an alternative study, Svensson (1995) 
advocates delegation to a both weight and inflation - target conservative central bank, 
as a solution to reconcile the flexibility versus credibility problem in models with 
output persistence. Finally a more promising way of achieving better outcomes than 
those considered so far has been suggested by Lockwood et a]. (1995). Based on 
reputation building factors, a la Barro and Gordon (1983), they consider, in a model 
without output persistence, delegation to a central bank that is more far-sighted than 
the government. Thus, delegation could achieve better outcomes, if the central bank 
has more incentives than the government for building a reputation against inflation. 
13 Here, I follow Svenssons's (1995) consistent terminology and refer to a weight conservative central 
bank as one with increased weight on inflation in the social loss function. The alternative, a inflation 
target conservative central bank, requires a monetary authority with an inflation target smaller than 
the society's desired one. 
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How relevant are these considerations for EC countries? First of all they (like all 
other non-German countries) will have suffered from the high interest rates which 
followed German unification in 1990. Secondly, since countries outside a narrowly 
defined core (Germany, Benelux plus France) have experienced significant shocks 
uncorrelated with the EC average, periphery countries should logically prefer more 
flexibility than core countries for the reasons analysed by Rogoff. In this spirit Alesina 
and Grilli (1992) warn specifically that 
"the countries that have more to lose from a monetary union, from a 
stabilisation point of view, are the countries at the periphery of Europe. " 
(Alesina and Grilli (1994), p. 61. ) 
Last of all, if there is hysteresis in European labour markets, then the demand shock 
coming from high interest rates and the lack of flexibility in response to supply shocks 
are likely to have prolonged effects. As pointed out by Drazen and Masson (1994), 
with persistence in unemployment, current anti-inflationary policy may well con- 
straint the room to maneuver in the future. Following a tough policy may actually 
harm rather than enhance credibility, if the public perceives that the government will 
not be able to ignore pressures to restore high employment 
in the future. Policy- 
makers' intentions are, no doubt, primary 
for the control of inflation. But the market 
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structure and the state of the economy should not be ignored when rigorous monetary 
discipline is advocated. 
Presently we are in the second of the three Stages leading to Monetary Union in 
Europe; so it is important to consider how its provisions are to be implemented. In 
Stage I Germany's partners responded to the problem of following the Bundesbank's 
tough lead on monetary policy in three different ways - by doggedly holding the line 
against the DM (the franc fort policy), by floating (as for sterling and the lira) or 
by realigning (as for the peseta). The lesson drawn by European central banks from 
these varied responses in Stage I has been the need for more flexibility in the ERM. 14 
A realignment of the DNI in 1990 would, for example, surely have eased a good deal of 
the subsequent pressure on Germany's partners. What our analysis suggests is that 
the same message may well apply to the conduct of exchange rate policy in Stage II 
and to monetary policy in Stage III. 
14Williamson (1992) suggested an asymmetric wide band for the DM as an alternative to the D'-M 
realignment. 
4 Controlling inflation in Spain 
Chapter 4 
Controlling inflation in Spain 
4.1 Introduction 
In the late 1970's, the 1980's and 1990's the unemployment rate in Spain has been 
among the highest in the OECD. This persistence reveals that we deal with a struc- 
tural problem which, although it has received considerable attention from both labour 
and macro economists, still awaits a satisfactory explanation. 
One can argue that most European countries have experienced the same pattern 
of increasing and then persistently high unemployment. The breakdown in the un- 
employment - inflation trade off also suggests an increase in the equilibrium level 
of unemployment. ' Nevertheless, the scale of the Spanish problem demands further 
68 
'See, for example, Blanchard and Summers (1988). 
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attention. 
"The specificity of the Spanish experience comes from the Franco 
legacy, which left Spain in the mid-1970's with both an archaic system 
of labour relations, and a thoroughly inadequate production structure". 
(Bentolila and Blanchard (1990). ) 
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The breakdown of labour relations and the wage explosion that arose with the 
end of Franco's dictatorship have been blamed for the violent inflation observed in 
the 1970's, which led to a peak of nearly 24% in 1977. Simultaneously, affected by 
the virulence of the oil crisis after 1975, unemployment, which had averaged 1% in 
the 1960's, was running at 6.8% in 1978. As a result, in the first half of the 1980's 
contractionary aggregate demand policies were implemented. A moderate real wage 
growth and the reduction in the growth rate of money aggregates were agreed in 
the Pactos de La Moncloa, in order to contribute to a gradual deceleration of the 
inflationary process. The social consequences of such an anti-inflationary policy are 
well illustrated by the Spanish unemployment rate, which ran at 21.1% in 1985. 
Furthermore, as a result of the second oil crisis, the inflation rate was still running at 
8.8% during that year. 
According to Bentolila and Blanchard 
(1990)27 the increase in unemployment at 
2 See also Dolado et a]. (1986), Andr6s et al. (1990) and Jimeno et al. 
(1994). 
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work in the early 1980s, was mainly due to this non accommodating stance of mone- 
tary policy. 
Table 4.1: Unemployment Rates 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 
Canada 8.3 7.5 10.9 11.2 9.5 7.7 8.1 11.3 10.3 9.5 
U. S. A. 6.0 7.0 9.5 7.4 6.9 5.4 5.6 7.5 6.0 5.5 
Japan 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.9 3.1 
France 5.2 6.2 8.1 9.7 10.4 10.0 8.9 10.3 12.3 11.6 
Germany 3.5 2.9 5.9 7.1 6.4 6.2 4.8 4.6 8.4 8.2 
Italy 7.1 7.5 8.4 9.4 10.5 11.0 10.3 10.5 11.1 - 
Sweden 2.2 2.0 3.5 3.4 2.8 1.9 1.8 5.8 9.8 9.2 
Norway 1.8 1.6 2.6 3.1 2.0 3.2 5.2 5.9 5.4 4.9 
U. K. 5.9 6.4 11.3 11.7 11.2 8.6 6.9 10.1 9.5 8.7 
Spain 6.8 11.1 15.6 19.7 20.8 19.1 15.9 18.1 23.8 22.7 
Source: Quarterly Lab_our Force Statistics, OECD, 1996, No. l. 
From 1986 to 1990, the unemployment rate fell substantially to reach 15.9% in 
1990. During this period, aided by Spain's integration into the EEC (1986), the oil 
price fall and the general good health of the world economy, GDP grew by 5% on 
average and total employment increased by 3% per year. On the monetary side the 
deflationary process continued, although the capital inflows and the increased pressure 
on demand led to an inflation rate of 6.9% in 1990. Finally, in June 1989, Spain joined 
the EMS in an attempt to import credibility and complete the deflationary process. 
Soon after the entrance of the peseta to the EMS, Spanish unemployment started 
to increase again. Among other factors, the serious loss of competitiveness of the 
Spanish economy -a result of the disadvantageous movements in both inflation and 
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exchange rate - and the record levels of real interest rates seem to be responsible 
for the large increase in unemployment. Yet, it was after the collapse of the EMS in 
August 1992 when a period of major instability began. Today Spanish unemployment 
stands at about twice the European average, 22.3% in 1996 (Q-1), while inflation runs 
at about 4.5%. 
The size of the Spanish unemployment rate has been a matter of discussion in both 
domestic and international fora. In Spain, while there is political consensus about the 
need to conquer the unemployment problem, there is also widespread political agree- 
ment that Spain should pursue the disciplinary policies that could allow it to qualify 
as an eligible candidate for accession to the EMU, under the conditions stated in the 
Maastricht Treaty. This latter objective has taken precedence in recent decisions by 
the Spanish Parliament, and in doing so has overshadowed the unemployment issue. 
Following the lines in Blanchard et a]. (1994), reducing the Spanish unemployment 
rate to 5% within the next decade would imply an annual GDP growth of 5%. To 
achieve such an ambitious objective, the CEPR Group on Spanish Unemployment has 
suggested the following strategy. First, it is essential to adopt macroeconomic policies 
that sustain aggregate demand during the next decade. Second, the fight against 
unemployment should not be accompanied by inflation. So as to avoid inflationary 
pressures, these authors propose not the implementation of rigid monetary policy, 
but the identification of labour market rigidities that, in the late 1980's, expedited 
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Yet, pursuant to the Treaty on European Union, the Banco de Espafia has been 
granted with the autonomy envisaged in the Treaty for the monetary institutions. 
The Law of autonomy of the Banco de Espafla, which defines price stability as the 
primary economic objective of the central bank, and which is intended to mitigate 
the hypothetical credibility problem suffered by the Spanish monetary authorities, 
was published on June 2nd, 1994. 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, credibility problems have been invoked most 
often in macroeconomics to explain an alleged inflationary bias in macroeconomic 
policy-making, and the size of the inflation bias has been proven to depend upon the 
market structure of the economy. For example, Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) 
demonstrate that the degree of persistence in the unemployment rate - hysteresis - 
characteristic of imperfect competitive labour markets with two different types of 
workers, the insiders and the outsiders, reinforces the incentives tempting the mone- 
tary institution to create surprise inflation. 
Also, in the next two chapters of this thesis, we show that the desynchronisation 
of the timing in the renegotiation of wage contracts, as well as the length of the con- 
tracts themselves, appear to increase the size of the inflationary bias. Finally, the 
existence of costs of changing prices and near-rational behaviour lead to more lasting 
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effects of monetary surprises, therefore enhancing the credibility problem faced by 
the monetary authority. In these circumstances, controlling expected inflation is, no 
doubt, imperative. But to the extent that all these elements represent departures 
from perfect competitive labour and goods markets, they reinforce the role for active 
monetary policy stabilisation, if the economy were to be subjected to supply-side 
shocks. In the previous chapter, we have shown that the optimal precommitment 
policy involves increasing output stabilisation when output persists. Furthermore, 
the optimal condition for delegation depends upon the degree of output persistence 
in the economy. A similar result has been obtained in Waller (1992) for the case of 
heterogeneous market structure. Hence, if the incorporation of some specific charac- 
teristics of the labour and goods markets reinforces the time inconsistency problem 
of monetary policy, those countries with highly distorted markets will suffer from 
severe losses when delegating monetary policy to very conservative central banks in 
the presence of supply-side shocks. 
In this chapter we discuss the relevance of these issues for the Spanish economy. 
In other words, we try to answer the following question: How can Spain control ex- 
pected inflation and, at the same time, implement sensible monetary policy, as needed 
in the battle against unemployment? Section 4.2 describes some factors that seem 
to have contributed to endowing Spain with the most distorted labour market in 
Europe. Section 4.3 discusses how best the mechanisms suggested in the theoretical 
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literature on the time consistency problem of monetary policy can alleviate the hypo- 
thetical credibility problem, to which the Spanish monetary authorities are exposed. 
Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.2 Spain: One of the most distorted labour mar- 
kets in the world 
4.2.1 Unemployment and its persistence 
It is generally accepted that unemployment is in equilibrium only when there is consis- 
tency between the intended mark-up of prices over wages and the intended mark-up 
of wages over prices. Hence, all the theories of unemployment revolve around the 
so-called, battle of mark-ups. There are mainly two mechanisms that can cause un- 
employment to be high enough so as to prevent the wage-price spiral: the efficiency 
wage theory of unemployment and collective bargaining with unions. However, these 
theories cannot explain by themselves the twin movements in both equilibrium and 
actual European unemployment rates, and substantial research has been undertaken 
by labour economists in an attempt to identify potential mechanisms at work behind 
this phenomenon. 
Initial research focused on wage setting models where labour demand was unilat- 
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erally determined by profit maximising firms given a set wage. Then, it was assumed 
that the wage was unilaterally fixed by the workers, normally in advance of the real- 
ization of the shocks affecting labour demand and supply. 
The departure from this traditional approach assumed that the wage, at least in 
expected value, was set so as to keep the relevant membership, insiders, at work. The 
normal assumption in membership models is that membership is closely related to 
current and past employment. 3 
Alternatively, the employment target would be a weighted average of the labour 
force and those currently in employment when the contracts are drawn up, ývhere 
the case for hysteresis implies that only employed workers, insiders, matter for wage- 
setting. ' These approaches are quite reasonable given that, apart from the cases where 
collective bargaining takes place at the national level, unions seem to act primarily on 
behalf of employed workers and, perhaps, of those recently or temporarily laid-off. In 
this context, there would be little pressure on wages to re-enfranchise the unemployed; 
movements in employment would be highly persistent and short-lived shocks could 
have long-run effects. 
Even if we accept that the wage-setting process takes place between dominating 
firms and more or less selfish employed workers, one needs to ask what is the role of 
'See Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck and Snower (1986) 
4 See, for example, Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994). 
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the unemployed in wage determination. 5 
There are various reasons for thinking that the presence of unemployment affects 
the bargaining power and the decision-making of both firms and employed workers. 
First, unemployment affects how easy it is for employed workers to find another job, 
if they were to become unemployed. Poor prospects in the case of job loss will weaken 
the workers' demand for higher wages. Second, unemployment also affects how easy 
it is for firms to replace existing workers. In the presence of high unemployment, 
firms can threaten to turn to the pool of the unemployed for replacement workers, so 
that unemployment again jeopardises the workers' bargaining power. 
But it is often the case that current workers and new hires are not perfect sub- 
stitutes, as will happen, for example, in the presence of firing and hiring costs. In 
that event, firms might be reluctant to replace insiders by outsiders so as not to 
incur unnecessary costs. Furthermore, current employees and new workers differ in 
their ability to co-operate with their colleagues. Those currently employed, MsZders, 
might be able and prepared to affect the new entrants' productivity by withdrawing 
co-operation from them. They might also raise the entrants' disutility of work via 
unfriendly attitudes, a behaviour which is now known as harassment. Hence, the pos- 
sibilities of pursuing both co-operation and harassment activities generate an ability 
'Some authors have pointed out that unemployment is not the relevant labour market variable 
in wage determination, but the present discount value of current and anticipated ratios of unem- 
ployment to vacancies. See, for example, Blanchard and Diamond (1992). 
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difference which can be exploited in the wage determination. 
A different type of model explains the persistence of sustained unemployment as 
a result of the skill and work habit deterioration associated with prolonged unem- 
ployment. The evidence of micro econometrics studies suggests that variations in the 
effectiveness of the unemployed as potential job seekers, provide a clear mechanism for 
generating persistence. ' The long-term unemployed, suffering from demoralisation, 
deskilling, reduced information about jobs, reduced job-search and natural employer 
discrimination exert less downwards pressure on wages. 
If the presence of high unemployment cannot easily discourage highly protected 
workers from getting large wage increases, the implementation of supply side policies 
is urgently called for. Furthermore, it is also likely that, without the implementa- 
tion of suitable labour market reforms, the adoption of aggregate demand policies is 
interpreted as a signal of future inflation by the financial markets. 
4.2.2 The Spanish labour market institutional reform 
Simultaneous with the increasing unemployment experience, labour market flexibility 
became a controversial debate. According to Bentolila and Bertola (1990), during 
the economic recession that followed the oil price crisis, firms felt constrained by the 
6 See Bean and Layard (1989). 
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relatively high costs which they had to incur in order to dismiss workers. The same 
costs would have been responsible for the firm's reluctance to hire during the 1980's, 
as they feared facing large severance compensations, if they later had to fire those 
workers. In consequence, many European governments introduced measures to reduce 
labour market rigidities. 
With respect to Spain, an institutional change occurred in 1984, when a new 
fixed-term contract, which can be signed for short periods and bear low firing costs, 
was created. 
- labour law by the 'Alcr. c- The fixed-term contract was first introduced into Spanis"LL 
er's Statute of 1980. However, it was considered a restricted alternative to the pre- 
sumed indefinite normal contract. Fixed-term contracts were allowed to exist only 
when the nature of the activity being undertaken justified doing so - in other words, 
either to substitute a permanent worker with the right to maintain his or her vacancy, 
or in order to face activities which are, either temporal, not ordinary, or that imply 
a sudden increase in the normal activity of the firm. It can, therefore, be said that 
the Statute maintained the traditional preference for the indefinite contract, and the 
fixed-term contract remained an exception. 
The legislation on employment security was voiced by employers as one of the main 
obstacles to employment creation. Based on the need, economically inescapable, for 
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further labour market flexibility, as well as to encourage new job creation, the Worker's 
Statute Amendment came into place on the 2nd August, 1984. New contract types 
were introduced: for example, those for training for recent graduates in firms, and 
for part-time jobs. Most importantly, aided by the so-called Employment Promotion 
Programme (EPP), a new fixed-term contract was established by the Royal Decree 
1989/84,17th October. Under this agreement firms could hire unemployed workers 
who were registered in the Employment Office for a minimum of six months (one year 
since July 1992) 7 up to three years. 8 
Fixed-term contracts were conceived to help to increase the flexibility of what was 
considered a very rigid labour market. In the presence of massive unemployment, ' 
fixed-term contracts with lower adjustment costs were supposed to facilitate hiring 
and firing practices. The characteristics of the EPP were as follows: 
If the fixed-term contract expires and the worker becomes unemployed, he or 
she receives a severance payment of twelve days' salary per year of service (versus 20 
days for permanent contracts). Furthermore, the extinction of the contract cannot be 
appealed to the labour courts. 10 The law prohibits a firm from filling a vacancy with 
7 See Law 22/1992,30th July. 
8 The contracts expiring in 1994 were allowed to be renewed once for a period up to 18 months. 
See Royal Decree 18/1993,3rd December. 
9The Spanish unemployment rate was, in 1985, about 21.1% of the labour force. 
IOIn the case of an indefinite contract, the worker is protected against unfair dismissal; the worker 
being able to receive a severance payment of 45 days of salary per year of service up to a maximum 
of 42 months. 
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a fixed-term worker if the vacancy results from another fixed-term contract which 
expired in the previous year and which lasted the maximum duration. The firm 
cannot hire a fixed-term worker when a worker has been laid-off or unfairly dismissed 
in the previous year. There is no limit to the number of fixed-term contracts that a 
firm is allowed to sign. 
For the years 1986-1990,98% of all contracts registered at the employment offices 
were fixed-term ones. While in 1987 (2nd quarter), 15.6% of total salary workers' 
held a fixed-term contract, by 1990 this percentage had increased to 29.8%. The 
proportion of temporary employees varies across sectors and workers. They are more 
prevalent for women than for men (34.2% and 27.8%, respectively), for young people 
(77.9% for those aged 16-19), for less educated workers (36% for illiterates versus 
17.3% for university graduates), in agriculture (50.6%) and construction (54%). " 
The macroeconomic implications for the Spanish economy of the introduction of 
this new fixed-term contract have been widely investigated. With respect to labour 
supply, Bentolila and Dolado (1993) analyse how the presence of adjustment costs 
affect the wage setting process, which in Europe appears to be highly dominated by 
insider employees. These authors set up and tested a model which assumes that tem- 
porary workers who suffer from an unstable attachment to the firm, are disregarded 
in wage bargain processes, i. e. they are outsiders. They observed three reasons why 
"See Segura et a]. (1991). 
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fixed-term employees do not participate in the wage bargaining processes equally with 
permanent workers: (i) a buffer effect, arising from the fact that fixed-term workers, 
bearing lower costs, will be the first ones to be dismissed, (ii) a composition effect, 
because of the potential difference between the two types of workers' wages, and (iii) a 
bargaining effect, composed both of an harassment and discipline effect. 
Given the extensive use made of fixed-term contracts in Spain, this suggests that 
the real Znstders group may be smaller than one would assume. Indeed, in the words 
of Bentolila and Dolado (1993): 
"The flexibility - enhancing measures taken by the Spanish 
Govern- 
ment have created a two-tier labour market in which temporary employees 
have little to say in wage formation, at least in manufacturing ... 
We find 
that a percentage point increase in the proportion of temporary employ- 
ment, raises the growth rate of permanent worker's wages by on a third of 
a percentage point. " 
In a parallel study based upon dual labour market theory, Alba 
(1991) demon- 
strates that an enhanced segmentation process is taking place in the 
Spanish labour 
market due to the introduction of fixed-term contracts. 
As Alba (1991) stresses, there seems to be two different labour markets: the 
primary sector, that is rationed and includes stable jobs, with 
higher wages and better 
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working conditions, and the secondary sector that comprises low-paid, unstable jobs. 
Hence, temporary workers, expecting to become permanent, will make a great effort 
to obtain an indefinite contract. Similarly, those employees more averse to short-term 
jobs or committed to the firm will work harder to obtain a stable position within the 
firm. Hence, fixed-term contracts become a cheap recruitment instrument as well as 
a monitoring tool to elicit greater efforts from the temporary workers. 
Conducting a test for a sample of large Spanish firms in 1989, Alba (1991) found 
that female workers, under 30 and lower educated were more likely to sign fixed-term 
jobs. He also found an important wage differential between temporary and permanent 
workers, the former receiving significantly less than the latter. This result is consistent 
with the following: firms that employ a higher proportion of fixed-term workers pay 
a lower average wage. " This could help to explain the wage moderation observed 
during the most recent boom between 1985-1990. On the other hand, the fraction of 
fixed-term employment in the firm appears to have null or negative effects on labour 
productivity, although the proportion of fixed-term employees among newly hired 
workers does increase the average productivity of the firm. Furthermore, only around 
15% of the temporary workers will get a permanent job once the fixed-term contract 
has been completed. 13 The trade unions claim that Spain has a very flexible labour 
"In Jimeno and Toharia (1992a), fixed-term workers seem to earn about 11% less than permanent 
employees of similar characteristics. 
13 The figure of the fixed-term contract, as described above, started being revised during the early 
1990s; see, for example, Law 22/1992,30th July, Royal Decree 18/1993,3rd December, and 
Law 
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market. However, the introduction of the fixed-term contract seems to have created 
a dual segmented market, increased labour turnover and lowered labour productivit-,, -. 
During the recession of the early 1990's, these fixed-term contracts enhanced the 
power of workers with a permanent job - the real insiders - leading to unjustified 
wage rises. 
With regard to labour demand, Bentolila and Saint Paul (1992) focus their theo- 
retical and empirical analysis on the direct effects of adjustment costs of employment 
on labour demand policies. They analyse the behaviour of the temporary workers 
- who are allowed to differ in their productivity, wages and firing costs - within a 
stochastic framework where firms suffer from booms and slumps. 
In presence of fixed-term contracts, the optimal policy for a firm suffering from a 
slump will be characterised, first, by firing temporary workers and, second, by pro- 
ceeding to reduce the number of permanent jobs, mainly through voluntary vacancies. 
With regard to the cyclical behaviour of employment within a firm that signs fixed- 
term contracts - versus another where flexible contracts are not available -, the 
level of employment will be larger during booms but will tend to decrease more signif- 
I icantly during slumps. If the economy suffers from a general recession, the decrease 
in the level of employment will be larger and the recession shorter in an economy 
with fixed-term contracts. In other words, the model predicts that the availability of 
10/1994,19th May on Medidas urgentes de fomento de la ocupacidn. 
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fixed-term contracts increases the size of total employment's response to aggregate 
shocks, while decreasing its persistence. 
This increased elasticity of employment finds empirical support in a panel of Span- 
ish manufacturing firms in 1985-88: the lower firing costs entailed by the fixed-term 
contracts would have been responsible for an increase in employment of 1.5% points 
over these three years. But employment does not appear to be significantly less per- 
sistent after flexible labour contracts were extensively used! On the contrary, the 
degree of unemployment persistence for the Spanish economy is extremely high, close 
to the full hysteresis hypothesis. 
There is no single cause for Spanish unemployment to be so high. Unfortunately, 
the inefficiencies inherited from Franco's legacy had to be reformed at a moment of 
international economic crisis in the mid-1970's and early 1980's. In the hope of easing 
the political transition from dictatorship to democracy, government and employers 
tried to satisfy workers' wage claims. Unemployment increased sharply and, in order 
to ensure the participation of the unions in a national agreement to enforce lower 
wages, the government provided generous unemployment protection, which would 
later be regarded as a significant source of unemployment persistence. 
The distorting effects of the labour market reform in 1984, and the role played 
by the demand policy must be also taken into account. After some years of success 
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in the war against unemployment, the combination of tight monetary policy, trying 
to import credibility from the Bundesbank, pro-cyclical fiscal policy and significant 
wage increases has been held responsible for the immense pool of unemployment. 
According to Dolado and Jimeno (1995), an expansionary stand for monetary policy 
and the implementation of supply-side reforms are the two necessary elements to 
overcome the high Spanish unemployment rate. Labour market reforms, intended to 
enhance the flexibility of the labour market, are already on their way. But, how can 
the Spanish authorities provide expansionary monetary policy without putting the 
anti-inflationary reputation of the Banco de Espafia at risk? This is the issue that we 
discuss in the next section. 
4.3 Monetary regimes and output persistence: The 
case for Spain 
During recent years the monetary economics literature has produced an important 
number of papers discussing the implications of the persistence of unemployment. 
Following the lines of these papers, we could conclude that the high degree of unem- 
ployment persistence exposes the Spanish economy to a huge inflation bias. A number 
of institutional reforms, intended to control inflation, while implementing optimal or 
sensible stabilisation policies, have been suggested. 
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In this section we discuss what a simple. numerical exercise can teach us about the 
potential welfare losses suffered by the Spanish economy under different monetary 
regimes. The four monetary scenarios refer to four different constitutions for the 
central bank. In particular, we consider the following cases: 
(i) Discretionary case, when the government, chosen democratically by the people, 
runs monetary policy. In this case, the government chooses the rate of inflation, 
so as to minimise the following social misery index: 
00 6t 
2 V Et-I 
2 
Prt 
t=O 
subject to 
yt = pyt-I + a(7rt - , te) + Ut7 (4.2) 
where yt and yt-I are deviations from their equilibrium values. As usual in this 
literature, the public is assumed to dislike deviations of inflation and output 
from their socially desired levels (0 and ý, respectively). For simplicity, we 
assume that individuals are indifferent against these two bads, i. e., we propose 
identical preferences for inflation versus output stabilisation. 6 is the society's 
discount rate, p is the degree of output persistence and a, the slope of the 
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aggregate supply, measures the marginal revenue of inflation- 14 
(H) Delegation a la Rogoff, when the monetary power is left in the hands of a wezght- 
conservative, myopic institution, different from the government. In other words, 
we consider the social welfare losses (4.1) when the inflation rate is chosen by a 
central bank that minimises 
V 
ü)2] 
7 Et-, 2 
[7rt + Ab (Yt (4-3) 
t= 
subject to (4.2), where Jb and k are optimally determined as explained in 
Chapter 3. Note, therefore, that once 6bwas set equal to its optimal value, i. e., 
zero, Equation (4.3) would be simplified to read: 
Et-I 
I 17t 2+ Ab(Yt 
2 
(iii) Delegation a la Svensson, when the monetary policy is run by an inflation target 
and weight- conservative central bank. The social losses are evaluated when the 
inflation rate is determined by a central bank that minimises: 
00 it 
)2 ý)2] V Et-I E2[ (7rt - ITb +Ab (Yt (4.4) 
t=O 
"Further algebra on the solution for the discretionary equilibrium with output persistence can 
be 
found in Svensson (1995). The original work by Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) contains the 
algebra for the discretionary equilibrium with unemployment persistence. 
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subject to (4-2), where7Fband Abare optimally determined as in Svensson (1995). 15 
(iv) Commitment solution, when the government itself is able to convince the public 
about its well-meaning behaviour. Welfare losses under commitment correspond 
to the second-best solution, as derived in Appendix A. 3 of this thesis. 
4.3.1 Calibration results 
To get a feeling for the values of the underlying parameters, we proceed as follows. 
First, the parameter for which we could obtain no empirical estimate, the society's 
discount rate, was chosen as J=0.85, which implies a social rate of interest of 
approximately 0=0- 16. 
Our estimate for the standard deviation of real GDP is based upon the OECD 
statistics series, which has estimated a standard error of &,, = 2.454% for Spain. Ob- 
serve, however, that this will be an underestimated value of a, the ex ante variability 
of the shock to GDP growth, as some degree of stabilisation policy should have been 
in force. Furthermore, in order to account for the output persistence effect, given 
in Equation (4.2), we will recalculate the real output variance by using the formula 
22 cry p )UU . 
15 With persistence, a combination of an optimal state-contingent inflation target and a weight- 
conservative central bank can achieve the second-best solution, characterised by zero expected infla- 
tion and optimal output stabilisation. 
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Although output and employment are not strictly commensurate7 the latter fig- 
ures have been used as a reference to choose the calibration values of yt-, - initial 
deviation of output from the equilibrium - and ý- the equilibrium deviation of out- 
put from its desired level. For the initial equilibrium deviation of output we refer to 
the estimates of the Spanish NAIRU, as in Dolado and Jimeno (1995) and Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991). These studies place the equilibrium rate of Spanish un- 
employment around 16 - 20%, implying that inflationary pressures could develop, if 
the unemploymeht rate were to fall below this level. These numbers are regarded as 
a problem by most Spanish people, so we suggest that an unemployment rate around 
9- 10%, close to the EEC average unemployment rate, is desirable. Moreover, the 
level of Spanish unemployment is currently at around 22%. Hence, for the Spanish 
economy, the values of yt-1 and ý have been selected within the range (-6%, -3%) 
and (8%, 3%), respectively. 
As regards the value of p, the evidence is less than uniform, but it seems to be 
close to the unit root hypothesis. 16 We therefore focus on relatively large degrees of 
persistence. With respect to the degree of nominal rigidity in the Spanish economy, 
a value of &=0.2 has been estimated. Like most European economies, Spain seems 
to suffer from severe real wage rigidity, and long-term nominal contracts appear to 
be relatively less important to explain the fluctuations of output around the natural 
"See Jimeno and Toharia (1992b). 
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The figures below represent how social welfare losses respond to changes in a, 
the inverse of the Phillips curve's slope, and in p, the degree of output persistence, 
under different monetary regimes. The four monetary regimes under scrutiny rank as 
follows: 
both commitment and inflation targeting deliver the optimal feedback rule, second- 
best, with zero expected inflation and optimal output stabilisation. Optimal delega- 
tion to a myopic central bank constitutes the third-best solution. It reduces expected 
inflation at the cost of less than optimal stabilisation. The worst scenario, fowrth-best 
coincides with a discretionary policy regime. 17 
Output persistence sensitively decreases social welfare. Figure 4.1(a) illustrates 
the increase in welfare losses when p varies between 0 and 1.11 Although delegation 
and precommitment do not differ too much for low values of p, the benefits from dele- 
gation rapidly decline with the degree of persistence. The same applies for increasing 
values of a. Figure 4.1(b) shows how the welfare losses vary when a takes values 
"The existence condition, 
jp2)2 
4JCC2 p2 
(4-5) 
appears in the algebra for the discretionary equilibrium. See Lockwood and 
Philippopoulos (1994), 
Lockwood et al . 
(1995) and Svensson (1995). 
"In Figure (4.1(a)) the real output standard deviation takes the original value, 6ý, = 2.454%. 
When welfare losses are plotted against the degree of output persistence, controlling 
for the output 
persistence effect in the variance of real output seriously complicates 
this exercise. 
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Figure 4.1: Welfare losses under different monetary regimes 
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between 0 and 1. Here, the degree of persistence has been chosen as p= . 8, so that 
dy 2=0.36 d,, 2. It should be noted that a large value of a increases the marginal rev- 
enue from an inflationary surprise. If the incentives tempting the monetary authority 
to inflate are increasing in a, so must the inflationary bias, and, therefore, the welfare 
losses. But a large value of a also facilitates the stabilisation of supply-side shocks, 
since a smaller amount of inflation is necessary to offset a given productivity shock. 
Hence, if the government owns a technology that enables it to control expected in- 
flation (through precommitment, inflation targeting or via delegation), welfare losses 
will decrease in a. 
Our figures emphasise that, for large values of output persistence or nominal 
rigidity, Rogoff's delegation to a conservative, myopic central bank, although still 
desirable, does not deliver as many goods as expected. Furthermore, social losses in- 
crease dramatically if we allow for partial delegation to a conservative central banker 
only, i. e., if the central banker's discount rate is equal to society's-19 This issue is par- 
ticularly important for the Spanish economy, which suffers from high unemployment 
persistence. Indeed, as soon as Spain joined the EMS in June 1989, in an attempt to 
import credibility from the Bundesbank and, effectively, delegating monetary policy 
to the German institution, the Spanish unemployment rate started to increase 
(see 
Table 4.1). 
19See Lockwood et a]. (1995). 
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It is more than likely that, during recent years, Spanish monetary policy has 
been too contractionary, allowing for less than optimal stabilisation. Surely, Spain's 
membership in the EMS is politically and economically advisable. But, in such cir- 
cumstances, it is imperative to look at other mechanisms that bring us closer to 
the second-best solution. The economic literature on the institutional design of cen- 
tral banks has suggested optimal incentive contracts and optimal inflation targets as 
potential tools to overcome this complication. The difficulties of implementing an 
incentive contract have been already discussed in this thesis. In this section we would 
like to focus our attention on the inflation target solution, as advocated in Svens- 
son (1995). In the presence of output persistence, Svensson (1995) demonstrates that 
delegation to a weight- conservative central bank with an optimal state- contingent 
znflation target can implement the optimal feedback rule: 20 
b*ut --Ia Ut. 
- jp2 + Ce2 
(4.6) 
The values of the parameters 7rb 7 the central banker's inflation target, and 
ýb, 
the central banker's weight on preferences, that would induce a central banker to 
20 See Appendix A. 3, for a derivation of the optimal feedback rule, and Svensson (1995), for further 
details on inflation target regimes. 
0 
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implement the second-best policy are given by: 
7rb : -- go + glyt-1; 
where 
go 1- ÖP - äceý , 
and 
g1 =a= 26ap 
[(I 
_ 
6P2) 
_ (1 - 6p2)2 - 4Ab 6a2p2 
I 
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(4.7) 
(4-8) 
(4.9) 
Although the inflation target in (4.7) eliminates the inflation bias, it does not 
deliver optimal inflation response to the supply shock. Hence, optimal output stabil- 
isation has to be achieved through delegation to a weight-conse7-vative central bank. 
ýb is chosen so as to satisfy: 
21 
a 
6p2 +a2 
/ý ba + 
JCeý2 
I OzAb -W 6a262 
(4.11) 
21jt can be shown that an existence condition for feasible Ab would appear in Svensson's algebra 
for optimal delegation to an inflation target and weight- conservative central bank. This condition is 
more restrictive than the one displayed before and it reads: 
1< 
(i 
- 
jp2)2 
(4.10) 
or _90 -9. Lo(X-P- 
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Table 4.2: Optimal Stabilisation, Inflation target and Conservative Bias 
b* 7rb Ab 
P= . 94 70% -16.2% 0.50- 
p= .8 40% -7.6% 0.89 
p- .7 32% -5.6% 0.95 
p= .5 24% -3.6% 0.99 
Other values 6= . 85) a= . 2, yt-, = -6%, ý= 8%. 
b* 7rb Ab 
p . 94 70% -6.6% 0.50 
p .8 40% -3.1% 0.89 
p .7 32% -2.9% 0.95 
p .5 24% -1.4% 0.99 
Other values J= . 857 a= . 2, yt-I = -3%, ý= 3%. 
b* 7Fb ýb 
a =. l 16.8% -1.1% 0.99 
a .3 44.5% -3.6% 0.89 
a .5 59.9% -8.7% 0.69 
a .6 63.6% -28.7% 0.56 
Other values J= . 85, p= . 7, yt-, = -3%, ý= 3%. 
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Table 4.2 presents the values for the parameters 7rb , the central 
bank's inflation 
target, -4, the central 
bank's conservative bias, and b*, the optimal stabilisation 
coefficient. All the way through our calibrations, we have assumed a social discount 
rate 6= . 85. 
With respect to the degree of persistence, p, and nominal rigidities, a, 
statistics are less uniform across countries. The same is true for the initial deviation 
of output from the natural rate, yt-1, and for the equilibrium deviation of output 
from its desired level, ý. 
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Although the last two variables are not relevant to calculate the optimal stabili- 
sation coefficent, b*, yt-, and ý do reflect to what extent the monetary authority is 
tempted to inflate. We allow for different values of yt-, and ý, keeping in mind that 
most European countries suffer from too high unemployment rates and from highly 
distorted labour markets. Furthermore, we should emphasise that the value of the 
standard deviation of the real output shock does not enter any of the expressions 
for the coefficients b* , Irb and Ab -see Equations 
(4-6), (4.7) and (4.11), respectively. 
Therefore, the value of d,, is not relevant to this exercise. Intuitively, 7b and ýb are 
parameters which control the monetary authority's incentives to create a monetary 
surprise, and such incentives do not depend upon the variance of the output shock. 
Similarly, the optimal feedback rule says to which extent the society is willing to 
bear inflation in order to offset a negative output shock. The parameter b* measures, 
therefore, the percentage of the shock that the public is willing to accomodate, and 
such percentage does not depend upon cý,. 
We draw the following conclusions: 
the optimal stabilisation coefficient is increasing in p, the degree of output per- 
sistence. If supply-side shocks have long lasting effects, the government will 
find it 
optimal to stabilise today, in order to avoid losses of output tomorrow. 
Furthermore, 
optimal stabilisation is also increasing in a. If the marginal revenue of 
inflation in- 
creases with the degree of nominal rigidities in the economy, greater stabilisation 
is 
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desirable. 22 
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But the optimal feedback rule is time inconsistent and cannot be easily imple- 
mented without resorting to sophisticated institutional arrangements. Following 
Svensson's idea of delegation to a weight- conservative central bank with the optimal 
inflation target might imply negative values for 7rb. For the Spanish case, assuming 
relatively large values for yt-, and ý, an inflation target around -16% might be nec- 
essary! Even when we consider much smaller figures for these variables, the optimal 
inflation target values around -6%. 
With respect to other industrialised countries with less distorted labour markets, 
an inflation target around (-3%, -6%) is urgently called for. Indeed, for EEC coun- 
tries, like France, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands, the degree of persistence has been 
estimated to be not smaller than ý=0.8. For the U. K., U. S. A. and Canada, the 
degree of persistence is relatively low -ý=0.5 - 0.6. But, when it comes to nominal 
rigidity, these countries, especially the U. S. A. and Canada, present much larger values 
for &1 23 and the size of the inflation target increases more dramatically with 
Although the calibration exercises should be interpreted carefully, we believe that 
they are sufficiently honest to support the following discussion. It is hard to think of 
the way in which this institutional design could be implemented. We observe inflation 
22 These results have been derived analitically in Chapter 3. 
23See Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 98 
targeting regimes like those of the U. K., Canada, Spain, Sweden and New Zealand, 
but we do not observe inflation targeting as advocated in Svensson (1995). What 
this model predicts is a central bank's inflation target that does not line up with 
the observed level of inflation. In the real world, however, central banks announce 
credible inflation targets, which coincide with the observed level of inflation. It has 
been suggested that the optimal inflation target might be interpreted as a non-linear 
inflation contract for the central bank. But, if this was the case, we should go back 
to the discussion on the feasibility of implementing any incentive contract. Finally, a 
different interpretation for inflation targeting has been presented in Svensson (1996). 
The most appropriate guide to monetary policy, under inflation targeting, is inflation 
forecast targeting. The idea has some advantages but, as pointed out by Svensson: 
It remains to be seen whether a central bank's inflation forecasts can be 
made so observable and verifiable as to allow sanctions to be conditional 
on forecasts rather than outcomes. (Svensson (1996), p. 21. ) 
4.4 Conclusions 
There has been far less empirical than theoretical work on the implications of dynamic 
inconsistency. NVIen we depart from the the simpler labour market used in Rogoff 
(1985a), the assumption that monetary policy suffers from a time consistency prob- 
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lem has two important implications: first, it suggests dramatically large values for 
the inflation bias, that do not match the inflation levels observed in the real world. 24 
Second, institutional design, which has been proposed to reduce expectations for in- 
flation, such as delegation to weight- conservative central bankers, inflation contracts 
or inflation targeting, is difficult to implement. As a whole, the time consistency prob- 
lem of monetary policy acquires different significance and becomes more troublesome 
to solve. 
The literature on the time consistency problem of monetary policy focuses on 
normative economics about what central banks should do, based upon behavioural 
assumptions, that may or may not capture what is happening in the real world. What 
appears to be missed in this literature is a more positive analysis of what central 
banks actually do. This concept is not revolutionary. In the words of Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989), 
There are two questions. First, do governments in fact act in a dynami- 
cally inconsistency fashion - or equivalently, do societies suffer as a result 
of their governments' inability to precommit themselves to policies? And 
second, if not, why not - that is, what institutions or constrains on be- 
haviour exist or can be created to mitigated the problem? (Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989), p. 592. ) 
241j, May 1996 Spanish inter-annual inflation was running at 3.8%. 
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As emphasised before, the introduction of special characteristics of market struc- 
ture seriously complicates the design of central bank constitutions, intended to miti- 
gate the credibility problem of monetary policy. On the other hand, the composition 
of labour and goods markets seems to be of great relevance at the time of quantifying 
the severity of the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. Perhaps, one could 
say that the introduction of microfoundations for wage - and price - setting raises 
general doubts about the inconsistency model, as a positive theory of macroeconomic 
policy. Countries like Spain seem to have found ways to institute a reputation for 
fighting inflation. But, if reputational effects are large enough, the optimal feedback 
policy could be implemented, so as to avoid further losses of employment. 
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Chapter 5 
Overlapping contracts: The 
consequences of staggered wage 
0 
se ting 
5.1 Introduction 
Many new Keynesian economists have often blamed short-run nominal wage rigidity 
for causing unemployment in the wake of adverse nominal shocks. Indeed, the impact 
of aggregate demand on inflation and employment depends, among other factors, on 
the length of wage contracts and on the speed of adjustment of contracts to new 
information about the state of the economy. Where there are long-term staggered 
contracts and absence of synchronised wage setting, changes in monetary policy will 
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have a much greater effect on employment. Hence, the role for active monetary sta- 
bilisation, under staggering, has been defended by Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979), 
within a context of time-varying and fixed wage contracts, respectively. Furthermore, 
many authors have argued that the staggered timing of price adjustment makes out- 
put losses inevitable during deflation, because of the inflationary momentum caused 
by overlapping price and wage decisions. 
Nominal wage and price rigidities reflect the empirically common practice of set- 
ting wages and prices in money terms for several periods in advance. ' But multi 
period contracts are often incomplete, i. e., they are not contingent on nominal wage 
and price developments elsewhere in the economy. As pointed out by Buiter (1996), 
Economic theory has been unable so far to provide a convincing rationali- 
sation of this particular form of incomplete contracting. Indeed, we do not 
have good theories as to why wage and price contracts tend to use money 
(the medium of exchange and means of payment) as the numeraire (unit of 
account), rather than some bundle of goods, (Buiter (1996), footnote 13). 
In contrast with the new Keynesian theory, new classical economists argue that 
credibility problems are central to the disinflationary process, so that disinflation 
would be costless if the government announced credible commitments. 
'For a detailed discussion of nominal wage rigidity in OECD countries, see Layard et aL (1991). 
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But, if multi-period contracts lead to more lasting effects of monetary policy 
surprises, they will enhance the credibility (time consistency) problem of monetary 
policy. In other words, credibility problems and microfoundations of wage - and price - 
setting cannot be easily separated for the quantification of the costs of disinflationary 
policy. Despite the relevance of this problem, to our knowledge, only Levine and 
Pearlman (1994) have formally incorporated wage setting dynamics into the time 
consistency literature. 2 
Borrowing heavily from Calvo (1983), these authors analyse real and nominal 
wage inertia, which arises from the existence of contracts, based upon expectations 
for future prices and unemployment, extending over many periods. On one hand, for 
contracts longer than one period, a role for an active monetary policy, even when 
completely anticipated, emerges. On the other, there is a greater credibility problem. 
In an attempt at realising the benefits of monetary policy stabilisation, these authors 
study delegation to a conservative central bank. They show that the conservahsm of 
the central banker increases as nominal and real wage inertia increases, and focus on 
the feasibility of a monetary union. 
To our mind, Levine and Pearlman (1994) contribute to the debate on 
delegation 
in two important ways. First, it generalises Rogoffs result to a multi-period contract 
model and highlights how the degree of conservatism 
depends upon the characteristics 
2 The research reported here was conducted independently of 
Levine and Pearlman (1994). 
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of the labour markets. Second, it caveats that labour European markets should not 
be very different ones, if the benefits of delegation want to be realised. 
However, with multi-period contracts, delegation to a conservative central bank 
does not provide as many goods as we would have hoped for; delegation to a central 
banker involves less stabilisation policy in the presence of multi-period contracts. This 
result is particularly inefficient: a role for an active monetary stabilisation emerges for 
contracts longer than one period'. Realising the full benefits of monetary policy sta- 
bilisation requires other solutions than delegation. Yet, Levine and Pearlman (1994) 
simply rille out precommitment solutions and do not explore optimal incentive con- 
tracts for. the central banker either. Clearly, we believe that further research on 
precommitment or, alternatively, optimal contracts is needed. 
What we propose here is a simple generalisation of the Taylor (1979) model on 
contracts to show, firstly, how the interaction of staggered and credibility problems 
generates different series of inflation and output behaviour. Section 5.2 presents the 
model. In Section 5.3 we obtain the discretionary equilibrium, where the government 
cannot precommit to a rate of inflation, and compare it to the static model with one 
period contracts. Our findings indicate that the existence of long-term staggered con- 
tracts increases the credibility problem of monetary policy. This result mirrors that 
obtained by Levine and Pearlman (1994), for an economy where nominal rigidities 
3See Taylor (1979) and Fischer (1977). 
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arise from the presence of Calvo contracts. The discretionary policy may be improved 
by precommitment. In Section 5.4 we depart, to our knowledge, from any previous 
work and focus on the feasibility of precommited equilibria. It will be shown that, as 
wage contracts last for more than one period -where by a period it is meant the length 
of time between the decisions on monetary policy taken by the central banker-, the 
central banker will face severe difficulties to deliver zero inflation monetary policy. 
This is the key result of this chapter. The role for delegation is briefly discussed in 
Section 5.5, where we refer to the work by Levine and Pearlman (1994). Section 5.6 
concludes. 
5.2 Wage contract models 
5.2.1 The static model 
Prior to studying the dynamic case, consider the following one period wage setting 
model. The economy evolves over an infinite number of periods. All variables are in 
logs and real variables represent deviations from their long-run equilibrium levels. 
Wage setters select their nominal wage, xt, in order to target the real wage. As- 
suming that the wage setters' target real wage is zero, the contract wage determination 
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is given by: 
Xt (5-1) 
where pt denotes the price at period t and - the rational expectations operator. 
A contract is assumed to specify a fixed nominal wage which will apply for the 
duration of the contract. The contractually determined money wage will be set equal 
to the expected market - clearing money wage, based on the known money wage and 
on individuals' expectations of the average level of prices prevailing in the market. 
Once wages have been set, the actual supply and demand conditions become known. 
Then, the actual level of employment equals the actual quantity of labour demanded, 
i. e., it is assumed that labour demand, the short side of the market, always dominates. 
The general level of prices depends upon the underlying nominal wage and demand 
fluctuations, 
A == Xt + pyt 1 
(5.2) 
where p represents the output elasticity of the price level. Alternatively, Equa- 
tion (5.2) can be seen as a downward-sloping labour demand curve, where Ilp is 
the price elasticity of labour demand. Aggregate demand is an increasing 
function of 
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real money balances, 
Yt Mt - pt) (5-3) 
where mt is the logarithm of the nominal money supply. The model is completed by 
specifying an objective function for the government. As is customary in this literature, 
it is assumed that the government sets its monetary policy, after the wage contract, 
xt, has been determined, in order to minimise a social loss function of the form 
00 
vt E 55-1 RI - A) (Yt - 
ý)2 + A(pt _ pt_1)2] (5.4) 
S=t 
where 0<A<I captures the weight that the government puts on targeting inflation 
versus output or, equivalently, employment. ý, the socially desired level of output, is 
greater than 9, the long run equilibrium level of output, which in our model equals 
zero. Zero is the most preferred level of inflation and 0<6<I is the parameter 
representing the society's inter-temporal preferences. 
Possible factors which might cause equilibrium output to lie below the socially 
desired level include distortions in the labour market such as income taxation, unem- 
ployment insurance and monopolistic unions. 
As will be shown later, in equilibrium the nominal wage is set at a sufficiently 
high level so that the monetary authority will not choose to inflate beyond that point 
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consistent with the wage setters' anticipated rate of inflation. The equilibrium is 
Nash because the monetary authority finds that the marginal utility from further 
inflation, that would raise output above the market determined level, is equal to 
the marginal disutility from added inflation. Furthermore, even if each group of 
wage setters dislikes inflation, just as society does, they have little incentives to stop 
their nominal wage increases because the impact of individual contracts on aggregate 
inflation is negligible. 
Solving for the discretionary equilibrium one finds that 
Yt -0 
(5-5) 
and 
pt-I - 
A)ý (5.6) 
Ap 
5.2.2 The dynamic model 
Borrowing from Taylor (1979), wage contracts last for two periods and decision dates 
overlap in the dynamic version. For simplicity, we assume that 
half of the contracts 
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are set in period t, half in t+1. The contract wage determination is assumed to be 
73f + f)"-Ll 
xt -- (5-7) 
As before, the wage contract is assumed to specify a fixed nominal wage which 
will apply for the duration of the contract. Hence, workers have to form expectations 
about current and future prices. 
The aggregate price level at t is determined by the average wage prevailing at time 
t, wt = (xt-1 + xt), together with output fluctuations, 
Pt 
Xt-i + Xt + pyt ,p 
(5-8) 
Hence, pt is homogeneous of degree one (hereafter, HOD 1) in past and current 
contracts, while xt is HOD 1 in current and future prices. The degree of nominal 
inertia is symmetric in lag and lead contracts. 
Aggregate demand depends upon real money balances, 
Yt = Mt - pt. 
(5.9) 
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Using (5.8) and (5-9), we find 
A, 
Ipmt 
+, (5-10) +p2 
(xt + xt-')] 
Yt 
I lrnt 
-, (xt + xt-1) 
1 
(5.11) 
+p2 
Finally, the objective function for the government is as in (5.4) above. 
Due to the presence of long-term staggered contracts, the central bank plays a 
dynamic rather than repeated game with the wage-setters. In repeated games, the 
simplest and best-understood class of dynamic games, players face the same physical 
environment in every period, and the players' overall payoff is a weighted average of 
the payoffs in each period. Dynamic games, however, consider strategies in which 
the past has some influence on current and future strategies because it has a direct 
effect on the environment. In these more complex environments, attention is often 
focused on equilibria in Markov strategies, that is,. strategies that only depend on 
the past history of the game through an appropriately defined state variable, as the 
state variable surnmarises the effect of the past on the current environment. Players' 
strategies are, therefore, restricted to be strategies without memory: bygones are 
bygones, except in so far as they affect the current state variable. 
V-1lowing this approach, we obtain the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), which ru 
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has been defined as a prohle of Markov strategies that yields a Nash equilibrium in ev- 
ery period (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p. 501. ). However, there can be many other 
equilibria. For instance, the MPE restriction rules out punishment strategies, which 
could be used to sustain a low inflation equilibria as in Barro and Gordon (1983). 4 
5.3 The time consistent policy rule 
Under the MPE restrictions dynamic programming provides a powerful method for 
studying dynamic optimisation. In particular, to obtain the time consistent equi- 
librium we will apply Bellman's principle of optimality which states, in this case, 
that 
V(Zt-, ) Min 1 (yt 2+X (pt _ pt _ 1) 
2+6V (Zt) (5.12) 
mt 
where zt is the relevant state variable of the system, and V(zt-1) is the optimised 
value function for the policy-maker at time t, given the lagged value for the state 
variable. 
The most important features of this procedure are twofold. First, the solution is 
characterised by the optimal value of the functional V*, rather than by the properties 
of the optimal control path, mt, as in optimal control theory. Second, it embodies the 
4See Obstfeld (1990,1991) for examples of monetary games focused on Markov perfect equilibria. 
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original problem of optimisation in a familY of optimisation sequences, which leads to 
the development of an iterative procedure that will actually solve for a whole family 
of problems. 
5 
In this game the state variable is chosen to be the inverse of the last wage contract 
that was written, expressed in real terms. It will be denoted 
Zt : --: ý A- Xt - 
(5-13) 
As mentioned before, we focus on equilibria in Markov strategies, i. e., strategies 
that only depend on the past history of the game through an appropriately defined 
state variable. However, how can we explain that zt is the relevant state variable of 
our problem? Indeed, we could have proposed a more general value function that 
included separate state variables, V(pt-1, xt-1). By doing so, we would have allowed 
pt-I and xt-, to enter the value function in a more general form than the one proposed 
here. Yet, in Appendix B. 1 we will show that there exists a solution to our problem 
in which pt-, and xt-, enter the policy maker's (wage setters') reaction function in a 
difference form, so that the state variable zt-1, defined in Equation (5.13), captures 
the effect of the past history of the game on the current environment. Although there 
may be other MPE that do not have this propoperty, and this should be emphasised, 
'See Chiang (1992). 
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we focus on a solution where a general strategy for the central bank (respectively, 
wage-setters) is to choose the money supply (wage contract) at every time period as 
a function of the state variable zt-1. In addition, the central bank also reacts to the 
current wage contract xt. Hence, the wage setters' reaction function is simply to set 
xt - ceo + alzt-, + pt-17 (5 ý 14) 
conditional upon the state variable zt-j. ' The constants ao and a, need to be de- 
termined and the term pt-, has to be introduced in order to satisfy the homogeneity 
properties of xt, i. e., it is only the wage contract, in real terms, that matters. 
Moreover, we denote as 
2 V(Zt-1) 00 + OlZt-I + 02Zt-1 (5.15) 
the present discounted value of social losses from t onwards, conditional on the state 
variable zt-1, where the coefficients ý0,01 and 02 need to be determined. 
Then, after substituting (5.15), (5.10) and (5.11) into (5.12), the best response of 
6Since the problem is linear quadratic, we look for a solution in which Vt(zt-1) is quadratic, and 
decision rules are linear. 
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the central bank to the wage-setters' reaction function is to choose mt to minimise 
V(zt-1) = MZn(l - A) 
[I(, 
-", - 
xt 
- 
xt-1) 
Mt 1+p22 
+Ap+ (Xt + Xt-l) - Pt-l 
11 
+p 2(l + p) 
I 
Z2). 6(00 + PlZt + ý2 t 
where 
Zt ::::::::: A- Xt -I 
[Pmt +I (Xt + Xt-i)l -Xt. I+p2 
(5-16) 
The optimal monetary policy at t is characterised by the first Oriler condition to 
this problem, which, after substituting xt in Equation (5.14), can be written as 
mt = 2A(i + p) (I - A)ý - A(I + p)Jp, 31 
Bceo + Cxt-I + Dpt-, + Balzt-1, 
where 
I 
2 (1 _A+ Ap2 + 6p2 ý2) 
B=A- [026P (I + 2p) +1-A- Ap], 
-A - Ap-MP) 
(5.17) 
D= A-[ (02Jp + pA) (I + 2p) +I- A]. 
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Note that C+D = 1, so that the homogeneity properties of the model are satisfied. 
Thus, the optimal monetary policy can be expressed as: 
Tnt = 2A(I + p) (I - A)ý - A(l + p)6pýj 
Bao + pt-, + (Bal - C)zt-, - 
(5-18) 
Substituting (5.18) into (5.10) and (5.11), making use of xt = ao + alzt-I + pt-, 
and simplifying the expressions for inflation and output in terms of the real state 
variable zt-1, we get the following: 
pt - pt-, = 2A(I - A)pý - AJp 
2ý1 
+ O'o 
(pB 
++ 
(paB - pC +2 zt-1, 1+p21+p 
yt = 2A(I - A)ý - AJppl 
+ 
(a, B -C-"2 
-c'o 
(B 
-- Zt-j. (5.20) 1+p21+p 
To guarantee consistency of the solution and get expressions for 01 and ý2, we 
must substitute the monetary rule given by (5.18) back into (5.16) and ensure that 
the coefficients on the state variables in the valuation function are identical to those 
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of (5.15). In other words, 
V(Zt_, ) =0+O, Zt_l +0 Z2 t02 t-1 
xt Xt- 12 A) 
+ mt 22 
+A p ""t +I- (xt + xt-1) - pt-I 
11+p 
2(l + p) 
I 
Z2). 6(00 + 01. Zt + 02 t 
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Furthermore, the parameters ao and a, in (5.14) must be consistent with those 
deriving from substituting (?? ) into (?? ). This leads to a system of equations for ao, 
oz, I 
Oo, 01 and 02, of which the four relevant ones are presented in Appendix B. 2.1. 
We now derive the steady state of the system where the rate of inflation is constant, 
pt - pt-1 --::::: k, xt - xt-1 : -::::: k, and, hence, zt - zt-1. The long-run 
(steady state) 
equilibrium level for the state variable of the system will be characterised by: 7 
Zt 
(-l + A)ý(l -A+ 2A, 02 
+ jA p 2) 
(5.21) 
2Ap [I -A+ 
2Ap2 + (A - 1)6] 
Similarly, the inflationary bias that corresponds to the steady state will be given 
'It should be pointed out that, for any value of zt-1, the state variable, zt, immediately jumps 
to its steady state value, given by Equation (5.21). 
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by: 
k= 
(I - A)ý(l -A+ 2Ap2 + jAp2) 
Ap [1 -A+ 2/\p2 + (A - 1)6] ) 
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(5.22) 
which is unambiguously larger than the inflationary bias associated with the static 
economy, given by Equation (5-6). Indeed, given 1>A> 07 it will be always the case 
for: 
so that, 
I-A+ 2Ap2 + JA p2 
1-A+ 2AP 2+ (A - I)j 
- A)p 
Ap 
This result mirrors that obtained by Levine and Pearlman (1994) for an economy 
where nominal rigidities arise from the presence of Calvo contracts. 
The equilibrium level of output is given by Equation (5.20), once zt-I has been 
substituted by its steady state value. As is usual in a time consistent equilibrium, 
the long-run level of output equals its natural equilibrium level, which in our model 
8 
equals zero. 
In order to discuss the welfare implications of the existence of overlapping con- 
8See Appendix B. 2.2 for further details on the algebra for the steady state. 
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tracts, we compare the time consistent equilibrium of our staggered economy with 
that obtained from the so called static economy, in which wages are set only for a 
single period. A comparison between the two economies leads to the following results. 
First, in the long-run equilibrium, the existence of overlapping contracts does not 
make any difference in terms of output. As was pointed out above, in both 
cases, the nominal wage is set at a sufficiently high level so that the government 
finds it too costly to allow for higher inflation. Despite the presence of multi- 
period contracts, monetary policy has no real effects in the equilibrium. This is 
a simple consequence of wage setters' expectations being fulfilled in the steady 
state. 
Second, for the two economies, the steady state level of inflation appears to re- 
spond in the same direction to changes in the parameters. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
how the inflationary bias decreases with p, the output elasticity of prices, for 
6-0.95) A=0.5 and ý-0.3. The larger p, the more costly is a monetary 
surprise and, therefore, the smaller the incentive to inflate. Moreover, the infla- 
tionary bias decreases with A, the monetary authority's concern about inflation. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates, for J=0.95, ý=0.3 and p=0.25, the point emphasised 
by Rogoff (1985a), that calling for a more conservative central banker will re- 
duce the credibility problem. Also, the smaller ý, the equilibrium output loss 
due to the labour market distortion, the smaller the inflation in the equilibrium. 
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This is shown in Figure 5.2 for 6=0.95, A=0.5 and p=0.25. Finally, for 
the staggered contract economy, expected inflation increases with J) the gov- 
ernment's discount factor. This point is illustrated in Figure 5.2 for A -- 0.51 
ý=0.3 p=0.25. Furthermore, the static and dynamic cases coincide for 6=0. 
As was the case in the presence of output persistence, the benefits of appointing 
a myopic central bank are overwhelming. A central bank, which does not care 
about the future, does not take into account the future benefits of expansionary 
policy either, so that the credibility problem faced by the monetary policy is 
heavily reduced. 
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Third, the existence of multi-period contracts makes a difference when looking at 
the size of the inflationary bias. Where there are long-term staggered contracts, 
the losses in terms of inflation are extremely large. Though monetary policy 
has no permanent real effects, it does lead to temporary changes in output and 
employment. This can be explained as follows: 
Suppose that we start off at the inflationary bias associated with the static (one 
period contract) equilibrium. We aim to show that, in the staggered-contract 
model, there is an incentive for the government to inflate beyond this point. At 
the static model's equilibrium, the level of expected inflation is such that there is 
no incentive for the government to inflate any further. By definition of the time 
consistent solution, the benefits of increasing demand in terms of increasing yt 
are exactly offset by the increased inflation. However, in the staggered contract 
model, if wage setters anticipated the stahc equilibrium rate of inflation, a little 
extra inflation will be worth paying. At this point, it becomes necessary to 
explain one of the main characteristics of our model. Since we have assumed that 
our contracts last for two periods, our economy can be thought to be composed, 
at any point in time, of two cohorts, the young and the old. Furthermore, the 
wage contract fixes the nominal wage to be received for the next two periods, 
so that, for any equilibrium with positive inflation, the current old's real wage 
is below zero, while the young's is above. Therefore, if wage setters anticipate 
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the static equilibrium rate of inflation, 7r', the real wage received by the workers 
will evolve as in Figure 5.3 below. 
In the long-term staggered contracts economy, if wage setters anticipate the static 
equilibrium rate of inflation 7s, a small increase in yt, due to a monetary expansion 
at time t, will represent a zero first-order loss at t. However, the monetary surprise 
at t implies that, during period t+1, the old's real wage will be too low. If we went 
back to the static equilibrium rate of inflation, *7r', from t+1 onwards, yt+l would be 
increased at effectively no cost (hence, a first-order gain). When nominal wages are 
fixed for two. periods, the short-run incentive to inflate is not different from the static 
case. But, given that an inflation surprise at t will not only increase current output, 
but also next period output, the (present-value) benefit of inflation increases. 9 
Let us now refer to the equilibrium paths. The adjustment of zt towards the 
equilibrium is given by Equation (5.21). This implies that, for any given initial infla- 
tion, our state variable immediately jumps to reach the unique rational expectations 
equilibrium. However, the dynamic paths for inflation, pt - pt-1, and output, yt, are 
expressed in Equations (5-19) and (5.20), respectively, 
'A similar argument suggests that the inflation bias associated with the static case would not be 
sufficient to stop the government inflating in a model with long-term, time-varying contracts a la 
Fischer. 
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pt - pt-, = 2A(l - A)pý - A6P201 
+ ceo pB ++ celzt-1, 
(5.23) 
I+p 
(2 
and 
yt = 2A(l - A)ý - A6pol 
+ c'o 
(B 
-1)+( 
Ap 
Zt-i - 
(5.24) 
1+p21-A+ 2Ap2 
) 
Deviations of inflation and output from their long-run equilibrium rates respond 
to changes in zt-, as expected. 
Departure from commitment 
Suppose we start off at time t with the second-best policy, characterised by 
zero inflation and output at its natural rate (yt = 0). " This policy is optimal 
only ex-ante because, though the policy-maker would announce zero inflation 
before wage setters write their contracts, he would prefer to depart from its 
earlier commitment afterwards. These kinds of policies are also known as time 
inconsistent and cannot be implemented in the absence of precommitment. 
Let us now assume that at time t+1 the government reneges on its commit- 
"Let us recall our definition of first-best policies as those aimed at eliminating the distortions 
tempting monetary policy makers to inflate. 
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ment and announces its intention of following a discretionary policy from now 
onwards. In a one period wage ýetting model this would imply an instantaneous 
jump to the unique discretionary equilibrium; but this is not the case in our 
context with staggered wage setting. Because at time t money remains constant 
as expected, xt and xt-I must be equal to the price level, so that zt must equal 
zero. This implies, in turn, that, at time t, zt is larger than Z, so that the state 
variable jumps downwards to reach the unique equilibrium, where zt+l = 
As a result, the real wage received at period t+1 for those workers that are 
writing their contracts at period t+1 increases and inflation goes up. But, 
as the average real wage of the economy at period t+1 is smaller than zero, 
output jumps above its long-run equilibrium level. As a consequence, inflation 
and output increase. This can be illustrated with the Figure 5.4 below. The 
expansionary effects last only for one period. At period t+2, the state variable 
zt+l already equals Z, its long-run equilibrium level, and output, inflation and 
the average real wage reach their equilibrium values. 
5.4 The Role for Precommitment 
As pointed out in the previous section, a second-best solution would be to design a 
permanent constitutional reform that prescribes zero inflation but allows the central 
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bank to respond optimally to disturbances. There are some practical drawbacks, 
however, in legislating a fullY state- contingent rule. For example, for the rule to 
be effective, it must be set in such a way that it is very difficult to change. This 
raises the danger that the policy-maker may be unable to foresee the nature of the 
shocks buffeting the economy many years in advance. Furthermore, the existence of 
transaction costs may make it prohibitively costly to specify the inflation rate to be 
chosen optimally in every possible state of nature. 
In a deterministic framework - as in the one presented here - no monetary policy 
stabilisation is required; the optimal policy rule is easy to legislate, and a policy 
maker, who has a zero inflation bliss point, could perfectly deliver sensible monetary 
policy . 
Indeed, in the one period wage setting model - here also referred as the static 
economy - the precommitment to the ex-ante optimal monetary policy unambiguously 
provides us with the 8econd-be8tsolution. Precommitment, solutions, however, appear 
to have different properties in the presence of staggered wage setting. 
In this section we discuss the commitment solution for an economy with long-term 
staggered contracts. In particular, we look at two different scenarios. In the first one, 
the central bank announces the money supply only for the current period mt. We 
show that, as the wage contracts last for two periods", the monetary authority's 
"By a period it is meant the length of time between the decisions on monetary policy taken by 
the central bank. 
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precommitment to mt, but not to rnt+l, is not enough to remove the inflation bias. 
Therefore, we also analyse the precommitment solution when the government is able 
to announce in advance the monetary policy that will be implemented for the same 
duration as nominal wage contracts. In other words, we allow the central bank to 
choose the money supply one period in advance, so that at the beginning of time t 
the central bank also makes the announcement for mt+,. We show that, with this 
precommitment structure, the second-best solution, which provides zero inflation with 
no losses of output, is shown not to be ex-ante optimal. In other words, even before 
the wage setters write their contracts, at the beginning of time t, the policy-maker 
will generally prefer to announce a monetary policy, mt+,, that does not deliver zero 
inflation. 
Before turning to this discussion, we should emphasise, that we do not solve for 
a one-time commitment to all future money supplies, - commitment to Imt+i 7Z= 
01 ... , oo 
1, at the beginning of time t. One may argue that such a precommitment 
structure could be sufficient to solve the credibility problem described so far. This is, 
however, a possibility that we do not consider in this chapter. First of all, we believe 
that neither governments nor central bankers are able to precommit to the entire 
path of all future money supplies. Second, we do not observe such a precommitment 
structure in the real world. 
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130 
The optimal rule under commitment to mt is derived as the solution to the following 
problem: 
V(zt-1) Min [(I - A)(yt - ý)' + A(pt - pt-1)' + 6V(zt)] (5.25) mt 
subject to 
A=1 [Pmt +1 (Xt + Xt-l)]) (5.26) 1+p2 
II 
Yt - Imt -- (xt + xt-, )], (5.27) 1+p2 
xt = aO' + Cel'Zt-1 + Ce2'(Mt - Xt-1) + Pt-li (5.28) 
and zt =- pt - xt. 
12 
This problem differs from the discretionary solution in that mt is already known 
when the wage setters are writing their contracts. Formally, the only difference from 
the previous model is that, within a period, the order of movements between the wage 
12 From now on, the parameters aj, (, 8i, ) denote the coefficients that characterise the equilibrium 
wage setters' reaction function (present discounted social losses) under commitment to mt. 
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setters and the policy-maker has been reversed. Following the MPE restrictions, we 
propose a wage setters' reaction function that includes the new variable, (mt - xt-1), 
in order to capture all the relevant information available to wage setters at the time of 
writing their contracts. Note that the present discounted social losses from t onwards 
are still given by an equation of the form of (5.15), so that the optimal rule is given by 
a feedback rule for mt on zt-1. To obtain the first order condition to this problem, we 
shall resort to computer algebra. Hence, after running the Mathematica programme 
presented in Appendix B. 3.1, we can write: 
Mt = 
Yt - 
ao, + (2- Ce2') 
2(l + p) 
Zt-i I Pt-l 
zt-l + Pt-l 
CQ Cf2'+(2- Ce2') 
+ 2(l 
ao, + (2p + a2')(-J) A 
2(l + p) -I- 
Zt-i I 
Cel' + Ce2' -I+ (2p+ Ce2')( 
2(l + p) 
i 
ao, + (2p + a2')( A 
Zt aO' + Ce2 '(A) + 2(l + P) 
02, K a, 
+ Ce2'- I+ (2p +02') 
+A all - Ce2' 
+ 
2(1 + p) 
(5.29) 
(5-30) 
(5.31) 
(5-32) 
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Or alternatively, 
-J K mt - xt-1 AA Zt-1; 
(5.33) 
Yt -- - 
ceol +[ 
2- Ce2' ] 
(rnt 
_ Xt_l) _ 
a,, +I 
Zt-i (5.34) 2(l + p) 2(l + p) 2(l + p)] 
Pt - Pt-l - 
ceo I+- 
Xt-l) + 
a,, -I- 2p Zt-i 1 2(l + p) 
[ 
2(l + p) 
I 
(mt 
[ 
2(l + p) 
1 
(5.35) 
zt = -aol + 
CZO I+ 2p + a2' 
_ a2 (rnt _ xt_l) + 
[a,, -I- 2p Zt-17 2(l + p) 
[2(l 
+ p) 2(l + p) 
(5.36) 
where 
J= -2ao, + CtO'Ce2' - a2'01'6 + CiO'a2'02'6 + 2ao, A + 201, bp - 3a2'016P - 2ao'02'6P 
+ 4ceo, 02'02'6P + 2ceoAp + 201'6p 2- 2a0l'bP 
2- 4ao'02'6P 2+ 4ao'Ce2'02'6P 2 
- 4ý + 2a2'ý + 4Aý - 2a2 '4 - 4pý + 2Ce2'Pý + 4Apý - 2Ce2'4ý7 
(5.37) 
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A=4- 4Ce2' + Ce2' 2+ Ce 2' 2 02'6- 4A +4Ce2, A - 
4Ce2'fl2'6p+4Ce2 2 02'6P 
+ 402', ýP + 402'6P 2- 8002 6P2 + 402 2 02' bP2 + 4AP21 
(5.38) 
K=2- 2cel, - 
3Ce2' + Cel'a2' + a2' 
2+ 
Ce2'02'6 + Cel'Ct02'ý + Ce2' 
2 02'6- 2A + 2a,, A 
+2Ce2'ý 
- 202'6P - 
2cel'02'6P + 4cej'Ce2'P2'6P + 402' 2 P2'6P - 2Ap + 2a,, Ap 
+ 2a2'AP - 4a, '02'6P 
2 
-4Ce2'#2 6P2 + 4a, 'Ce2'02 6P2 +4a2 2 02 6P2. 
(5-39) 
In order to characterise the solution to our problem we need to identify the pa- 
rameters ao,, al', a2,01,, and ý2'- With respect to ao, and a,,, the coefficients in 
Equation (5.28) must be equal to those obtained after substituting Equation (5-35) 
into (?? ). Furthermore, we must replace the expressions (5.30) and (5.31) into (5.12) 
and ensure that the coefficients on zt-, are identical to those of Equation (5-15). 
Looking at the expression for zt, after substituting out the values for ao, ý a,, and 
02', presented in Appendix B-3.2, we can write: 
Zt -(I - 
A)ý (5.40) 
4Ap 
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Our solution for the state variable mirrors that obtained in the dynamically consis- 
tent equilibrium; in the sense that the state variable is always at its unique rational 
expectations equilibrium level. Therefore, Equation (5.40) gives us the steady state 
value for zt, which, in turn, implies a steady state inflationary bias of: 
A)ý 
2Ap (5.41) 
With respect to the equilibrium level of output, this remains at the natural rate, i. e., 
y=o. 
A comparison between Equations (5.41) and (5.6) enables us to conclude what we 
had already suggested. The equilibrium inflation rate equals half the inflation bias 
associated to the static case. The reason for this is pretty intuitive: In any moment 
of time t, half of the wage contracts will not be revised, and the government has an 
incentive to exploit the output benefits derived from surprise inflation. Wage setters 
anticipate this temptation and increase their wage contracts so as to prevent any 
monetary surprise. " In the presence of long-term staggered contracts, in order to 
remove completely the inflation bias, the government should be able to precommit 
for as many periods as periods last the wage contracts. We turn to this matter in the 
next subsection. 
130ne might think that this structure of precommitment could be sufficient to remove the current 
inflationary bias in the presence of long-term, time-varying contracts a la Fischer. If wage contracts 
last for more than one period, however, precommitment to mt only will not be sufficient to avoid 
the incorporation of positive expected inflation in the future. 
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In this section, we analyse the precommitment solution when the government is able 
to announce in advance the monetary policy that will be implemented for the whole 
duration of the contract written at t-1. In other words, before the wage contracts are 
written, at the beginning of period t-1, the government announces mt-, and mt. It 
should be noted that the government cannot follow this structure of precommitment 
for more than one period: when time t arrives, mt has been already determined by 
the previous announcement, and all that is left is the announcement of the monetary 
policy for next period, mt+,. This will lead to a sort of sequence of overlapping 
monetary decisions. 
The optimal rule under commitment to mt+l is derived as the solution to the 
following problem: 
V(zt-,, mt - xt-1) MM 
A)(Yt 
_ 
ý)2 +A (pt _ pt_1)2 + 6V(Ztl Mt+l - Xt)] 
mt+l 
(5.42) 
subject to 
Pt pmt + (xt + xt-1) 
(5.43) 
1+p2 
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Yt 
Imt 
-, (xt + xt-1) 
I 
+p2 
xt = ceo 11 + Cel"(Mt - Xt-1) + Ce2"(Mt+l - Xt-1) + Xt-1) 
and zt - pt - xt. 
14 
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(5.44) 
(5.45) 
In this case, the wage setters know both mt and mt+l at the time of writing 
their contracts. Following the MPE restrictions, we propose a wage setters' reaction 
function that includes the new state variable (mt - xt-1), and also (mt+l - xt-1) as the 
workers make use of all relevant information available when the contracts are written 
at the beginning of period t. With respect to the present discounted value of social 
losses, the reaction function given by Equation (5.15) has to be rewritten to look like 
V(Zt-1, Mt - Xt-1) - 
00" + 01"Zt-I + 02"(Mt - Xt-1) 
03"Zt-l(Mt 
- Xt-1) + 
04"Zt-1 2+ 05"(Mt Xt-l) 
(5.46) 
As argued in Section 5.3, a more general value function for the policy maker, 
V(pt-1 , xt-I , mt) , could 
have been proposed. We will show, however, that there ex- 
ists a solution to our problem in which pt-1, x, -,, mt enter 
the policy maker's value 
function in the way proposed here. 
14 From now onwards, the parameters ai,, (, 3i,, ) denote the coefficients that characterise the equi- 
librium wage setters' reaction function (present discounted social losses) under commitment to mt+,. 
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The model is solved, once again, with the help of Mathematica. 15 In this case, 
we cannot obtain a general solution for the equilibrium inflation rate, but we do get 
some economic intuition through the numerical simulations presented in Table 5.1.16 
Table 5.1: Inflation in the steady state 
. 95 . 01441 
.5 . 06 1 0 3 
0 -. 03 
Other values p= . 25, A= . 5, and ý= . 03. 
'7r 
1.5 . 0011 
. 75 . 0033 
. 05 . 0867 
Other values 6 -- . 95, A= . 5, and ý= . 03. 
0 
.8 . 0041 
. 05 . 01805 
Other values p= . 25,6 = . 95, and ý -- . 03. 
W 
1 . 4805 
. 05 . 024 
0 0 
Other values p= . 25, A= . 5, and 6= . 95. 
If the government does not suffer from a credibility problem, either because it is 
only concerned about inflation, (A = 1), or because it lacks the incentives to create 
monetary surprises, (ý = 0), the equilibrium inflation rate equals zero. However, 
when the parameter A is not equal to I or when ý is different from zero, the long-run 
level of inflation does not correspond to zero. In these cases the value of society's 
discount factor seems to play an important role. 
"Since we assume that Vt(zt-i, mt-xt-i) is linear quadratic in zt-1 and (mt -xt-1), the optimal 
monetary rule can be written as a linear feedback rule for mt+l on zt-1 and (mt - xt-1). 
16 Some infinite horizon monetary policy games, based on MPE, have been shown to possess 
a multiplicity of Perfect Nash Equilibria, see, e. g., Lockwood and Philippopoulos 
(1994). Our 
simulations suggest that this is also the case for this example. The results presented 
in this subsection 
correspond to the most intuitive equilibrium. 
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For example, assuming that we start off at zero inflation, a very impatient mone- 
tary authority would choose to announce future cuts in the growth of money, so as to 
induce a short-run increase in current output. In other words, a monetary institution 
that heavily discounted the future would choose to announce, at the beginning of time 
a contractionary monetary policy for t+1. In extreme cases7 when the policy-maker 
is very myopic, a deflationary policy would be announced. Our simulations show that 
a negative steady state inflation rate might well exist for small values of 6. 
The intuition is clear: at time t, rnt has been already determined by, let us say, 
a previous government committed to zero inflation, i. e., rnt :, --:: rnt-1 :::::::: pt-1. The 
announcement of a decrease in the growth of money for tomorrow, mt+l - rnt 
leads to a disinflationary process, for labour market equilibrium to be preserved at 
t+I. " As a result, wages written at the beginning of time t, xt, will not be as high 
as expected at time t-1, when xt-1 and mt were chosen. Therefore, the current level 
of prices, pt, will be smaller than expected at t-1. But, if pt < pt-1 = rnt, mt will 
be too large and there will be gains in terms of current output. 
Similar scenarios for costless, credible disinflations, which occur without any in- 
crease in unemployment, can be found in the literature. In Taylor (1983) credible 
disinflation can be costless, but only if it is slow, in a model with precommitment 
17 Note that, in this particular example, disinflation (decrease in the growth rate of prices) effec- 
tively means deflation (decrease in the price level), since we are assuming a zero inflation starting 
point at time t. 
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and time-varying wage contracts. Buiter and Miller (1985) use Calvo (1983) model 
of staggering to show that inmediate disinflation is costless. The closest example 
to our analysis is provided by Ball (1994), who finds that fully credible disinflation 
will cause a boom in a model a la Taylor. Our analysis, however, departs from these 
works in two important respects. First, trying to explain whether the inflationary 
inertia arising from the staggered timing of price adjustments can be blamed for the 
costs of disinflationary policy, these authors assume perfect credibility from the side 
of the policy-maker. In our model, however, disinflationary policy is not assumed to 
be credible but it is shown to be the optimal and, therefore, credible choice of a very 
impatient policy-maker. Second, our model predicts that, for a very impatient central 
banker, not only disinflationary policy but also a deflationary one may be optimal 
and credible. 
A very different picture is obtained when society is relatively more patient - values 
of J close to 1, as the long-run equilibrium is inflationary. We do not have a good 
intuition for this result, but we provide the following theory: In our model, even 
although the government announces what tomorrow's money supply, Tnt+,, is going 
to be, it is unable to precommit to the level of prices, pt+,. But, when wage setters 
try to target the equilibrium real wage, they are concerned over the value of pt+,. Yet, 
pt+l is a function of xt+,. But xt+l depends upon I'nt+2, which is not determined at 
the time of writing the contracts at the beginning of time t. Wage setters may believe 
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that, if the policy-maker is known to care about the future, he might departure in 
the future from the zero inflation rule. So, under staggering, even if we allow the 
government to precommit itself for the two periods that the contracts last, it may be 
unable to solve the time inconsistency problem of monetary poliCy. 18 
Finally, the benefits of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker with 
the appropriate discount factor are clear: in our numerical simulations, if 6 was equal 
to 1/3, the zero inflation rule could be easily achieved, when p=0.25, A=0.5 and 
y=0.03. Moreover, the delegation of the monetary policy to a policy-maker without 
any concern over output, A-1, or the elimination of the distortions tempting the 
policy-maker to inflate, ý=0, will also deliver a zero inflation rule. 
5.5 Conservative central bankers 
The results of the previous section indicate that the presence of long-term staggered 
contracts increases the credibility problem of monetary policy. In the light shed by 
that finding, one may argue that appointing a central bank more conservative than 
society will lead to a higher social welfare. This would be easy to achieve in our 
non stochastic framework. If the banker were solely concerned with inflation, i. e., if 
18 Our intuition suggests that this result may not be translated to an economy with 
long-term, 
time-varying contracts. If this was the case, the need for a long term precommitment should 
be 
emphasised. 
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A=1, zero inflation would be delivered. 19 Things will be different, however, in a 
stochastic model where the appointment of a more conservative central bank imposes 
a short-run trade off between low inflation and output stabilisation. Furthermore, 
as shown by Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979,1980), under long term contracts, a 
role for an active monetary stabilisation policy, even when completely anticipated, 
emerges. Monetary policy can offset the variability of output arising from economic 
disturbances that were not known at the time of setting the wages. Therefore, in 
economies characterised by staggered wage setting, the government would like to 
maintain the instruments to accommodate large shocks to output. 
Levine and Pearlman (1994) obtain the optimal choice of a conservative banker 
for a staggered wage contract economy in the spirit of Calvo (1983). They find that, 
as nominal wage stickiness increases, optimal delegation of monetary policy requires 
a more conservative central bank. The reason for this is that nominal wage stickiness 
increases the present value benefits of monetary surprises, so that the government 
finds it more difficult not to inflate. In turn, this implies that a more conservative 
central bank needs to be appointed to achieve a given level of inflation. This result 
- recall also the literature on hysteresm - is particularly inefficient. In a context 
where monetary policy stabilisation is strongly desirable, the classical dilemma that 
characterises monetary policy-making provides control of inflation only at the cost of 
19This can be easily shown in Equation (?? ). Note that 01, a, and ao equal zero for A=1. 
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much less than optimal stabilisation. 
5.6 Conclusions 
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What we show in this chapter is how the credibility problem of monetary policy 
acquires special significance in the presence of staggered wage setting. Moreover, 
some of the solutions proposed in the literature to overcome this problem, such as 
delegation or precommitment, appear to be less efficient when the extensive use of 
overlapping contracts is accounted for. There are several reasons: 
Taylor (1980) demonstrates that, under staggered wage setting, one-time shocks 
to the economy are capable to generate unemployment persistence. We have already 
discussed, earlier in this thesis, how the persistence in unemployment increases the 
costs of delegating monetary policy to a very conservative central bank. Conservative 
central bankers are a reasonably good, third-best solution in a model a la Rogoff, but 
they seem not to perform so well for economies with distorted labour markets. 
Precommitment to the ex-ante optimal monetary policy (second-best) though dif- 
ficult to implement in a stochastic environment, would eliminate the inflationary bias 
of non credible monetary policy in a model with one period wage setting. Yet, allow- 
ing for nominal rigidities seriously reduces the efficiency of this mechanism. As shown 
before, period by period precommitment is not sufficient to reach the second-best so- 
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lution, if wage setters write their contracts for more than one period. If monetary 
decisions are taken at the beginning of each period, when, let us say, workers are 
setting contracts for two periods, at the beginning of every second period, then, the 
central banker will face credibility problems if committed only period by period. This 
result is also relevant to the literature on optimal inflation contracts for the central 
bank, for it emphasises the need for the sufficient length of such incentive contracts. 
Finally, trying to solve this difficulty, a long-term but still feasible commitment 
has been proposed. Our findings suggest that, in the presence of long-term staggered 
wage contracts, a monetary authority, if sufficiently impatient, will not necessarily 
deliver zero inflation. 
6 The consequences of near-rational behaviour 
Chapter 6 
The consequences of near-rational 
behaviour 
6.1 Introduction 
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In most of the Keynesian models of the 1970's and early 1980's nominal rigidities 
were assumed rather than explained. However, in most cases, it was clearly in the 
interest of agents to eliminate the rigidities they were assumed to create. Fortunately, 
Keynesian economics has made much progress in the past few years, producing models 
in which optimising agents choose to create nominal rigidities. 
Transaction costs and costs of negotiation involved in the wage - and price - 
setting process have been recognised, so that nominal wage contracts - and prices - 
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which fix the nominal wage - and price - for a period are usually readily accepted. 
A different source of nominal rigidities leads us to the mechanism controlling 
the expectation formation process. Rational expectations - versus adaptive expecta- 
tions - became increasingly attractive due to the important efforts undertaken after 
the Lucas' revolution in both empirical and theoretical basis. 
According to rational expectations theorists, when economic agents take decisions 
they make efficient use of all the information available to them. Given that today there 
is limitless economic information available to the public, any attempt by the monetary 
authority to affect real economic activity will be futile. But recently an important 
number of economists have managed to embody in relatively sophisticated models 
what seems to be a much more appealing approach to reality: Rational people make 
good evaluations about the state of the economy, but they do not make continuous use 
of every single piece of information they can possibly obtain; that is, they are near- 
rational. Though near-rational behaviour does not make a great difference to single 
agents, the aggregate outcome may be very surprising. In particular, departures from 
fully rational behaviour can lead to real effects of nominal money and large output 
effects. ' 
In this chapter we show how the introduction of microfoundations, which explain 
'See Akerlof and Yellen (1985). 
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the nominal rigidities assumed in the literature, adds significantly to monetary policy 
games. We show that, when near-rational behaviour is considered, the time consis- 
tency problem of monetary policy acquires different relevance. Section 6.2 presents 
the model, borrowed from Akerlof and Yellen (1985), on which our analysis is based. 
With less than fully rational behaviour, monetary surprises lead to large output ef- 
fects. Positive monetary shocks tend to expand the economy in the short-run, but 
disinflationary policy is too costly. Section 6.3 simply extends the original model to 
introduce the alleged credibility problem suffered by the monetary authority. As a 
result, the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies is shown. Section 6.4 
concludes. 
6.2 The Akerlof and Yellen model 
Let us consider an economy with only two different types of monopolistic firms. A 
fraction (I - 0) of all firms - the fully maximising firms - choose their prices and 
wages at the level that maximises profits, taking as given the average price level, i. e. 
assuming that its decision does not affect that of its competitors. The remaining 
fraction ý- the non-maximising firms - sets its price and wage according to a rule of 
thumb in the short-run. 
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A downward-sloping demand curve for each firm is given by 
mp) (pp) -" Iq >17 (6.1) 
where Y denotes output of the firm, p the price being charged by the firm, and p the 
general level of prices, defined as a geometric mean of prices. M denotes the money 
supply per firM2,77 is the price elasticity of demand and 77 >1 implies that each firm 
has increasing revenues as its own price falls. 
The production function of the firm equals 
(eN)" 0<a<1 (6.2) 
where e captures the average effort of workers and is assumed to depend upon the 
real wage paid by the firm: e= e(w). e= e(w) is assumed to be a differentiable, 
concave function, whose elasticity with respect to w is less than one at high w and 
greater than one at low w. N denotes the level of employment in the firm. a is the 
elasticity of the production function with respect to total units of effort within the 
firm, so that 1/a is the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. 
2 Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989) demonstrate how a demand 
function for an individual firm, with real money supply and the firm's relative price as arguments, 
can be derived when consumers maximise an utility function which contains real money balances. 
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Nominal profits for the firm are given by 
ri = M) 
e(w) 
148 
(6-3) 
In the long-run equilibrium, i. e., under the perfect information hypothesis, both 
types of firms charge the same price p -- p. Each firm chooses its price and wage in 
order to maximise profits, taking the average price level p as given. For notational 
convenience, let us denote the variables in the initial period as follows: 
MO as the initial money supply per firm, 
po as the average price, the price of maximising and non-maximising firms and 
wo as the average real wage, the real wage of maximising and non-maximising firms. 
Thus, the first order condition for profit maximisation implies 
(i) First, with respect to prices, 
-77/cf-l Wfi 
- 0. (6.4) arl 77) 
(M) (P)-" 
+" 
(M), /C, (p) 
(W) ap ppaP 
fj-77/0- 
Evaluated at the initial equilibrium, where p= p- = po, w=w= wo and 
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M- MO, one can write 
W, (6-5) 
Po a Po e(wo), 
so that 
(M 
0)[, 77 wo a/(a-1). 
(6-6) 
Po ý7 -1a e(wo) 
1 
Or, alternatively, 
po =: kMo, k=1q 
WO (6-7) 
Irl 
-1a e(wo) 
1 
(ii) Furthermore, given that a unit of real wage provides c units of effort, profit 
maximisation also implies, with respect to wages, 
Min WO 
le(wo)1 Oe(w*) W* 
aw e(w*) 
(6-8) 
i. e., profit maximisation implies that the firm chooses the real wage that min- 
imises the unit cost of a labour efficiency unit. The real wage is chosen at 
the optimal level w* where the elasticity of effort with respect to real wage is 
unity. In other words, the firm is paying the efficiency wage3 and the first order 
3See Yellen (1984) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) as examples for efficiency wage models. 
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condition needs to be written as 
po k*Mo, k* =1 
77 w] (6-9) 
171 
-1a e(w*) 
With this choice of real wage w*, the firm's labour demand is given by 
No 
k*-llof 
(6-10) 
e(w* ) 
If the productivity of labour is assumed to depend on the real wage that workers 
received, this may induce firms to set wages above the market-clearing equilibrium 
level and involuntary unemployment will occur. Hence, we can assume that total 
supply for-labour per firm exceeds total labour demand, so that there will be unem- 
ployment and the firm will obtain as much labour as it wants at its preferred real 
wage w*. 
This characterisation of the initial (long-run) equilibrium Provides Akerlof and 
Yellen (1985) with the benchmark to discuss how much employment will change if 
there is a monetary surprise when some of the firms are not fully maximisers in the 
short-run. 
If the money supply changes by a very small fraction E, so that M= Mo (1 + E), 
the short-run equilibrium will be characterised as follows. The short-run maximising 
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firms, whose variables will be denoted by an m superscript, set both price and wage at 
those levels that exactly maximise profits. The non-maximising firms follow a rule of 
thumb and continue to charge the same price for output and to pay the same money 
wage as in the original equilibrium. Variables for those firms are denoted by an nm 
superscript. 
Thus, at the short-run equilibrium, 
p nm = po. 
Furthermore, short-run profit maximisation with respect to wages implies that 
wm must remain unchanged from its long-run value w*, the efficiency wage, obtained 
in (6.8). Thus, 
wm =w*. (6-12) 
Setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to prn equal to zero, given 
w= w*, yields the optimising pI as a function of p and M. Remembering that p 
is a geometric mean of prices, so that P= p' 
1-0 P nm, 3 , and setting pnm = po and 
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M= A/lo (1 + c), one can write 
4 
pm Po (i + o0l (6.13) 
where 
0 a)/a < 1. (6-14) 
In this scenario, an increase in money supply shifts upwards the demand curve faced 
by the firm. As the firm operates under decreasing returns of scale, the marginal cost 
is upward sloping and profit maximisation leads to an increase in the relative price. 
Given the definition of the general level of prices as a geometric mean, P -- 
p MI-0 p nm, 3 , using (6.11) and (6-13), it follows that 
p= Po(l + (6.15) 
Finally, as the nominal wage paid by the non-maximising firms remains at its 
initial value7 one can write 
nm 
w* Po 
Po (1 + 6)(1-0)0 
= (6.16) 
4See Appendix C. 1 for further details. 
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where w* is the efficiency wage and (1 captures the departure of the real 
wage paid by the non-maximising firms from its long-run equilibrium. 
It should be noticed that an increase in the money -supply induces the non- 
maximising firms to hire more labour, to an extent which depends upon the reduction 
in the relative price of output, the increase in aggregate real balances, and the number 
of labourers needed to produce output according to the production function. Hence, 
the average level of employment will be equal to 
sI 
Mo(l + 6) 
1/a 
[e, (w*)]'-, ' le-(w*(' + 
1PO(I 
+ E)(I-, 3)01 
The non-neutrality of monetary policy can be easily illustrated since 5 
a(SINO) 
06 16=0 
1 +ýo - 
a 
o(1 - 0)0 > 0. 
(6.17) 
(6.18) 
Given that 0 is a positive number not higher than one, an increase in the money 
supply causes an increase in employment. Also, as the fraction of non-maximising 
firms tends to zero and, thus, 0 ---ý 0 and 0 --ý 1, the model turns into one of monetary 
neutrality. 
5 See Appendix C-2 for further details on the algebra of Equation 6.18. 
6.2 THE AKERLOF AND YELLEN MODEL 154 
In order to explain whether or not it is reasonable for the firm not to revise 
prices and nominal wages, Akerlof and Yellen first write the firms' profits, given by 
Equation (6.3), as functions of E, i. e.,: 
I-Inm = pol-"f (E) - po-a'lg(E)h(c)w* [e(w*h(c))]-', 
(6-19) 
,71 mf [po (I + g(E)W* [e 
ri [PO (I + E)T (W*)]- 
. 
where H' denotes the profits of a typical maximising firm and 11" the profits of a 
near-rational firm. Furthermore, f (, E), g(E) and h(c) can be found after substituting 0 
po (I + and Mo (I + E) for p and M, respectively, into the profit function given 
by Equation (6.3). 
The near-rationality of the firm is justified as the losses to the non-maximising 
firms, over their maximum possible profits, can be shown to be second order with 
respect to c. After calculating the following derivative, 
a(ri m- iinm) 
77) (pm 
apm 
096 19E 
+ 
t(, )(pm(6»- 1-77/Ctg(, E)w*(e(w*»-' 
, Op 
ce (96 
" w*[e(h(e)w*)]-' h(, )W*20e(h(e)w*) - [e(h(f-)w* -2 0(ý 
1- 
" (pm (, E» 
1-77 Of (6) (pm W) '/' w* [e- (w ae OE 
(PO), -" 
Of (6) 
- (po)-ll'h(c)w*[e(h(c)w*)]-1(9g(E) Oe 0( 
ah(g) (P0) -, /", g (E) aE 
(6.20) 
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where po(I has been simplified to p', it can be shown that - 
a(rlm 
- llnm) 
= 
155 
(6.21) 
aE I E=o 
Indeed, the first three terms in Equation (6.20) are zero for c equal to zero because 
of the first-order condition for p' and w*, maximands of the profit function Ilm. 1 
Furthermore, the fourth and the fifth term in curly brackets also cancel for c equal to 
zero, because p'(0) = po and h(O) = 1. This is a key result of Akerlof and Yellen's 
paper, as it shows that the losses to the non-maximising firms over their maximum 
possible profits will be only second order with respect to E. 
Intuitively, the non-maximising firms may be thought of as facing a cost of chang- 
ing prices and money wages, which is assumed to be constant, independent of the 
magnitude of the change, and equal to -y in real terms. ' Therefore, in choosing the 
optimal level of prices and money wages, the non-maximising firms must balance the 
opportunity cost of having the wrong price and money wage and the cost of changing 
them. Suppose now that both price and money wage are set so as to be optimal for 
the value of E=0, and suppose that c varies. The non-maximising firms decide not 
'Note that h(c) = (1 + c)-('-, 3)19 has the property that h(O) = I. 
7 Ball and Romer (1990) have argued that the Akerlof and Yellen's model, by itself, is not suc- 
cessful in providing foundations for the Keynesian assumption of nominal rigidity. 
A combination 
of a departure from full rationality and small nominal frictions is necessary 
for substantial nominal 
rigidities to arise. 
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to revise nominal variables if and only if: 
ri (po(i + c),, w*) - ri 
(po, w*(i + 
But, given that 
ri (Po(i + ol, w*) - ri 
(PO7 w* (I + 0-(1-P)o) 
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7p. (6.22) 
f=0 = 
07 (6.23) 
for any fixed cost of changing prices and money wages, (-ý), the monetary authority 
can always find a small enough monetary surprise (c) such that the firm decides not 
to adjust. 
8 
In summary, the model presented shows how changes in aggregate demand can 
cause significant changes in the level of employment. The model is characterised 
by two types of monopolistic firms: those who are fully maximisers, ready to take 
advantage of any single piece of information or profitable opportunity available to 
them, and those who choose to be maximisers exclusively in the long-run, given 
that they can only make small gains from altering their behaviour in the short-run. 
Intuitively, prices might not change in response to modest shifts in costs because of 
the gap between price and marginal cost in a monopolistic industry. Furthermore, one 
could think of the non-maximising firms as agents who face small costs of changing 
8 Here we should note that the money supply per firm, a variable entering the firm's profit function, 
has been excluded to simplify the notation, because it is not a choice variable for the firm. 
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nominal wages and prices. If, in response to a change in money supply, they find it 
almost costless not to adjust prices and money wages, these small costs will lead to 
real effects of nominal money. The firms' behaviour can be labelled as near-rational 
because, even if they behave suboptimally and suffer from losses from not adjusting, 
those losses are very small. Properly speaking, the losses derived from the monetary 
policy shock are second order losses. 
There are many explanations of the sources of these fixed costs incurred when 
prices are changing. ' Carlton (1989) has recognised that the monopolistic discipline 
includes a certain degree of price rigidity: firms are reluctant to change prices because 
there is a risk that a price war could break out, any time a price change occurs. He also 
suggests that, because the customer might interpret price changes as a signal that 
market conditions are varying, monopolistic firms are willing to not accommodate 
temporary or small shocks. Menu costs of relabelling prices on items have been also 
accepted as an interpretation for price rigidity. 
The Akerlof and Yellen model is, no doubt, one of the most salient expositions 
of the New Keynesian tradition. As a framework in which agents do not have much 
of a local incentive to revise nominal variables, it is an excellent microfoundation for 
a world with nominal rigidities. In this paper, however, the credibility problem of 
monetary policy is not considered. Obviously, what the authors want to show is that, 
'See, for example, Blinder 
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even if anticipated, monetary policy might have real effects. 
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In the standard time consistency model, it is assumed that some agents are pre- 
committed to nominal variables (usually, the nominal wage). Indeed, the assumption 
of some kind of nominal rigidity is central to the model: without nominal rigidities, 
the time consistency problem of the optimal monetary policy would not exist. " In 
some way, infinite menu costs or less than near-rational behaviour have been assumed 
to explain the nominal rigidities presented in all the papers about the time consis- 
tency problem of the optimal monetary policy. This is a very strong assumption 
since renegotiation is presumably possible, when these agents obtain large gains from 
changing their nominal variables. 
As we show in the next section, the importance of studying a monetary game 
that includes a microfoundation to explain the existence of nominal rigidities is not 
purely aesthetic. Indeed, the incorporation of microfoundations, such as near-rational 
behaviour and fixed costs of changing prices, may well lead to the non-existence of 
an equilibrium in pure strategies. 
"We have already emphasised that the Akerlof and Yellen (1985) model turns into one of monetary 
neutrality when the fraction of non-maximising firms tends to zero, i. e., when nominal rigidities are 
removed. 
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6.3 Credibility problems 
159 
It is generally accepted that monetary policy is normally set so as to reconcile a low 
level of inflation with the need for output or, equivalently, employment stabilisation 
around certain socially desired levels. According to these models the government 
chooses the money supply, A/It, that minimises the following ad hoc social loss function 
A-92 
fit-i 
12 Qt A) 
( 
No 
)+A (ý5t 15t- 
.), (6.24) 
where p denotes the average price level at time t and Nt is the average number of 
workers at period t. 1ý denotes the socially desired level of employment, No represents 
the long-run equilibrium labour demand of the firm, and 0<A<I captures the 
relative weight that the monetary authority puts on inflation versus employment 
stabilisation. 
In a model that embodies monopolistic competition, one could consider the in- 
efficiency associated with monopolistic competition, with output of monopolistically 
produced goods being too low, as aa distortion tempting the monetary institution 
to inflate. If such a model displays also non-neutrality of money - like the one pre- 
sented above - this could lead us to conclude that it is possible and desirable 
for the 
monetary institution to affect the real economic activity. But, in order to consider 
this possibility, one needs to take into account the role that expectations about the 
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future path of money supply play in price and wage determination. Once the gov- 
ernment's incentives to affect the real economic activity have been recognised, firms' 
decisions will be determined by their expectations about the central bank's future 
behaviour and they will not believe announcements of monetary policy that are time 
inconsistent. 
The discretionary or time consistent equilibrium is the equilibrium where, within 
the period, the monetary authority cannot precommit to the rate of inflation before 
the non-maximising firms set their nominal wages and prices. It consists -of the 
following three stages: 
stage I At the beginning of each period t, lagged prices, pt-1, are given. The non- 
maximising firms, those who face some costs of changing prices and behave in 
a near-rational way, form their expectations about the money supply, Aft, and 
choose their nominal wages and prices, pt" (let us say, in order to print a new 
catalogue), in advance of the determination of Mt. 
stage 2 Subsequently, Mt is chosen. In other words, the deviation away from the 
rate of money growth anticipated by the non-maximising firms, e, is determined. 
stage 3 Finally, the maximising firms choose p' and the non-maximising firms decide t 
whether to revise or not their prices. Thus, pt and 
St are determined. 
The non-maximising firms and the policy-maker play a non-cooperative game. 
The 
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model is solved by backwards induction. First, we show that a non-inflationary policy 
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. Second, we explain why an equilibrium in 
pure strategies does not exist, for sufficiently small costs of changing prices. 
6.3.1 The zero inflation policy is not an equilibrium 
In this section we show how the traditional time consistency problem of the optimal 
monetary policy would arise in a model a la Akerlof and Yellen, if costs of changing 
prices were sufficiently large. For very large costs of changing prices, the monetary 
authority would suffer from a credibility problem, if it tried to precommit to a zero 
inflation policy rule. Given that the zero inflation policy is not time consistent, it 
could not be sustained as an equilibrium. 
Suppose that the non-rational firms had chosen p" = pt-1, which would imply t 
an anticipated rate of money growth equal to zero; the government's best response 
would be given by the solution to the following minimisation problem: 
2 
Alin Qt (1 - A) 
Nt - 1ý 
No 
fit - fit -i 
fit- i 
(6.25) 
nm Given pt , the 
first order condition implies that E, the proportional deviation 
i 
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away from the level of money supply anticipated by the non-maximising firms, which 
is proportional to the price that they set, should be chosen according to" 
aQt 2A [p nm (1 + pt_l t nm(l + 
P2 
A 
t-I 
+ 
2(l - A) k*-'/ck 
No2 e(W*)(l-, 3) e(W*(l + 
k *-11CL 
e(w*)(1-0) e(w*(l +E 
1 1+, 30-0 e(w*)'-Oo e(w ae al7v 
1+Ea e(w*)('-, 3) - e(w*(l + acv ac 
= 
The solution p't' = pt-1, which would deliver zero inflation, can be proved not to 
be an equilibrium because the government can be better-off by choosing a positive 
monetary surprise, c>0. Analytically, 
ae 6=0 
2 Afit (1 - 3) 0 (fit - fit- 1) 
P2 
t-1 
2(l - A) 
No -N 
No 
1+00-0 + O)o < 
07 
aI 
(6.26) 
when p" i. e., when the rate of money growth anticipated 
by the non- 
t 
"Here, we assume that p" is fixed. Although this is not true for all values of 6, it will be true t 
locally, around the value of c anticipated by the non-maximising firms. 
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maximising firms, which equals zero, is fulfilled. 
163 
If the sociar misery index is decreasing locally, around the rate of money growth 
anticipated by the non-maximising firms, the government can improve social welfare 
by choosing an E>0. Given that this is the case when the non-maximising firms 
anticipate a rate of money growth equal to zero, a non- inflationary strategy cannot be 
sustained in the equilibrium. The traditional time consistency problem would arise 
as the - policy-maker cannot credibly commit to a zero inflation policy rule. Hence, 
the near-rational firms must assure themselves that the monetary authority will not 
systematically inflate by choosing a level of prices different to pt-1. In particular, 
the non-maximising firms would choose pnm =D such that the government had tA) 
no incentives not to fulfill their expectations, i. e., such that the government had no 
incentives not to choose an E equal to zero. The monetary authority should choose 
the rate of money growth anticipated by the non-maximising firms, i. e., the following 
condition should be satisfied: 
6=0 
2Afit(I - 0)0(fit - fit-1) 
-2 Pt-i 
2(l - A) 
No -N 
No 
l+OO-0 
+ ý(1 ý)o 
1a1 
(6.27) 
Taking the Positive root for this expression, one can wrl e 
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-D Pt-1 + Vjjt2-j - Pt =-2 (6.28) 
where 
A) [1+00-0 + 0(1 - 0)0] (No - (6.29) No A(I - 0)0 
Given that 
1+00-0 
+ 0(i - O)o > 0) (6.30) a 
and also that, by assumption from monopolistically produced output, 
No -9< 07 (6-31) 
A can be proved to be smaller than zero, A<0, so that -D is higher than pt-1. In Pt 
the presence of near-rational behaviour, a zero inflation policy could not be sustained 
as an equilibrium. By choosing p" = -D the near-rational firms would be trying t Pt 7 
to assure that the monetary authority did not systematically inflate. " If the policy- 
12 Note that, from Equation (6.28) above, if pn, = pD was an equilibrium, it would imply that tt 
the non-maximising firms' anticipated rate of money growth equalled: 
Mt = Mt-l 1+( 
vl-l --4A 
_1)]I 
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maker were to choose a level of prices abovepD, t i. e., an E>0, he would achieve 
a positive output stimulation equivalent, in terms of welfare, to the cost of bearing 
higher inflation. Thus, although the model retains the properties for non-neutrality of 
money, the monetary authority would always prefer not to generate any inflationary 
surprise. 
Before explaining why also pD cannot be sustained as an equilibrium, for small val- t 
ues of -y, let us read in more detail Equations (6.28) and (6.29) above. Equation (6.29) 
suggests that, if menu costs were extremely large, the size of the inflationary bias 
would decrease with A, the monetary authority's concern about inflation, and would 
increase with 
No -N the employment loss due to the labour market distortion (in No ' 
our case, monopolistic competition). The size of the inflation bias would also increase 
with the value of P, the fraction of non-maximising firms, since non-maximising firms 
increase the marginal benefit of a monetary surprise. Indeed, if ý equalled 1 and all 
firms were non-maximisers, the short-run aggregate supply curve would be horizontal 
and the inflationary bias would tend to infinity. If the short-run aggregate supply 
curve was horizontal, i. e., ý=1, the marginal cost of a monetary expansion would 
be always zero and there would be no finite value for -D in the absence of precom- Pt 
mitment. This is) of course, the justification for having maximising firms in addition 
to non-maximising firms. 
and that the non-maximising firms'expectations were realised, c=0. 
6.3 CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS 166 
It is important to note that, as -y does not appear in Equation (6-28), fit' would 
not depend upon the size of the cost of changing nominal variables. The intuition for 
this is clear: if costs of changing nominal wages and prices were taken into account, 
nominal rigidities could be explained. Given the nominal rigidity, the monetary au- 
thority would be ex-post tempted to inflate. A positive 7, therefore, would only 
explain why a positive monetary surprise, c>0, as long as sufficiently small not to 
violate Equation (6.22) above, might lead to a positive marginal benefit. 
The real menu cost -ý - alternatively, the degree of irrationality of the firm - would 
measure by how much the monetary authority can surprise the non-rational firms. 
But the monetary authority's decision on how much to inflate would not depend upon 
the size of -y, but upon the marginal costs and marginal benefits derived from such an 
inflation. At pD I the marginal cost 
from further inflation equals its marginal benefit, 
in terms of output expansion. These variables, however, depend upon the parameters 
in the social loss function and upon the factors affecting the elasticity of output with 
respect to inflation - e. g., the fraction of non-maximising firms - not upon the costs 
of changing prices. 
6.3.2 The non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies 
As mentioned before, the strategy pD does not constitute an equilibrium 
for small 
values of 7. In contrast with other examples of monetary policy games, 
in our frame- 
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work the real costs of changing nominal variables have been accounted for. By doing 
so, our model differs from others in that the government can force the non-maximising 
firms to revise prices. If -y is a finite value, the government could always choose an 
appropriate rate of money growth, which not only did not fulfill the non-maximising 
firms' expectations, but which also forced them to revise their prices. The latter 
possibility has been, to our knowledge, always ruled out in monetary policy games. 
Assuming infinite costs of revising prices, the government is left only with the op- 
tion of to fulfill or not to fulfill the non-maximising firms expectations. Given that 
a surprise is normally too costly for the government, the policy-maker always ends 
up fulfilling the firms' expectations. Clearly, for very large values of -ý, p' could be 
sustained as an equilibrium. However, this will not be the case when the costs of 
changing prices and money wages are sufficiently small. 
For small values of -y, the government would like to deviate from PD, had the 
non-rational firms decided such a price. In particular, if pnm = pD, a deviation away tt 
from the rate of money growth anticipated by the non-maximising firms equal to: 
1 --4 AI 
2 
would be equivalent to Mt = Mt-, - see footnote 10 - and would force the 
firms to 
revise if, at that point, the condition (6.22) above was violated. 
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For small values of -y, the government will always prefer to choose: 
Vl- --4A I 
2 2] 
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By choosing Mt = Mt-1, the government could keep prices constant at pt-1, so as to 
avoid the losses of the inflation bias, while, in either case, output would be at the 
natural rate. " This solution is not, thus, an equilibrium, since the non-maximising 
firms do not have their expectations fulfilled. 
Similarly, any level of prices different to ptD cannot be sustained as an equilibrium 
in pure strategies, since for any pnm =A ptD the government would find it optimal to t 
choose a positive deviation away from the rate of money growth anticipated by the 
non-maximising firms, i. e., a positive monetary surprise, E>0, as stated in Equa- 
tion (6.27); the government will find it optimal to deviate locally (without triggering 
the menu cost) from the level of prices anticipated by the non-maximising firms. 
Hence, the rational expectations condition would be violated, as the non-maximising 
firms get their expectations wrong. In summary, an equilibrium in pure strategies 
might not exist, when real costs of changing nominal variables are incorporated into 
monetary policy games. 
13jt should be pointed out that the government does not take into account the cost of changing 
nominal variables in its social loss function. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
In recent years, new Keynesian economists have made much progress on explain- 
ing the rationality of less than fully rational behaviour. It has been demonstrated 
that near-rational economic agents might choose to create nominal rigidities. Antic- 
ipated money supply changes may cause fluctuations in business activity provided 
that agents are willing to incur very small losses. Furthermore, if monopolistic firms 
face some cost of changing prices, they may decide to revise prices only when the 
opportunity costs of not doing so are sufficiently large. 
The literature, however, has not paid enough attention to the problems that both 
near- rationality and fixed costs of changing prices present for the credibility problem 
of monetary policy. Somehow, costs of changing prices or near-rational behaviour 
have been assumed to explain the nominal rigidities presented in all the papers about 
the time consistency problem of monetary policy. But, to our knowledge, they have 
never been incorporated into the analysis. This chapter attempts to do so. 
Rather than assuming nominal rigidities, we have borrowed one of the best-known 
frameworks for the explanation of the rigidity of prices. Then, we have incorporated 
the credibility Problem of monetary policy to the analysis. From a theoretical point of 
view, near-rational behaviour seems to open a new spectrum of problems in monetary 
policy games. What we have shown is that combining microfoundations for nominal 
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rigidities and credibility problems may. lead to the non-existence of an equilibrium in 
pure strategies. It would be very interesting to find out whether an equilibrium in 
mixed strategies can be found. But this is a question that we shall leave for further 
research. 
7 Conclusions 
Chapter 7 
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Keynesian economics have been characterised as the economics of nominal (and real) 
rigidities, where the role for monetary policy stabilisation can be justified and mon- 
etary policy intervention called for. 
On the other hand, New classical economists typically insist on the need to reduce 
monetary stabilisation to its minimum. This is because, in the presence of nominal 
rigidities, a monetary authority that is concerned over, let us say, employment has 
incentives to create monetary surprises. As a result, in order to control this credibility 
problem, the monetary authority should focus on the control of inflation, without 
further considerations. 
But when supply-side shocks are considered, the policy-maker would like to retain 
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some flexibility to stabilise output. In recent years an important amount of research 
has been undertaken in order to design central bank constitutions that may solve 
these incentive problems but that, at the same time, allow the central banker to 
stabilise output optimally. 
What we have shown in this thesis is that the microeconomic details of wage 
- and price - setting not only affect the costs (benefits) of credible disinflationary 
(inflationary) policy, but that they need to be considered to determine whether those 
disinflationary (inflationary) policies can be perceived as credible or not. 
This idea has been illustrated with two main examples: 
First, we have presented an economy where unemployment persistence could be 
generated if only employed insiders mattered for wage setting. In Chapter 3 it has 
been shown how the benefits of output stabilisation seriously increase when there 
is serial correlation in output. With output persistence, however, a small increase 
in current inflation not only increases today's output but also future levels since 
output benefits persist. The credibility problem of monetary policy is, therefore, 
enhanced in the presence of output persistence. Moreover, unemployment persistence 
appears to add significantly to the already difficult implementation of some monetary 
constitutions. The suitability of different central bank constitutions has been analysed 
in Chapter 4. We have emphasised the difficulties that a country like Spain, with a 
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A second mechanism of introducing wage setting dynamics has been presented 
in Chapter 5, where long-term staggered wage setting is taken into account. Once 
again, the microeconornic details of wage setting add significance to the time con- 
sistency problem of the optimal monetary policy. Period by period precommitment 
to zero inflation is not sufficient to eliminate the inflationary bias of the economy, if 
workers are setting wage contracts that last for more than a period. Allowing for long- 
term precommitment leads us to the result that, even in a deterministic framework, 
commitment to zero inflation policies may not be credible. Furthermore, as suggested 
by Drazen and Masson (1994), following a tough monetary policy in the presence of 
unemployment persistence may actually harm rather than enhance credibility, if the 
public perceives that the government will not be able to ignore pressures to restore 
high employment in the future. 
A different but still related result has been shown in Chapter 6. We have inves- 
tigated how the introduction of microfoundations that allow us to explain nominal 
rigidities affect the credibility problem of monetary policy. We have shown that there 
is no equilibrium in pure strategies when near-rationality or, alternatively, costs of 
changing prices are incorporated into monetary policy games. 
There are various lessons to be learnt. First, the microfounclations of wage - and 
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price - setting are too important to be ignored at the time of designing efficient 
resolutions to the credibility problem of monetary policy. Not only are the costs and 
the benefits of anti-inflationary policy strictly related to the market structure of the 
economy, but so also are the incentives tempting the monetary authority to inflate. 
It is, therefore, dangerous to disregard the market structure of the economy when 
recommendations for central bank institutional design are being given. 
Second, the empirical literature on central bank independence should be carefully 
revised. To our knowledge, no empirical work takes into account the peculiarities 
of the market structure of the economy, when measuring the institutional success in 
controlling inflation across countries. For example, a central banker with a certain 
degree of conservativeness would perform very differently in two different countries, 
if those countries happened to have very different labour markets. Third, the intro- 
duction of special characteristics of market structure raises general doubts about the 
inconsistency model, as a positive theory of macroeconomic policy. The literature on 
the time consistency problem of the optimal monetary policy focuses on normative 
economics about what central banks should do, based upon behavioural assumptions, 
that may or may not capture what is happening in the real world. What appears to 
be missed in this literature is a more positive analysis of what central banks actually 
do. 
Finally, countries like Spain seem to have found ways to institute a reputation for 
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fighting inflation: the level of Spanish inflation does not correspond to that predicted 
in the literature for a country with such a highly distorted labour market. Reputa- 
tional effects may be significantly large, so that the optimal feedback policy could be 
implemented without too many difficulties. 
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A. 1 The Demand Effects in the Periphery of an Id- 
iosyncratic Supply Shock to the Core Country 
The results shown in Figure 3.1 can be derived formally from the following two country 
model (This is essentially a simplified version of Canzonerl and Henderson's analysis, 
to which the reader is referred for a more comprehensive treatment). 
Let the total money demand in the two countries, core and periphery, be denoted 
=py+p 
*y*7 (A. 1) 
where variables in the core country are labelled with an asterisk. Assuming both are 
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the same size, we can write this in terms of growth rates as follows 
gm =I (7r + gy) +1 (7r* + gy*), (A. 2) 22 
or 
gm- 
1 
(7r + X) +1 (7r *+X* ), (A. 3) 
where x denotes the percentage shift in output. 
Assuming both countries start in equilibrium, where y-9, and assuming also 
that 7r' = 7*' =0 we may write the short run supply curves as 
0(7r 
- 7T, 
) = 07r, 
(7r *- 7r *e +u*)= 0(7r* + U*), 
(A. 4) 
(A. 5) 
where u* is the idiosyncratic supply shock in the core, measured as a percentage of 
output in the core country. 
Let us assume that differential inflation shifts demand between the two areas, so 
gy - gy'. = CY 
(7r 
7r) (A-6) 
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and so in the short run 
Ce (7F 7F). 
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(A-7) 
Assume now that monetary policy is set so as to check inflation in the core country, 
i. e., it is as if policy has been delegated to a conservative central bank in the core 
country. For simplicity, assume 7r* - 0, so there is no inflation in the core country. 
Then, given from (A-5) that x* = Ou*, from (A. 4) and (A. 7) we find 
7r -ßu, 3 
(A. 8) 
ce + ß' 
and 
02 
u (A. 9) 
The growth of money demand in the two countries together can be obtained by 
substitution into (A. 3) to give 
gm =I10 U* +u*+ ou* I= 
202 + o(I + a) 
u *. (A. 10) 
2 a+O a +, 3 
1 
2(a + 0) 
1 
As an example, take the case where the supply curves have unit elasticity, 
0=1, 
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so 
gm 
3+ ce 
U* as a + a) 
. 10 
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(A. 1i) 
If, further, a=1 then gm = u* = x* = 2x, equalities used in Figure 3.1 to illustrate 
the consequences of an asymmetric adverse productivity shock (u* > 0). 
A-2 Optimal Delegation with Autoregressive Out- 
put 
In the absence of precommitment, with autoregressive output, the government del- 
egates monetary policy to a weight-conservative, myopic central banker. Such a 
policy-maker will set monetary policy so as to minimise: 
mt Ab 7rt 
2+ Ab) [kp - yt]2 y 
subject to 
Yt -yý:::::: p 
(yt_l + Ce(7t _ te) + Ut, 
(A. 12) 
(A. 13) 
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taking expected inflation, 7te, as given. Furthermore, ut is i. i. d. normal, with variance 
U2, and 1 ý-ý Ab ýý 0 measures the weight preferences of the central banker. U 
The central banker's reaction function is obtained as the first order condition to 
the problem above, which, after substituting 
1-Ab 
= 7, gives us: Ab 
7rt ::::: /a [kp - yt] - 
(A. 14) 
Substituting out Equation (A. 14) into (A. 12), the misery index at time t can be 
rewritten to read: 
mt = (i +a 
2 
"Y 
2) [ky- _ yt]2 . (A-15) 
Yet, substituting out Equation (A. 14) and 7rt' = -ya 
[(k - 1)YI into (A. 13), one can 
write 
I- (A-16) 
Yt -Y:::::::: P(Yt-1 + 1-+7oZ2Ut' 
Now, if we define: 
(1 OZ27) . (yt_l - 9) = 6t_l I 
(A-17) 
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the misery index can be written as: 
2 
. 
A/It + ce2 
2) (k 
2 I+ a 71 
where yt -y follows an autoregressive process 
(1 ce, -Y) - (yt - 9) = ft = Pft-l 
+ Ut. 
2 ut is i. i. d. normal with variance aul namely, 
07 
US, 
07 
2 au 7 
if 8> 
t7 
if s<t; 
if s S, and s, s' > t, 
if s S, and s, sl > t) 
where Ft contains all the information available at the beginning of period t. 
The expected misery index in infinite time horizon is defined as 
00 
E E( 
Mj I-TO)7 
j=o 
(I + op 
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(A-18) 
19) 
(A. 20) 
(A. 21) 
(A. 22) 
where 0 is a discount rate. 
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From (A-19), one finds 
Ej = /ý+l Et-l +p iuj-i. (A. 23) 
i=O 
Taking expectation conditional on the information at t-0, using (A-20), one 
derives 
E(Ejl, 'ro) = pý+lct-,. (A. 2 4) 
Using (A. 20), (A. 21) and (A. 23), the expectation of ej 2 becomes 
(621, )7 )= P2(j+1)62_1 +P 
2(j+l) 
u2 (A. 25) j0tp2-U, 
Using (A. 24) and (A. 25), the expectation of Mj becomes 
E (Mj I Fo) (I + Ce272) [(k - 1) 
29 2_ 2(k - 1) y pj+, Ct-l I+ a2 7 
p 2(j+l) 62 p 
2(j+l) 
_1 2]. + t-1 +, 07 (A. 26) 
(I + a2, y)2 + Ce2, y)2(, 02 U 
So 
z+ Ce272) ý(k - 
1)2y-2 
1+0 2(k - 1) P(l + 0) yet-1 
0+ Ce2, y) (1 +0- p) 
t-1 
(I + 0)2U2 2(l +0)62 
+p+u (A. 2 7) 
+ Ce2,. y)2 (I +0- p2) +a 27)20(1+0- p 
2-1. 
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When Et-, = 0, the above equation is simplified as 
1+0 (1 + 0)(7.2 
z J(k - 
1)2 y2+u+ Ce2 "Y 
2). (A. 28) 
0 (1 + a2, ý)2(1 +0- p2) 
Optimal -y** satisfies: 
az 
O, y -01 
or 
1- ** (I + O)or2 
+a23+0- 
p2)(k 
u 
1)29-2 
(A. 29) 
A-3 The optimal feedback rule with output per- 
sistence 
With output persistence, the optimal feedback rule for the inflation rate 
is derived as 
the solution to the problem 
V(yt-, - 9) = MM Et-, 
t7rt 2+ (kg _ yt)2 + öV(yt - Y) (A. 30) 
7rt 
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subject to 
Yt -y --:::: p (yt_ I+ a(7rt _ , te) + Ut, (A-31) 
and 
E t_, 7rt = 7, te, (A-32) 
where V(yt - 9) is obtained by an identical optimisation procedure at t+1. 
Moreover, we can denote as V(yt - 30+ #, (yt-I -+ 
202 (yt-I -y 
)2 the 
present discounted value of the misery index from t onwards, where the coefficients 
00,01 and02 need to be determined. ' 
The FOC to our problem implies: 
Et-1) [(k - I)y - p(yt-, - a(7rt - Et-17rt) - ut] 
6 ov (Yt - Y-) a (Yt - (A. 33) 
2 0(yt - Y) a7rt 
Taking expectations at t-I on (A. 33) implies 
7rt e= 07 (A. 34) 
'In Chapter 5 we describe this optimisation procedure in more detail. 
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so that the optimal rule is 
7rt =-(a+ 
2602 ) 
ut. 1+ a2 + 2Ce2602 
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(A-35) 
To solve our problem, 02 needs to be determined. The following condition needs 
to be satisfied 
V(Yt-l - 9) 
This implies, 
7 flo + ol (yt-I - 9) + 
202 (yt 
-1- 
y-) 
2 
= Et-I 
[7rt 2+ (ky- _ yt)2 + 6V(yt _ 9)] . (A-36) 
00 + ol (yt-I + 202(yt-, _ 9)2 -a- au 
2+ (k 292 
(I +a2 6p2)2 
2(yt_l 
_ -)2 + OrU2 
1- jp 22 
py(I+ 
Ce2 - 
jp2 
) 
- 2(k - 1)gp(yt-, - 9) + JOo + J01P(Yt-i - 
+ 2JO2 P2(yt_l _ 9)2 + 
jp 222 (I 
+ a2 - jp2 
) 
Ou 
Equalising coefficients in both sides of the previous expression, we obtain 
(A. 37) 
02 
-p 
(A-38) 
2(l - 6p2) 
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2(k - 1)pq 
1-6p 
and 
00 (k - 
1)292 +2a 
(1 + a2 6p2)2 
Therefore, substituting 02 into the expression for inflation leads to 
ce 
7t 6p2 + Ce2 
Ut' 
(A. 40) 
(A. 41) 
With output persistence, inflation is allowed to fluctuate more in order to stabilise 
199 
(A-39) 
Jp 22 
(1 + 2JO2) 
+ a2 - 6p2 
) 
output in the presence of supply-side shocks. 
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That the state variables pt-I and xt-, enter the wage setters' 
reaction function, and the value function, as the difference 
Pt-i - Xt-i :: -- Zt-i 
Let us, first, propose the following value function for the policy-maker: 
(Pt- 
17 Xt- 1) : -- 00 + V)lPt- 1+ 02 Xt- 1+ 03Pt- 1 Xt- I+ V)4Pt- 12 + 
V)5Xt- 12 7 
where pt-, and xt-, enter V(pt-1, xt-1) in a general form. 
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Let us also apply Bellman's principle of optimality which states, in this case, that 
V(pt-1, xt-1) = Min [(l _ 
A)(Vt ý)2 + A(pt - Pt-l 
)2 + 6V(ptý Xt)] (B. 2) 
Mt 
where pt and xt are the state variables of the system, and V(pt-1, xt-1) is the optimised 
value function for the policy-maker at time t, given the lagged value for the state 
variables. 
We will demonstrate that there is a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) where 
the state variables pt and xt enter into the value function in difference form, i. e., 
V(pt - xt) = V(zt). 
In particular, we will assume that V (pt, xt) =V (zt) in the right hand sid -I (RHS) 
of Equation (B. 2), so that V(zt) 
2A 
second assumption ::: -- 00 + 01 Zt-I + 02 Zt-i* 
will consist of substituting out xt in the RHS of (B. 2) by xt -: "::: aO + alZt-I + a2Pt-I- 
Finally, it will be shown that, after taking into account rational expectations on the 
part of the private sector, all this implies that the value function also takes the same 
form on the left hand side (LHS) of (B. 2). This, therefore, establishes that there 
exists a MPE such that V(pt, xt) = V(zt) - 
Although there may be other solutions to our problem, we only intend to show 
that there is one that takes the form we propose. 
Hence, we write: 
v(pt-1, Xt [(I _ 
A) (yt 
_ ý)2 +A 
(pt )2 + 6(00 + OlZt + 02 Z2)] 
-1) = 
Min - Pt-l t 
mt 
(B-3) 
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where 
[Pmt 
+1 (Xt + Xt-l) (B. 4) +p2 
Yt -i 
Imt 
-i (B. 5) 1+p2 
(xt + xt-')] ' 
as given in Equations (5-10) and (5.11). 
The monetary authority chooses mt so as to minimise the expression above, subject 
to the Equations (B. 4) and (B. 5), taking xt as given. We can, then, show that the 
first order condition (FOC) to (B. 3) implies: 
mt -- 2A(l + p) (I - A)ý - A(l + p)JpOl + 2AAp(l + p)pt-, (B. 6) 
2A(I + p)Jpo2xt -A [(A - 1) + Ap + 6pO21 
(xt + xt-1), 
where 
1 
2 (1 -A+ 
Ap2 + 6p2 02) 
The monetary authority treats xt as given. Yet, if we assume that 
xt ::: --- ao + alzt-I + a2Pt-1, 
(B. 7) 
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on the RHS of (B. 6), we can write: 
mt = 2A(I + p) (I - A)ý - A(l + p)Jpýj 
(B. 8) 
where 
Bceo + Cxt-, + Dpt-I + Bozlzt-1, 
1 
(I -A+ Ap2 + 6p2 ý2) ' 
A- [ý26p (I + 2p) +I-A- ApIl 
C= A- (1- A -Ap-026p), 
D=A- [(026p + pA) (I + 2p) +I- A]. 
Rational expectations on the wage setters' side imply, however, that they choose 
their wage contract according to: 
Xt 
A+ Pt+l (B. 9) 
2 
We shall, therefore, prove that the wage setters' reaction function given by Equa- 
tion (B. 7) satisfies rationality. 
Indeed, it can be shown, after substituing out Equations (B. 4), (B. 7) and (B. 8) 
into Equation (B. 9), that the parameters ao and a, entering the wage setters' reaction 
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function satisfy the rational expectations condition if: 
ceo = [2A(l + p) (I - A)pý - A(l 
+ P)jP2ý11 . 
1+1 
pD ++a, pB +- 
ceo 
22 2(l + p) I+p 2(l + p)2 
)I 
+ 
2pB +3+ PC - 
C" 
- a, PB +1- 
(pD 
+1+ ce, pB + 
c" 1( 
221+P22) 
and 
204 
(pB 
+ 
')l 
7 2 
cel = 
[(pB 
+I+ pC -21-a, pB) + (1 + P) 
(pD 
+2+a, PB +2)( 
OZ 
pB + 
')l 
- 2 
celzt-i +1 
2(l + p) 2(l + p)2 
1 
pD - 2(l + p) 
(2 
PD +I+ aiPB + 
al 
22 
P) Zt-l- 
I 
pD ---p zt-l 2 
Furthermore, for these values, ao and a,, the coefficient associated to pt-I will be 
simplified till it equals one. 
Having shown that there is a solution where xt may be written as a 
linear func- 
tion of zt-1 and pt-1 only, as stated in (B. 7), the next step will 
be to show that 
Mt = 'yo + ^ft Zt-I + 72 pt-1. Hence, reorganising 
terms in (B. 6), it can be written: 
mt = 2A(i + p)(i - A)ý - A(I + p)6pýj + 2AO26p(l + p)xt 
+A [(A - 1) + 
AP + 6P021 (Zt-1 - Xt) +A [2Ap(l + p) - (A - 1) - Ap - 
6P021 Pt-l- 
(B. 10) 
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Substituting out the expression for xt, as given in (B. 7), an expression for mt will 
arise such that: 
Mt :: -- 'Yo + 71 Zt- I+ Pt- iI 
where 
-yo = 2A(I + p) (I - A)ý - A(I + p)6pýj 
A [2MP(l + P) - (A - 1) - AP - 6021 001 
and 
-yi =A ý2ý26p(l + p) + [(A - 1) + AP + 6PO21 (1 ozi) I- 
(B. 11) 
(B. 12) 
(B. 13) 
Before showing that there exists a solution where pt-I and xt-I enter the monetary 
authority's value function in a difference form, let us stress that, now, 
(B. 4) can be 
read as 
pt =: PO + Ill Zt- I+ Pt- 11 
(B. 14) 
where 
ILO =-1 P-yo + 
ceo (B-15) 
I+p12 
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and 
Al = Pyl + (B. 16) 1+p2]' 
Also, yt in (B-5) can be expressed as yt = 77o + 77, zt-1, where 
I ao 
770 
+p 
IN 
-21 (B. 17) 
and 
1 
I+ p 
171 
-21- (B. 18) 
Finally, zt = pt - xt will look like 
zt = (ILo - ao) + (IL, - al)zt-1, (B-19) 
or, alternatively, 
Zt - Oo + olzt-17 
(B. 20) 
if 00 = po - ao and 01 yj - cei . 
Hence, having demonstrated that there is a solution to our problem where the 
real variables yt, zt can be written as a linear function of zt-1 only, and where the 
nominal variables, pt and mt, are linear functions of zt-1 and pt-1 only, it will be very 
simple to show that this all implies that the social value function is a linear cuadratic 
B. 1 PROOF 207 
function on zt-1 only. In fact, after substituting out Equations (B. 14), (B. 17), (B-20) 
into the RHS of Equation (B. 2), we obtain 
V(pt-1, xt-1) =MM(I - /\)(770 + 77IZt_l 
ý)2 + \(/_Io + /, L, Zt_1)2 
Mt 
600 + 601 (00 + 01 Zt-1) + J02 (00 + O, Zt_1)2). 
(B. 21) 
This, therefore, establishes that there exists a solution to our problem where pt-1 
and xt-1 enter the value function in a difference form, and such that: 
V(Zt-1) = 00 + OlZt-I + 02Z 
2 (B. 22) t-1) 
where 
ýo = (1 - A) (, t7o _ 
ý)2 +A M02 + 6po + ý100 + MO 
2), (B. 23) 
ol = (I - A)(770 - ý)771 + 
A[Lo[ll + 6(Ml + 0200007 (B. 24) 
and 
ý2 
--:::: 
(1 - AN 
2+ Ap, 2+602 012. (B. 25) 
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B. 2 The time consistent equilibrium 
B. 2.1 Solving for cel, 02 1 01 and ao 
Our consistency conditions lead to the following relationships 
For cel: 
(1+p+pD+! +ajpB+ýýlL (ajpB+2ý1--pC-l 
cel 
22)2 
(I + p) [2(l + p) - pC -1+a, pB + 22 
Making use of the relationship C+D=1, and simplifying, one can write 
(1 +PC 
1 2+p- pB) 
For02: 
I-A+ 2Ap2 
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(B. 26) 
I a, 
-I- P) 
2 
02 
+ P) 2A 
ýpD + aiPB +22 
+I (I-A) D- 
1+ 
ajB - 
Cel 
(I + P) 2222 
+ 
602 
pD +I- (a, ++ p) + apB + 
0" 
ýj + p)2 
122 ]# 
Using C+D=1, substituting a, and simplifying, one finds 
ý2 - A)A(l -A+A, 02) (B. 2 70 
(I -A+2A '02)2 
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For ao: 
[2(l + p) + pD +1+a, pB + 911 
ceo =22 [2(l + p) - pC + a, pB + 211 22 
x 
[2Ap(l 
- A)ý - A6 p2pl. 
+ Ceo 
(I+p 
that, after simplifying, becomes 
ao 
For 01: 
1- A+ 4Ap2 
2(A - 1) 
1+p 
I al 
- ajB 2 
[2A(l - A) - 1]ý - A6pOl + ceo 
(1+p)I 
2A (pC 
+1- 
a' 
- a, pB 1+p22 
x 
[2A(l 
- A)pý - A6 P2ý1 
+ ao 
+p 
)l 
601 I 
PC + 
( 
+ al(i + p) - 
C' 
a, pB -21 1+p 2 
2602 (PC +1 + al(i + p) - a, pB - 
C" 
2 +p 2 
x 2A(I - A)pý - MP201 
+ Ceo 
(pB + ý' 
_ I+P2 
After making some simplifications, following similar steps as 
before, 
209 
2A(l -A+ 3Ap2) [2p(l _ 
A)ý _ 
6p2p, + Ceo(I -A+ 26P2 
P2)] 
- (B. 2 8) N, AA ') 
2(l - A)A 
2 
C'O) (B. 29) 
-A+ 2Ap 2 
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As to obtain the reduced form for ao and 01, we resort to Mathematica: 
ceo =: 
(-l + A)(-l +A- 3/\p2)(1 -A+ 2/\p2 + 6Ap2)ý (B. 30) Ap (1 -A+ 2Ap2) (1 -6-A+ 6A + 2Ap2) 
and 
2(-l + A)Apý 
+ 
(1 
_ /\)2(_l +A- 3A p2) (1 -A+ 2Ap2 + 
jl\p2) 
(B. 31) 
I-A+ 2Ap2 p(l -A+ 
2Ap2)2 (1 -6-A+ 6A + 2Ap2) 
B. 2.2 Looking for the steady state 
B. 2.2.1 The equilibrium inflation rate 
, pt =pt-, 
+k and In the steady state, it must be satisfied that xt = xt-1 + k. 
zt-, = zt, where k represents the inflationary bias associated with the steady state. 
Hence, making use of Equations (5-13) and (5.14), one can write 
zt =A- Xt = Pt - ao - celzt-i - Pt-l- (B. 3 2) 
Therefore, substituting out Equation (5.23) and simplifying, 
2ol ao 
I- 
zt = 2Ap(l - A)ý - A6p + -(pB -- P). 
(B. 33) 
1+p2 
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The reduced form for the state variable is obtained, once again, with resort to Math- 
ematzca: 
Zt 
(-l + A)ý(l -A+ 2Ap2 + JAp2) 
2Ap [I -A+ 2Ap, 6 + (A - 1)6] 
(B. 34) 
On the other hand, given that Equation (5.7) implies that, in the steady state, 
one can write 
Xt 
pt +pt +k (B 
.3 5) 2 
Zt 
k (B. 36) 
2 
which leads to 
k 
A)ý(l -A+ 2A p2 + 
jAp2) 
(B. 37) 
Ap[l -A+ 2AP 
2 +(A - 1)6] 
B. 2.2.2 The equilibrium level of output 
With regard to the expression for output, one needs to substitute the steady state 
value of zt, as given in Equation (B-33), into Equation 
(5.24), which yields, 
1-A+3, Xo 2 [2A(l - yt :: --::: -f-- 2 1-A+4, \p 
+ 
ao Ap 2B Ap 
l+P 
(21-A+4, 
\p2 7(1-- A+4 
Substituting out the expressions for ao and B, one can get 
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A(I A+ 3Ap 2) [2(l - A)ý - 6poll I A+4Ap 2 
+ -1 
+A- 4Ap2 - Ap + 2A(I -A+ 3Ap2)(02 6p + 2026p2 +I_A_ AP) 
(1 + p)(I -A+ 4Ap2) 
1-A+ 4Ap 2 
x1-A+ 
4Ap 2- 2A(l -A+ 3Ap2) (I -A+ 2026p2) 
x 
A(l -A+ 3Ap2) [2p(l _ 
A)ý 
_ 
jP2ý1] 
I-A+ 4Ap2 
I- 
Given that, 
p [-l +A- 4AP2 - Ap+ 2A(l -A+ 
3AP2) (o 2 
jp +202 6P2 +IA- Ap)] 
- (1+p) [I-A+4A P2 - 2A(i - A+ 
3AP2) (I 
-A+202 
6p2)] 
Yt = (B. 38) 
B. 2.3 The response of the equilibrium inflation rate to changes 
in the structural parameters 
The derivatives of the steady state inflationary bias with respect to 
A, ý, py6 can 
be calculated by resorting to computing techniques. 
Hence, 
D[k, A] 
A)2 + 4Ap2(l - A) + 4A 
2p4 + 2jA2p4 
A2P(l -6-A+ JA + 
2Ap2)2 
(B. 39) 
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A) (I -A+ 2Ap2 + jAp2) 
Ap(l -6-A+ 6A + 2Ap2) 
213 
(B. 40) 
[k, p] = Ap 2(1- 6-A+ JA + 2Ap2)2 
X [(, _ A)2(_l + 6) - 4AP2(l _ A) _ 6p2A(l + 6)(1 _ A) - 
2A2P4 (2 + 6)] < 07 
and 
D[k, J] 
(1 _ A)ý [(I _ A)2 + 3Ap2(l - 
A) + 2A2 p 4] > 0. (B. 41) 
Ap(i -6-A+ 6A + 2Ap2) 
B. 3 PRECOMMITMENT TO Mt 
B. 3 Precommitment to Tnt 
B. 3.1 Solving for the equilibrium 
214 
Here we present the Mathematica programme designed to obtain the FOC to our 
problem - Equations (5.25) - (5.28) -, and the set of expressions (5.29) - (5.32). 
(*The model is composed of the following equations below*) (*Here 1 appended 
means t-I and o is objective loss function*) 
yt := (I + rho) - (-l) (mt - (xt + xtl)/2); 
pt := (I + rho) - (-I) (rho mt + (xt + xtl)/2); 
o := (1 - lambda) (yt - ys) ^2+ lambda (pt - ptl) -2+ delta betO + delta betl 
zt + delta bet2 zt - 2; 
zt := pt - xt; 
xt := alphaO +alphal ztl + alpha2 (mt - xtl) + ptl; 
(*Solving for the optimal money supply rule, the F. 0. C. implies*) 
money = Solve[D[o, mt]==O, mt] >> mt; 
(*Yet, we are interested in a policy rule of the following form: gammaO + gammal 
ztI + ptI. Therefore, we calculate: *) 
MONEY = money /. xtl -> ptl - ztl >> MONEY; 
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gamma22 = D[MONEY, ptl] >> gamma22; 
gamma2 = Simplify [gamma22] >> gamma2; 
(*As expected, gamma2 is equal to one*) 
gammal = D[MONEY, ztl] >> gammal; 
gammaO == MONEY /. pti -> 0, ztl -> 0 >> gammaO; 
MT = gammaO + gammal ztl + ptl >> MT; 
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(*From here onwards, we rewrite the expressions for output, inflation, the wage 
contract and the state variable as a function of zt1 only*) 
(*yt must be equal to an expression of the form yt = psiO + psil ztl*) 
output = yt /. xt -> alphaO + alphal ztl + alpha2 (mt - xtl) + ptl >> output; 
outputl = output /. xtl -> ptl - ztl >> outputl; 
output2 = outputl /. mt -> MT >> output2; 
null = D[output2, ptl]-, 
nullo = Simplify[null] >> nullo; 
(*This derivative equals zero. Homogeneity properties are, therefore, satisfied. *) 
psill = D[output2, ztl] >> psill; 
psil = Simplify[psill] >> psil; 
B. 3 PRECOMMITMENT TO Mt 
psiO = output2 /. ztl -> 01 ptl -> 0 >> psio; 
OUTPUTt = psiO + psil ztl >> OUTPUTt; 
(*With respect to prices*) 
price = pt /. xt -> alphaO + alphal Al + alpha2 (mt - xtl) + ptl >> price-, 
priceO = price /. xtl -> ptl - ztl >> priceO; 
priceOO = priceO /. mt -> MT >> priceOO; 
theta22 = D[priceOO, pti] >> theta22; 
theta2 = Simplify [theta221 >> theta2; 
(*As we expected, theta2 is equal to one*) 
thetal = D[priceOO, ztl] >> thetal; 
thetaO = priceOO /. ztl -> 0, ptl -> 0 >> thetaO; 
PRICEt = thetaO + thetal ztl + ptl >> PRICEt; 
INFLATIONt = PRICEt - pti >> INFLATIONt; 
(*With respect to the contract*) 
contract = xt /. mt -> MT, xtl -> ptl - ztl >> contract; 
alpO - contract /. ztj -> 0, ptl -> 0 >> alpO; 
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alpl === D[contract, ztll >> alpl; 
B-3 PRECOMMITMENT TO Mt 
CONTRACTt = alpO+ alpi ztl + ptl >> CONTRACTt; 
(*With respect to the state variable*) 
statvar = PRICEt - CONTRACTt >> statvar; 
pmuO = statvar /. ztl -> 01 ptl -> 0 >> muO; 
mul = D[statvar, ztll >> mul; 
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STATVARt = muO + mul ztl >> STATVARt-, 
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B. 3.2 Solving for ao,, cell, Ce27,01, and02 ) 
Under commitment, our consistency conditions lead to the following relationships: 
02' 
2p (B. 42) 
I+ 2p' 
a,, -13 
(B. 43) 
aol 
(i - A) (I + P) (B. 44) 
2Ap(1+2p) 
(-l + A) (I -A+ 8Ap2)ý (B. 45) 
2p (I -A+ 4Ap2) 
02 
A (1 - A) 
2 
(B. 46) 
I- A+ 4Ap 
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C-1 How to obtain Equation (6.13) 
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Setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to pm equal to zero, given 
wm = w* and p, one can write 
arl 77 w 1+ 77-1 1 -1 - 
IL 
m cc 
OPM 
Pm + (e) pa 
MCC 
p 
p 
1-77 ce 
Hence, 
a-12 I)m 
* 
cý e(W*)a p77-2+la 
17 
p 
M-1+77- a (C. 2) 
w 77 
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Then, given that p- = pml-Op nm6 and making use of 
77 ], 
(C-3) 
a e(w*) 
it follows 
ct -1 0(17-2+ 1`7 M 
17 
-1+77+(0- 1)(17-2+ 
1 
ct 
77 ) 
(k*M) -- po cl p (C. 4) 
If M= Mo (I + E) and k*A1[o = po, 
or 111- 77 - 1+77+ (0- 1) (77- 2+ 
1- 77 ) 
po ck 
+, 3(77-2+ lQ+ 
E) 
"'CZ 
pM 
Ck Ck (C. 5) 
Note that 
-77 
-I+, q + 1)(77 -2+ (C-6) aaaa 
and 
2+1 77 ) == 1+077-20+ 
0 Oq I. 
Therefore, one can simplify this expression to look like 
Po(i + oll (C. 7) 
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where 
0 a)/a < 1. (C-8) 
+ 1) + (i - 0)(i - a)/a - 
C. 2 How to obtain Equation (6.18) 
First, we define the average level of employment as the following geometric mean, 
N13 N. 1-0. (C. 9) 
nm m 
Given the production function in Equation (6.2), one can write 
I/a y I/a Yým m (C. 10) 
e(wm) e(wm) 
From the demand curve for each type of firm, Equation (6.1), it follows that, in 
the short run, 
I lo [ P. -77 Mý (I + E) 
O/a 
le(w*(l 
+ c)-(1-0)0) Po(l + f)(1-O)o PO (1+ 6) (1 O)o 
[11 -ý3 Po(i + 6), ] -" 0/10 
(1 + E) 
e(w*) 
] IN 
(I + cyl-mo Po(i + 6)(l-, 
3)0- 
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Or 
MO(i + 6) 
Po(l + 
I 
e(w*)'-O - e(w*(l + 
e(w*), -O - 
Thus, given the firm's long run labour demand, 
No = 
k*-'/a 
e(w*) 
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(Cii) 
the non-neutrality of money implies that the elasticity of employment with respect 
to changes in the money supply is not zero. This elasticity can be calculated as, 
a (NI I No) (1 + 00 - O)e(w*)(1 +, E)1(1+00-0)/01-1 e e(w*(l + C) (W*)' aE Cee 
e(W*)(I + E)(l+, 30-0)1ce 
e, (w* )1-, 
30 
e(W*(, + 
e(W*)2(1-0) - e(W*(l + E)-(I-, 
3)0)20 
where i7v = w*(l + so that '9-ý = -(I - O)Ow*(l + 49C 
Applying the envelope theorem', we evaluate the differential at c=0, where 
w* = fv. Then7 making use of 
ae(w*) W* 
, 9w* e(w*) 
(I + 1E)(1+00-0)/a 
'See Varian (1979). 
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one obtains 
(9 (IV/No) 1 1+00-0 
I- 
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ß(i - ß)o > 0. (C. 12) 
E=o 
